

LANGUAGE POLICY IN EDUCATION AND ETHNIC  
RELATIONS IN CATALONIA, (1993-96)

Kate Miller

A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD  
at the  
University of St Andrews



2001

Full metadata for this item is available in  
St Andrews Research Repository  
at:

<http://research-repository.st-andrews.ac.uk/>

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

<http://hdl.handle.net/10023/14520>

This item is protected by original copyright

**LANGUAGE POLICY IN EDUCATION AND ETHNIC RELATIONS IN**  
**CATALONIA (1993-96)**

**KATE MILLER**

**PHD IN MODERN LANGUAGES**  
**UNIVERSITY OF ST ANDREWS**  
**DECEMBER 2001**





ProQuest Number: 10171034

All rights reserved

INFORMATION TO ALL USERS

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.



ProQuest 10171034

Published by ProQuest LLC (2017). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author.

All rights reserved.

This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code  
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.

ProQuest LLC.  
789 East Eisenhower Parkway  
P.O. Box 1346  
Ann Arbor, MI 48106 – 1346

Tr  
E 184

## Declarations

- (i) I, Kate Miller, hereby certify that this thesis, which is approximately 80 000 words in length, has been written by me, that it is the record of work carried out by me and that it has not been submitted in any previous application for a higher degree.

Date 12/12/01          signature of candidate

- (ii) I was admitted as a research student in October 1992 and as a candidate for the degree of PhD in October 1997; the higher study for which this is a record was carried out in the university of St. Andrews between 1992 and 2001.

Date 12/12/01          signature of candidate

- (iii) I hereby certify that the candidate has fulfilled the conditions of the Resolution and Regulations appropriate for the degree of PhD in the University of St. Andrews and that the candidate is qualified to submit this thesis in application for that degree.

Date 12/12/01          signature of supervisor

In submitting this thesis to the University of St. Andrews I understand that I am giving permission for it to be made available for use in accordance with the regulations of the University Library for the time being in force, subject to any copyright vested in the work not being affected thereby. I also understand that the title and abstract will be published, and that a copy of the work may be made and supplied to any bona fide library or research worker.

Date 12/12/01          signature of candidate

## **ABSTRACT**

This thesis is the result of research into the impact on the population of Catalonia of Catalan normalisation policies ('normalisation' in this context refers to the Catalan Government's intention to return Catalan to its rightful place as Catalonia's own language) in education in terms of language behaviour and ethnic relations. Chapter one focuses on the concepts of Bilingualism and Diglossia and how they have been employed in the Catalan context. Chapter two is a review of the relevant literature related to the Catalan situation. Chapter three is a narrative account of the political context of the period under study. Chapter four describes the methodologies and the results obtained from the fieldwork. Chapter five summarises the contributions of the preceding chapters, clarifies the grounded theory generated by this research project and draws conclusions.

The theory and methods used to investigate this topic are drawn from sociolinguistics and psycholinguistics, sociology and social anthropology, resulting in a multidisciplinary approach to the material. The wider political context of the Spanish state as a whole is thought to be a crucial factor to be considered in the investigation of ethnic relations within the autonomous region of Catalonia. The relationship between the central state and the region of Catalonia as history has unfolded has had its impact on the modern context of democracy and autonomy. The language attitudes and relations between members of the ethnolinguistic groups in Catalonia are a product of struggles and experiences that have been shared over generations.

The fieldwork for this thesis was carried out primarily in Igualada at the beginning of 1993, shortly after the general election when the Socialists lost their overall majority. The research methodologies were qualitative in nature and consisted of: a report on newspaper debates and public discourse concerning the political context of the implementation of language policy. Private discourses were researched by interviews with teachers, pupils and parents associated with the three secondary schools in Igualada, observation of linguistic interaction both in the school environment and in a variety of social contexts, and participation observation of everyday life.

The results and conclusions include a discussion of the evidence that the power relationship between the Castilian and Catalan ethnolinguistic groups is of importance to the success enjoyed by policies aimed at the 'normalisation' of the Catalan language. However, it is pointed out that, far from being stable or predictable, the situation of language and ethnic competition is changing and dynamic.

## **Acknowledgements**

First, I would like to thank my supervisor, Dr. Fowler, for his support and encouragement. Many thanks to all my family and friends who have helped and encouraged me in so many different ways. I would particularly like to thank Manuel Morales Pérez and my sons David and Daniel for their seemingly endless patience and providing me with the motivation to finish.

## CONTENTS

### LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

INTRODUCTION	1
CHAPTER ONE: BILINGUALISM OR DIGLOSSIA	6
1.1 Introduction	6
1.2 Bilingualism and diglossia: a theoretical perspective	7
1.3 Bilingualism and Diglossia in Catalonia: an historical perspective	21
1.4 Conclusion	29
CHAPTER TWO: THE DYNAMICS OF ETHNIC RELATIONS IN CATALONIA	31
2.1 Language, identity and power relations	32
2.2 Strategies for change	72
2.3 Strategies for change in Catalonia	76
CHAPTER THREE: THE DECLINE OF THE SOCIALISTS AND RISE OF THE CATALAN NATIONALISTS	83
3.1 The collapse of <i>UCD</i> and rise of <i>PSOE</i>	84
3.2 The Socialist government loses its overall majority	88
3.3 <i>PSOE</i> starts negotiations with the Nationalists	89
3.4 The backlash to the Catalans' power	94
3.5 The <i>Generalitat's</i> response to the debate on language policy	97
3.6 The Socialist government faces many corruption scandals	102
3.7 The European and Andalusian elections	103
3.8 Pujol as representative of Catalonia	105
3.9 Local and regional elections prove hazardous for the Socialists	108
3.10 The Catalan nationalists waver in their support of the government	111
3.11 The Socialists face further corruption scandals	113

3.12 The European Presidency buys time for González	115
3.13 Pujol breaks the pact with González	119
3.14 The opposition prepares for the coming general election	120
<b>CHAPTER FOUR: ETHNOGRAPHIC STUDY OF LANGUAGE POLICY</b>	<b>127</b>
<b>IN SECONDARY EDUCATION IN IGUALADA</b>	
4.1 Introduction	127
4.2 Discussion on methodological approaches	130
4.3 Description of methodologies used in ethnographic research	141
4.4 The interviews	150
Teachers	150
Students	153
Parents	154
4.5 Observation of linguistic interaction in the classroom	155
4.6 Observation of linguistic interaction in a variety of social settings	156
4.7 Results	157
Interviews with teachers	158
Interviews with students	170
Interviews with parents	174
Observation of Classroom Interaction	176
Observation of linguistic interaction in a variety of social settings	180
4.8 Conclusion	183
<b>CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSIONS</b>	<b>185</b>
5.1 Preliminaries	185
5.2 Summary of previous chapters	185
5.3 Summary of theoretical perspective	187
5.4 Conclusions drawn from the case study	203



<b>5.6 General Conclusions</b>	<b>208</b>
<b>Bibliography</b>	<b>219</b>
<b>Appendix</b>	<b>234</b>

## **LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS**

<i>AP</i>	<i>Alianza Popular</i>
<i>CDC</i>	<i>Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya</i>
<i>CDS</i>	<i>Centro Democrático y Social</i>
<i>CiU</i>	<i>Convergència i Union</i>
<i>DC</i>	<i>Democrazia Cristiana</i> , (the Italian Christian democrats).
<i>ERC</i>	<i>Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya</i> (the Catalan Republican Left)
<i>IC</i>	<i>Iniciativa per Catalunya</i> (the Catalan section of <i>Izquierda Unida</i> )
<i>IU</i>	<i>Izquierda Unida</i>
<i>IRPF</i>	<i>Impuesto sobre la Renta de las Personas Físicas</i>
<i>LOAPA</i>	<i>Ley Orgánica de Armonización del Proceso Autonómico</i>
<i>PCE</i>	<i>Partido Comunista de España</i>
<i>PNV</i>	<i>Partido Nacionalista Vasco</i>
<i>PSC</i>	<i>PSOE</i> in Catalonia
<i>PSOE</i>	<i>Partido Socialista Obrero Español</i>
<i>PSUC</i>	<i>Partido Socialista Unificado de Catalunya</i>
<i>UDC</i>	<i>Unió Democràtica de Catalunya</i>
<i>UGT</i>	<i>Unión General de Trabajadores</i>

## INTRODUCTION

The research for this thesis was carried out with the objective of investigating three aspects of language attitudes in the Catalan context. These are: firstly, the attitudes of both the Catalan and the Castilian ethnolinguistic groups to the policies of Catalan language normalisation; secondly, the effect these policies might be having on attitudes of each ethnolinguistic group to the other; and, thirdly, how language attitudes to Catalan and Castilian might influence the process of normalization.

Policies implemented by the *Generalitat*, the autonomous government of Catalonia, aimed at promoting the use of Catalan in all aspects of life were a product of the political and economic circumstances of Catalonia over a period of time. The period prior to the civil war had seen considerable gains for Catalan political institutions, followed by the repression of the Franco dictatorship, then the period of transition to democracy – all of which had encompassed some dramatic changes in the balance of power between the region and the state. The success of the *Generalitat*'s policies on Catalan normalisation will depend on how the ethnolinguistic groups in Catalonia interact on a daily basis and the extent to which both groups change their patterns of communication as a result of these policies. The political circumstances and balance of power between the ethnolinguistic groups will influence the patterns of interaction between members of both groups and therefore the overall outcome of the process of normalisation. The Language Normalisation Act for Catalonia (1983) states that: 'The restoration of Catalan to its rightful place as Catalonia's own language is the unquestionable right and duty of the Catalan people and must be respected and protected.'<sup>1</sup> This assertion is put in fairly strong language: the recovery of the Catalan language is considered by those in power in Catalonia to be of fundamental

---

<sup>1</sup> Language Normalisation Act for Catalonia (1983) reproduced and translated in Webber, J. and Strubell i Trueta, M., The Catalan Language: Progress Towards Normalisation, (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press Ltd, 1991), p. 56.

importance to the reconstruction of Catalonia. The implication of this assertion is that those that do not comply with the aims of normalisation are in fact acting in an anti-Catalan manner.

This thesis focuses on the years 1993–96, when the Socialist central government was maintaining power by virtue of the support of the Catalan nationalist autonomous government. The discourse surrounding Catalan normalisation at this time was a product of the historical and contemporary political situations. The extent to which the population of Catalonia accepted the official discourse on Catalan normalisation, promulgated by the *Generalitat*, is analysed from a multidisciplinary perspective in order to attempt to understand the complexity of relations between varying factors.

Although the Catalan ethnolinguistic group are a numerical minority in relation to the Castilian ethnolinguistic group in Spain, in political terms the power that they held in the historical period under study (1993–96) was considerable. This situation came about because of the Socialist government's inability to gain a majority in the 1993 elections. The Catalan nationalists were the only group with enough members of parliament with whom the Socialists were able to work. The Catalan ethnolinguistic group has enjoyed a relatively strong economic power since the industrialisation process in Spain began. The discrimination suffered by the Catalans under the Franco dictatorship was largely political and linguistic in nature. The Catalans were determined to use their new-found political power to reverse the damage done to their language and cultural and political identity.

The discussion on bilingualism and diglossia in chapter one provides the background to contemporary language policy in Catalonia by examining the historical context and debates on language issues in Catalonia. The process of Catalan language normalisation since Catalonia became autonomous in 1982 is justified in terms of past discrimination

against the language and the need to educate the immigrant Castilian-speaking population of Catalonia. The ideological nature of the terminology of this debate is significant in terms of the power of the discourse and its general acceptance by the Catalan population. There was a state of diglossia, with Castilian being the high language and Catalan the low language, due to previous discrimination against Catalan. Therefore, the Catalan autonomous government saw the need to 'normalise' the situation by promoting the use of Catalan. The policies implemented were intended to promote bilingualism, to put Catalan on an equal footing with Castilian. The result has been dramatic in that the vast majority of the Catalan population is now able to speak Catalan and the current generation has been and is being educated largely with Catalan as the vehicular language. The policies have been so successful that it could be argued that Catalan is now the high language and Castilian the low language in a new diglossic situation within Catalonia. In this sense it could be argued that the Catalan language has glottophagic tendencies.

In order to understand how this dramatic change has come about, it is necessary to take a closer look at ethnic group relations and examine the factors thought to influence changes in linguistic behaviour. Chapter two looks at the theoretical perspective of ethnolinguistic group dynamics and relates the theory to the Catalan context. The various possible strategies that could be employed by ethnolinguistic groups in contact with each other are examined and the factors that are likely to influence the choice of strategies are outlined. It is argued that objective factors thought to influence ethnolinguistic vitality are only part of the equation, and that the subjective evaluations made by members of ethnolinguistic groups concerning the relative status and power of ethnic groups and their respective languages is of significance in the overall dynamics of ethnic relations.

The public discourse on Catalan normalisation produced by the political parties and reported in the media has an impact on the way groups and individuals react to policies in a

more private context. Chapter three examines what was happening politically during the period 1993–1996. The debate in the media about Catalan normalisation is reflected in what was said by the people of Igualada, which was investigated in chapter four. The fieldwork part of the research for this thesis was carried out at the beginning of 1994, just after the general election when the Catalan nationalists were supporting the Socialists in order for them to maintain power. There was a right-wing backlash to the situation, which was primarily mounted by the main opposition party at the time, the *PP* and the right-wing press. The theoretical discussion on bilingualism, diglossia, and ethnic group relations is largely non-political in nature, which is why the political context of the period under study is important and relevant to the practical side of the thesis (the ethnographic study of the community in Igualada). The interviews and discussions, carried out in the schools and community of Igualada, draw together the theoretical and political aspects of Catalan language normalisation through the voices of those living in the community and adapting to the changing political and linguistic circumstances of the time.

The extent to which the public discourse on Catalan normalisation as produced by the *Generalitat* was accepted and the ways in which it was adapted and reproduced by the community is analysed in light of the results of the research in chapter five. The success of the normalisation process is a product of political, social and economic factors. The political and economic power of the Catalan ethnolinguistic group within Catalonia and in relation to the balance of power within Spain as a whole during the historical period under study was significant to this success story. The historical circumstances leading up to this period were also of importance. The uniting factors between the two ethnolinguistic groups within Catalonia as they worked together to rebuild democracy after the oppression of all sections of the population who were against fascism during the Franco period built a unity and bond which certainly aided the rebuilding of the Catalan nation. The status of the Catalan language was considered by those in power in Catalonia to be of primary importance to this

process. The majority of the population of Catalonia has, obviously, decided to support or at least not to actively undermine these policies, as more and more people are able and willing to use Catalan in a wider variety of contexts. Policies implemented in education have been of great importance to the normalisation process as pupils and parents alike have come to believe that the only way of achieving success within Catalonia is through the medium of the Catalan language. Only the future will show if the system can provide the benefits hoped for by members of both ethnolinguistic groups.

## **CHAPTER ONE: BILINGUALISM OR DIGLOSSIA**

### **1.1 Introduction**

In this chapter the concepts 'bilingualism' and 'diglossia' will be discussed in a general sense, in an attempt to establish how they have been employed in the description and analysis of linguistic behaviour by different ethnolinguistic groups within a speech community. The discussion is illustrated by reference to the Catalan case. It seems that the way in which these concepts are used and what they come to mean in the minds of members of the speech community,<sup>2</sup> cannot be divorced from the ideological, political and historical context.<sup>3</sup> The academic theoretical treatment of these terms cannot be divorced from the political context in which they are developed. The manner in which these concepts filter through to members of the community and indeed the way in which they are employed is significant in terms of the ideological climate that is thus created in any particular context. It is necessary to take a look at the theoretical development of these concepts before going on to take a closer look at how they have been employed in the Catalan context. The terms bilingualism and diglossia in British society are academic and not in general use. However, in Catalonia they have become well used by most sections of society because of their particular relevance to everyday interaction. The media and the community at large have picked up the frequency of usage of these terms in political and academic discourses. The significance and ideological import of these terms as used and understood by various sections of Catalan society is then of importance to the development of the argument of this thesis. The very term 'normalisation' infers that there is a normal state of affairs that needs

---

<sup>2</sup> As discussed in chapter four, which includes interviews with various people from the community in Igualada including teachers, pupils and parents. The purpose of the interviews was to discover what the people directly involved in the process of normalisation of the Catalan language had to say about the process and what their personal opinions were concerning the issues surrounding normalisation.

<sup>3</sup> The ideological context is discussed throughout the thesis but is particularly developed in chapter five. The historical context prior to normalisation is briefly described in chapter one. The political circumstances of the historical period under study are discussed in depth in chapter three.



to be returned to. The Catalan government uses the term 'normalisation' to describe the process of implementation of language policy with the aim of promoting the use of Catalan by all sections of the Catalan population. The intention was to change the state of diglossia with Castilian as the high language to one of bilingualism with Catalan becoming the first language in Catalonia.

### **1.2 Bilingualism and diglossia: a theoretical perspective**

The first problem to be confronted is the definition of the concept bilingualism. It is a term that has been associated with a wide variety of situations, though it is generally linked with the coexistence of two languages operating within one speech community. The term has been applied to a range of circumstances as diverse as the study of language behaviour of individuals and the study of language behaviour of groups or communities. Badia i Margarit<sup>4</sup> makes a distinction between two major categories of bilingualism. The first type he calls 'natural' bilingualism and the second 'environmental' bilingualism. The first occurs when the child has parents that speak different languages and is exposed to the two languages simultaneously from a very early age. The second type occurs when a minority language comes into contact with the language of an expanding state. He cites Catalonia as being a typical case of 'environmental' bilingualism. This will be the subject of this chapter.

The term bilingualism appears to have connotations that make it problematic for use in the description and analysis of language contact situations. Firstly, it has been associated with the description of individuals' situations and, therefore, is considered to be more suited to a psycholinguistic or microsociolinguistic study. Secondly, it implies that the two languages have, at least roughly, the same status, power and prestige. Finally, there is a

---

<sup>4</sup> Badia i Margarit, A., *Llengua i cultura als Països Catalans*, (Barcelona: Ediciones 62, 1964, 1975), p. 132–133.

further problem of an ideological nature that will be looked at further on. In the case of one language gaining ground at the expense of the other, it is important to ask questions such as: What position does each of the languages occupy relative to the community studied? What functions does each of the languages carry out within that community? What are the factors that account for this type of linguistic behaviour? In order to answer these questions, it is helpful to introduce the concept of diglossia, which was first outlined by Ferguson.<sup>5</sup>

Ferguson uses the terms 'high' (H) and 'low' (L) to refer to the two language varieties in diglossic contact. The distinction is based on a specialisation of function with H being appropriate to one more formal set of situations, while L is appropriate to another more informal set<sup>6</sup>. However, Ferguson does not consider the nature of the social groups, which use different varieties in different contexts, but simply states that incorrect usage of the L variety in situations that require the H variety results in ridicule. An example of this from the Catalan case might be the sort of reaction a Catalan speaking in Catalan to a Castilian-speaking official during the Franco period. The Catalan could expect a sarcastic comment such as '*hable en cristiano*', the implication being that Catalan is a folkloric type of language that certainly was not considered appropriate in an official context.

The H variety is supposed to have a superior prestige and a literary heritage. The L variety is not learnt formally, as the H variety is, but is acquired informally. The H variety is standardised whereas the L variety is not. The H variety is considered more grammatically complex, which in itself also carries the implication that it is somehow superior. All of these characteristics and attitudes to an L variety could be said to be 'typical' of Castilian speakers towards the Catalan language during the Franco period. Ferguson believes that all

---

<sup>5</sup> Ferguson, C., 'Diglossia', Word, Journal of the Linguistic Circle of New York, 15 (1959), p. 325-340.

<sup>6</sup> Formal in this context refers to work, education and public settings; informal refers to home, family reunions and private occasions.

these factors contribute to the stability of a linguistic diglossic situation. Glyn Williams<sup>7</sup> criticises Ferguson for not considering the H variety's role in relation to power and political interests, but rather discussing it in terms of a normative 'typical behaviour'.

Ferguson's discourse on diglossia is apolitical in nature. This is evident in his reference to normative consensus as the basis for the consolidation of the H/L distinction. The only reference to the source of this consensus is that the acquisition of L is through the family whereas the H variety is reproduced through formal education. Thus, we have what amounts to a free-floating norm, substantiated by subjective evaluation and ridicule with no source of origin nor derivation, and certainly devoid of any reference to power or materialism and without any reference to who benefits from such a norm.<sup>8</sup>

Fishman<sup>9</sup> elaborates the concept of diglossia by claiming that it could refer to any degree of linguistic difference from a small stylistic variation within a single language to the use of two totally unrelated languages. In developing his typology, Fishman distinguishes between diglossia seen as a sociolinguistic phenomenon and bilingualism seen as a psycholinguistic phenomenon. Fishman's objective is to consider diglossia at the societal level in relationship to psychological considerations. There are four types in his typology, namely: diglossia with bilingualism, diglossia without bilingualism, bilingualism without diglossia and neither diglossia nor bilingualism.

The inductive method is employed, drawing upon situations to exemplify the various cases. All of the types in the resultant typology refer to a situation in a specific speech

---

<sup>7</sup> Williams, G., *Sociolinguistics A Sociological Critique*, (London and New York: Routledge, 1992), p. 96.

<sup>8</sup> Williams, G., *Sociolinguistics A Sociological Critique*, p. 97.

<sup>9</sup> Fishman, J., 'Bilingualism with and without diglossia; diglossia with and without bilingualism', *The Journal of Social Issues*, xx111, 2, (1967).

community, which Fishman states can 'comprise an entire nation'. Society is presented as a rigid mechanical set of roles to which, all members of the community have ready access. Once the social system, seen as a set of roles, is conceived, the concept of the actors and the reasons for their actions becomes largely irrelevant. Williams points out that perhaps a more important criticism of this theory is that it is inherently evolutionary. There is a relationship between the complexity of society and linguistic repertoire through the mediation of social roles, with the nature of roles existing as a measure of social complexity.

The Catalan situation during the Franco period provides an example of diglossia with bilingualism. Fishman considers this typology to be a stable distribution of language varieties strictly according to social functions and a more flexible form of coexistence of two 'languages'. During the Franco period Castilian was definitely the language used in formal situations and was the language of education. This meant that the Catalan population of Catalonia needed to be bilingual in order to participate in public spheres of social life outside of the domestic context. However, not all sections of Catalan society were bilingual. Many of the immigrant Castilian speakers could not speak Catalan while many of the older generation of Catalans who lived in the countryside could not speak Castilian. These monolingual sections of Catalan society could be cited as examples of Fishman's diglossia without bilingualism. On a societal level it is difficult to imagine a situation of diglossia without bilingualism; it would have to be a highly stratified society with certain sections acting as translators between the various hierarchies, such as a society operating with slave labour. Fishman describes this type as having a strict functional separation of language varieties according to H and L variants as, for example, the use of French in the German and Slavonic courts in the nineteenth century. The third typology- bilingualism without diglossia- can also be illustrated by the Catalan situation, by reference to the period following Franco's death, during the process of normalisation of the Catalan language. This can be viewed as a period of transition, since during it there was arguably no overall

consensus as to which was the high and low language in various social contexts. Fishman says that in this typology the occurrence of bilingual behaviour varies with the situation, roles, topics and aims of communication and that it is not a stable situation. This leaves us with the last typology: a situation of neither diglossia nor bilingualism. This would have to be a small-scale non-hierarchical society where everyone has equal access to all roles within the society – again this is fairly difficult to imagine in practice. But Fishman is not even consistent with his own ideas. He discusses ‘stable’ and ‘unstable’ bilingualism as sociolinguistic (group) phenomena. There is no room for conflict to enter this typology, and, therefore, language shift is depicted as being unilateral. The assumption is that everyone has equal access to the various roles within society and will, therefore, learn the language variety that enables social upward mobility, i.e. the more prestigious of the two varieties. Bilingualism is depicted as being beneficial, as it is the basis for increased communication, but the power dimension is not included in the equation.<sup>10</sup>

If we consider the Catalan situation during the Franco dictatorship, it becomes obvious that the Catalans did not consider the imposition of Castilian and the prohibition of Catalan as being beneficial in terms of increasing their communicative abilities. Rather, there was a feeling of being oppressed and denied their cultural and linguistic identity. Since the advent of democracy in Spain and autonomy for Catalonia, the Catalans have tried to reverse the damage done to their language through the implementation of Catalan language normalisation policies.<sup>11</sup> These policies are considered to be successful in terms of

---

<sup>10</sup> Williams, G., *Sociolinguistics a Sociological Critique*, p. 95.

<sup>11</sup> Some of the key policies concerning language normalisation in education:

- 1978, Royal Decree 2092, 23 June: teaching of Catalan made compulsory in nursery school, *EGB*, *BUP* and at first level of *FP*.
- 1980, Decree 142, 8 August: teaching of Catalan extended to 2nd level *FP*.
- Decree 153, 12 September: teaching of Catalan incorporated into *COU*.
- Ministerial order, 15 December: certificate of Catalan competence required to teach nursery school or *EGB*.

promoting the use of Catalan in many areas of Catalan society. However, the success of these policies depends on the extent to which the immigrant-descended Castilian-speaking population of Catalonia is prepared to speak Catalan in the changing linguistic context. The stated aim of normalisation policies is to promote the use of Catalan without causing discrimination on linguistic grounds against non-native Catalan speakers in Catalonia.<sup>12</sup>

- 
- 1981, Ministerial Order, 26 February: *Convocatòria Oposicions BUP, FP*, include testing of oral and written comprehension of Catalan.
  - Ministerial Order, 28 February: *Convocatòria Oposicions EGB*; include testing of specific knowledge of language and culture of Catalonia.
  - 1982, Decree 270/1982, 5 August: obligation to use Catalan in one or more subjects in 2nd cycle *EGB* imposed.
  - 1983, *Llei de Normalizació Lingüística a Catalunya* unanimously approved.
  - Decree 576/1983, 6 December: obligation to teach minimum of one subject in Catalan.
  - Order 6 December: creating possibility of teaching other subjects in Catalan besides those previously permitted.
  - 1983, Order 6 December: *Convocatòria Oposicions BUP*: oral and written competence in Catalan tested.
  - 1984, Order 23 March: *Convocatòria Oposicions FP* include written and oral test of Catalan comprehension and expression.
  - 1985, Order 6 June: timetable for Catalan language and literature extended to 4hrs/wk for 1st and 2nd year *BUP*.
  - 1986, Decree 18/1986, 30 January: all teachers contracted by public examination must demonstrate knowledge of Catalan language and culture.
  - Decree 87/1986, 3 April: administration of state non-university education to guarantee 'significant application of *LNA* within each school'.
  - 1998 *Llei del Català* in: Webber, J. and Strubell i Trueta, M., The Catalan Language: Progress Towards Normalisation, p. 90–95.

The implementation and implications of some of these policies will be discussed further in chapter three.

<sup>12</sup> Although some factions and groups have argued that this is not possible to achieve for both political and practical reasons. Union leaders have argued that there simply are not enough resources available to ensure adequate language training for teachers, or production of materials in both languages for children aged under seven who choose to be taught in Castilian within the Catalan language school context. These issues will be discussed further in chapter four.



Whether the Castilian-speaking population of Catalonia feels that this has been achieved or not is significant in terms of the overall success of the Catalan normalisation process.

The implications of language policies that aim to change the linguistic description of a speech community, if considered by any section of the community to have caused feelings of discrimination and denial of cultural and ethnolinguistic identity, are bound to be controversial. If the results of Catalan normalisation policies are similar to those of language policies implemented by Franco in terms of patterns of bilingual and diglossic language usage, the question is not whether the end justifies the means but, rather, whether the means justify the end. Clearly, those in power to further nationalistic ends have used language policies either promoting use of a language or restricting use of a language as political tools. Julio Anguita makes this point when he compares Jordi Pujol's nationalism to that of Franco.<sup>13</sup>

Fishman adopts a functional model of language and society: the use of two (or more) languages within one community is dependent on each language serving a function which the other does not. If all speakers could use both languages interchangeably on all occasions, one would be superfluous and ultimately dropped from the repertoire of languages serving the community. It is, then, the fulfilment of separate functions by different languages, which permits persistent bilingualism within the community.<sup>14</sup> For the bilingual each language has its domain, e.g. family, religion, education, and employment. This same differential allocation of language or language variety on a societal level is termed

---

<sup>13</sup> 'The self-interested policy of confusion that Jordi Pujol uses to compare any attacks on his person or his policies as being attacks on all of Catalonia is exactly the same as Franco did when democratic international opinion attacked his régime and he invited the Spaniards to defend Spain. It's the same method. We haven't advanced much.' Anguita, J., *Cambio* 16, (12/8/94), 1.186:34.

<sup>14</sup> Fishman, J., *Advances in the Sociology of Language*, (The Hague: Mouton, 1971), p. 288–293.

diglossia.<sup>15</sup> However, bilingualism that is not supported by diglossia constitutes a particularly unstable language situation. Fishman observes that 'bilingualism without diglossia tends to be transitional both in terms of the linguistic repertoires of speech communities as well as in terms of the speech varieties involved per se.'<sup>16</sup> Where the groups do not agree upon the high and low categories, there arises a situation of unstable bilingualism in which the languages, or language varieties, are in competition. The logical end of the competition is for one of the languages to cease to be used within the community. If one of the languages or language varieties is to be saved from death within that speech community some form of political intervention is required. The problem lies in distinguishing 'unstable' bilingualism (with its competitive edge) from diglossia (with its relatively settled hierarchisation of varieties). It would appear useful to adopt a conflict power model of language and society. In such a model, 'unstable' bilingualism with a competitive edge can be understood in terms of competition for power between different ethnolinguistic groups. The Catalan case alone demonstrates that there is no inevitable evolutionary type movement from traditional to modern society accompanied by a transition through various stages of diglossia and bilingualism.

In contrast to Ferguson and Fishman's functional typology, Aracil<sup>17</sup> develops the concept of bilingualism on a societal level as a transitional tool used as part of a conflict of power between different sections of society. Aracil argues that a conception of bilingualism involving a free choice between two languages without considering the aspect of power is simply not possible. Aracil emphasises that bilingualism is merely a stage in the demise of the minority language. It is emphasised that any conception of language group relations must have power as central and must be devoid of any unilinear inevitability. The possibility

---

<sup>15</sup> Ferguson, C., *Diglossia*, p. 325-340.

<sup>16</sup> Fishman, J., *Advances in the Sociology of Language*, p. 298.

<sup>17</sup> Aracil, L., 'Bilingualism as a Myth', *Inter American review*, 2:4 (1973), p. 521-33.



of shift in both directions must also be a feature of the dynamics of language change. Only then can we begin to consider the nature of the forces involving language group relations as they relate to language change. Williams points out that those that make this point tend to be those actively involved in minority language struggles rather than detached academics.<sup>18</sup>

The identification of a language with a people and the consequent diagnoses of peoplehood by the criterion of language have been fundamental to much ideology of language. The equation of language and nation is a historical, ideological construct. Woolard<sup>19</sup> remarks that this construction is conventionally dated to late eighteenth-century German Romanticism and Joahn Herder's famous characterisation of language as the genius of the people. However, in fact Herder's formulation can be traced back to the French enlightenment and the French philosopher Condillac. She believes this nationalist ideology of language is globally hegemonic today.

Aracil describes bilingualism as a myth in the sense that it tries to overcome a contradiction. This contradiction arises from the conflict for supremacy between two languages and lies in the fact that the myth insistently implies that Catalan and Castilian are compatible, whereas they are not and can never be on the same footing. The resolution of this paradox can only be achieved hierarchically. Catalan and Castilian are complementary because they are not equal. Aracil states this as being the crux of the problem. According to him, 'the bilingualist myth, indeed, attempts to substitute a combination for a choice.'<sup>20</sup>

---

<sup>18</sup> Williams, G., *Sociolinguistics A Sociological Critique*, p. 107.

<sup>19</sup> Woolard, K., edited by Schieffelin, B., Woolard, K. and Kroskrity, P., *Language Ideologies Practice and Theory*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 17.

<sup>20</sup> Aracil, L., *Bilingualism as a myth*, p. 524.

Aracil observes that the myth, as is typical of a myth, stays intact despite major historical changes, as if it were a universal constant. Consequently, he thinks the next step should be to discover in what (paradoxical) relation myth stands to reality. Aracil concludes that the bilingualist myth does not reflect reality in any direct way. He believes that the significance of a misleading model is 'pragmatic' rather than semantic, and, therefore, concludes that the bilingualist myth does actually fulfil some real social function other than that of describing or explaining actual reality. He believes that the character of the myth is 'expressive' or 'symbolic' rather than 'instrumental'. In order to clarify how it can be both non-instrumental and pragmatic, he explains how he sees it operating in society in the following terms.

The myth replaces an unsavoury truth with a more agreeable piece of wishful thinking. Amounting to an (ideological) refusal to accept the real state of affairs, it is by embellishing and sublimating reality that the myth tries to conceal it; the problem being that this type of compensatory idealisation is fraught with ambivalence. Ambivalencies are unavoidable because they are built into the very structure of social inequality. The imposition of Castilian is presented in a favourable light, not as a substitution, but as enrichment. Coercive policies are, thus, tinged with paternalism. Aracil was referring to the imposition of Castilian during the Franco period. However, it is interesting to consider if the same idea could be applied to the current Catalan normalisation policies.

This mythical bilingualism is believed to suppress conflict by confusing and falsifying both retrospective history and the current state of affairs (which is of social and language conflict). Diachronically, society is assumed to have been uniformly 'bilingual' since the beginning of time; therefore no room is left for language shift. Synchronically, bilingualists pretend that the benefits of bilingualism are equally shared out amongst all sectors of society. Aracil points out a major problem on this count: the fact that bilingualists overshoot

the mark, since there cannot be much point in fortifying the inevitable and preventing the impossible. Presumably, Aracil is referring to the bilingualists who promoted the use of Castilian in Catalonia not as a coercive policy but as an enriching process.

The Catalan autonomous government's policies of language normalisation are intended to promote the use of the Catalan language. Catalan sociolinguists talk about an additive bilingualism, the aim being to teach the Castilian-speaking population of Catalonia to speak Catalan so that they will also be bilingual and, hence, able to participate more fully in Catalan society, and, of course, at the same time ensure the future of the Catalan language. Jude Webber and Miguel Strubell i Trueta<sup>21</sup> consider it utopian to contemplate the possibility of reinstating Catalan as the exclusive language of the *Països Catalans* in the near future. However, the question of returning Catalan to a position of prominence, or even proper parity, without promoting discrimination on linguistic grounds, is a delicate one. One option is to promote the use of Catalan in an additive way, as outlined by Lambert.<sup>22</sup> Some radical Catalan nationalists oppose any promotion of bilingualism on the grounds that a second language perpetuates the threat to their own demographically restricted language. A more acceptable and palatable option is to promote the case for additive bilingualism as the least detrimental policy to be pursued. It can be seen as a matter of pragmatic expediency: since Castilian seems here to stay, the only option is to depict Catalan as equally vital, but more vulnerable, and therefore in need of special protection. This argument was used towards the beginning of the normalisation process when it was in its initial, difficult, stages. Again, the power aspect of competition between languages was not addressed. Instead, there was an appeal for special care to be taken, as if the language was a sick child that needed nursing back to health.

---

<sup>21</sup> Webber, J. and Strubell i Trueta, M., The Catalan Language: Progress Towards Normalisation, p. 19–20.

<sup>22</sup> Lambert, W. E., 'The social psychology of bilingualism', Journal of Social Issues 23 (1967), p. 91–109.

The term 'normalisation', of course, implies that there is a normal state of the Catalan language, which must be returned to. The insinuation seems to be that before the repressive policies of Franco everything was normal and now policies need to be implemented to ensure that this supposed normality could return. A similar rhetoric is used when the benefits of bilingualism are stressed. The immigrant population was not able to benefit from integration into Catalan society due to Franco's repression but, now all obstacles are being removed, they can be taught Catalan and supposedly have equal access to the benefits of being Catalan. The problem of whether they want to speak Catalan and become Catalans is not addressed but rather seems to be taken for granted by the policy makers.

The backdrop to these language policies is the ideology promulgated by the *Generalitat*, namely that it is anti-Catalan to not support actively the wider usage of Catalan. In other words, not speaking Catalan, or at least not attempting to speak Catalan, is anti-Catalan. To be tolerant of non-Catalan speech is also considered to be anti-Catalan. The reasoning behind this is that, because of Franco's oppressive policies, the Catalan language has become endangered. Therefore, it is necessary to actively push for positive discrimination in favour of the Catalan language. The Language Normalisation Act for Catalonia states that:

The restoration of Catalan to its rightful place as Catalonia's own language is the unquestionable right and duty of the Catalan people and must be respected and protected. In this regard, knowledge of the language must spread throughout the whole of Catalan society, to all citizens regardless of the language they normally speak, within a global framework in which everyone will accept the use of both

languages and recognise and contribute to the recovery of Catalan as one of the fundamental aspects of the reconstruction of Catalonia.<sup>23</sup>

In the same text, it is pointed out that one of the factors that caused the Catalan language to be in a precarious position was 'the influx into Catalonia of a large number of mainly Castilian-speaking immigrants ... without Catalonia being able to provide adequate socio-economic, urban, educational, and other structures to enable them to become integrated and to participate fully in Catalan society from their own cultural identities, which the *Generalitat* acknowledges and respects.'<sup>24</sup> The last part of this quotation would seem to suggest that the *Generalitat* wishes to integrate the Castilian-speaking immigrant population linguistically with the purpose of safeguarding the position of the Catalan language. The immigrant population is not being asked to become Catalan but only to speak Catalan. There appears to be two paradoxes here:

1. opposition to Castilian intolerance becomes anti-Castilian intolerance;
2. learn to speak Catalan like a native, but we don't ask you to become a 'native'.

Whilst there is much reference to a desire to normalise the Catalan language without causing any discrimination along linguistic grounds for both native Catalan speakers and non-native Catalan speakers, it is unclear what is really considered to be discriminatory, particularly for the non-native Catalan speakers.<sup>25</sup> Language normalisation policies implemented by the Catalan government have had considerable effect in terms of changing

---

<sup>23</sup> Language Normalisation Act For Catalonia (1983) reproduced and translated in Webber, J. and Stubell i Trueta, M., The Catalan Language: Progress Towards Normalisation, p. 56.

<sup>24</sup> Language Normalisation Act for Catalonia, (1983) reproduced and translated in Webber, J. and Strubell i Trueta, M., The Catalan Language: Progress Towards Normalisation, p. 55.

<sup>25</sup> This issue will be discussed further in chapter four, which reports on what individual members of both ethnolinguistic groups said in interviews asking for their opinions on the normalisation process.

the patterns of linguistic behaviour of the population of Catalonia. This would suggest that changes in the balance of power between different sections of Catalan society and between the central state and Catalonia as an autonomous region of Spain have also been taking place.

In a stable diglossic bilingual speech community, one could assume that the power relations between sections of the speech community would also be stable. Each language or language variety serves its function within its allotted domain without being questioned. However, when power relations within a speech community are questioned and conflict begins to arise, the situation becomes unstable, at least insofar as there is no general agreement as to which language or language variety is the high variety and which is the low variety. Presumably this lack of agreement over language status will correspond to a lack of agreement over the power relations within the speech community, or at least will reflect a degree of discontent with the present *status quo*. The anti-Catalan backlash to the 1993 general election results provide an example of discontent that can occur when changes in language status and power relations occur.<sup>26</sup>

In order to understand the relationship in a language contact situation between two languages, two dialects, or even two registers, we need to understand the relationship between the linguistic groups that are interacting in the speech community. In language contact situations, language often becomes more than just a means of communicating. Language can also be a very powerful symbol in its own right. Where linguistic groups can

---

<sup>26</sup> The Socialist government lost its overall majority and had to make an electoral pact with the Catalan and Basque nationalists in order to govern. There consequently followed an attack on Catalan language policy orchestrated by the centralist right-wing opposition based in Madrid. There was also some opposition to language policy from Castilian speakers within Catalonia. These issues will be discussed further in chapters three and four.



be identified in terms of ethnic identity, an analysis of the relationship between ethnolinguistic groups will help to provide an understanding of the functioning and relative positions of languages in contact. Patterns of language use and code-switching in relation to ethnic group interaction are invaluable as a reflection of the state of ethnic relations in general. This will be discussed further in chapter two, which takes a detailed look at the way ethnolinguistic groups may interact under varying situations. It will be argued that, in actuality, patterns of language use and code-switching are more significant than merely as a reflection of relations of power: they are instrumental in influencing change in terms of political power relations and social relations. This will be discussed further in chapter five, which discusses the manner in which a dominant discourse comes into being given the particular political, economic and social relations of power that existed in the historical period under study in Catalonia.

In the following section, the debate over diglossia and bilingualism in Catalonia will be outlined and the linguistic description will be related to the broader political and historical context. The historical perspective is particularly important in terms of providing a framework for relating political relations between the Spanish state and the Catalan region to a linguistic description in terms of bilingualism or diglossia. Examining the way in which shifts in language usage correspond to varying political situations can help us reach a better understanding of the ideological role of language policies. Aracil's concept of a mythical bilingualism which is considered to suppress conflict by confusing and falsifying retrospective history and the current state of affairs is useful in analysing periods of decline and recuperation of the Catalan language and corresponding political and language policies.

### **1.3 Bilingualism and Diglossia in Catalonia: an historical perspective**

In Catalonia, the concept of diglossia has received much consideration and debate since 1968 when Aracil and Vallverdú first started using the term. The concept of diglossia, as

used in Catalonia, differs in at least one respect from the usual conception that comes from Ferguson and Fishman, the difference being that in Catalonia the concept diglossia is intrinsically associated with linguistic conflict. Ninyoles first developed this concept of a conflictive diglossia<sup>27</sup> in relation to not solely the Catalan-speaking regions but also to the rest of Spain. Ninyoles arrives at a hypothesis stating that the sociolinguistic situation in the Catalan areas between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries was characteristic of Fishman's diglossia without bilingualism but that, during the twentieth century, the typical situation has been diglossia with bilingualism. During the nineteenth century it was only the upper echelons of society that spoke Castilian – the rest of the population would have spoken Catalan. During the twentieth century, particularly in the cities, more sections of society could speak Castilian. However, it was still considered to be the high language and Catalan was spoken in informal situations.

Vallverdú<sup>28</sup> argued against this hypothesis. Ninyoles thought that the upper classes spoke the 'high' language, Castilian, while the lower classes spoke the 'low' language, Catalan. Vallverdú believed this not to be true, as Catalan continued to be the national language even among the upper classes and was the preferred language for certain public events. Therefore, there was at least a small sector of society in the Catalan regions that was diglossic and bilingual.<sup>29</sup> Vallverdú gave his own summary of the sociolinguistic situation of this period as follows:

---

<sup>27</sup> Ninyoles, R. L., *Consciència lingüística: vells tabús, noves exigències*, (Montserat: Serra d'or, 1969), p. 31–32.

Ninyoles, R. L., *Idioma y poder social*, (Madrid: Tecnos, 1972).

<sup>28</sup> Vallverdú, F., 'Hi ha o no hi ha diglòssia a Catalunya? Anàlisi d'un problema conceptual', *Treballs de Sociolingüística Catalana*, 5 (València, 1983).

<sup>29</sup> An example of this is found in Toni Turull's novel; where the *alta burgesia catalana* can not help talking Catalan yet try to speak Castilian. The novel is set during the Franco period. (Turull, A., *La Torre Bernadot*, Barcelona: Edicions 62, 1986)



- Since the sixteenth century a slow expansion of bilingualism amongst the upper classes, developed particularly in Valencia.
- From the eighteenth century onwards there was a rapid increase of bilingualism, particularly in the large cities.
- Towards the end of the eighteenth century, and for many periods of the nineteenth century, diglossic tendencies were restricted largely to the upper classes. (The exception to this was Rosselló, which, after its annexation to France, underwent rapid Francisation that resulted in a general situation of diglossia with bilingualism.)

If we consider this linguistic description of the relationship between Catalan and Castilian in the wider context of what was happening politically, the importance of the relative positions of ethnolinguistic groups in terms of power becomes apparent.

Catalans gained *de facto* independence from the Franks at the end of the tenth century. Catalan, a Romance language, had emerged gradually following the collapse of the Roman Empire. Catalans expanded their territory to the Valencian region, the Balearics and to Sicily, Sardinia and Greece. Literary production flourished in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries and it was in Valencia in 1474 that the first book to be printed in the Iberian Peninsula was produced (in Catalan). Catalan as a language and Catalan power began to decline after the death in 1410 of a childless king when a Castilian dynasty succeeded. The Castilian kingdom provided the focus of Christian resistance to Moorish power.<sup>30</sup> While there was a dynastic union of Ferdinand and Isabella in 1469, political union did not effectively occur for over two centuries. Aragon, which included Catalonia, retained its own coinage, laws, constitution and system of land tenure.<sup>31</sup> Castile, as a rising and then declining imperial power, politically dominated the rest of Spain including Catalonia. After

---

<sup>30</sup> Smith, A., *National Identity*, (London: Penguin, 1991), p. 58.

<sup>31</sup> Gallagher, T., *Autonomy in Spain: lessons for Britain*, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), p. 120.

the defeat of Catalonia, following the siege of Barcelona (1713) in the War of the Spanish Succession, the Catalan language was discouraged by an increasingly centralised state, and became increasingly dialectalised and archaic.<sup>32</sup>

In the nineteenth century, the increasing demographic and economic power of the Catalan region gave a basis for the *Renaixença* and, later, the *Modernista* language movements which enabled the Catalan language and culture to claim both a high cultural status and a cosmopolitan aspect.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, the Catalan language was standardised and modernised and served as the medium of collective self-assertion for a nationalist movement. Under the presidency of Enric Prat de la Riba, a degree of home rule was achieved through the amalgamation of the four *Diputacions* (local government assemblies) of Catalonia's four provinces to form the *Mancomunitat de Catalunya* (1914–1925), the precursor of the modern *Generalitat* (the government of Catalonia).<sup>33</sup>

Centralist opposition to autonomist aspirations was successful in the bloodless coup of General Primo de Rivera in 1923, who was from Cadiz. This occurred amidst a general situation of instability and tense relations between the centralist opposition to home rule in Catalonia. The proclamation of the Second Republic in 1931 marked a recovery of Catalan autonomy. In 1932 the *Generalitat* promoted Catalan education, administration and culture. The outcome of the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939), with the proclamation of Franco's

---

<sup>32</sup> Webber, J. and Strubell i Trueta, M., *The Catalan Language: Progress Towards Normalisation*, p. 13–15.

<sup>33</sup> Miller, H. and Miller, K., 'Language Policy and Identity: the case of Catalonia', *International Studies in Sociology of Education*, 6, 1, (1996), p. 126.

dictatorship, heralded a period of repression for Catalan, which has been described as a form of 'cultural genocide'<sup>34</sup>.

Linguistic conflict during the twentieth century has been somewhat complicated. The situation in Catalonia differs from the other Catalan regions, Valencia and the Balearic Islands, because of the former's politically autonomous status and language normalisation policies. Catalan gradually regained its status as a national language. This process was particularly dynamic during the period of the Republic (1931–1939). However, with the victory of Franco, the situation changed dramatically. The policy of linguistic assimilation to Castilian was extremely severe, especially in the 1940s. Franco's policy of assimilation clashed with the nationalist sentiments of the Catalan people and produced a violent reaction of 'language loyalty'<sup>35</sup>, which was extended to a struggle for democracy and national liberty.

Weinreich<sup>36</sup> states that a language, like a nationality, may be thought of as a set of behaviour norms: language loyalty would designate the state of mind in which the language, as an intact entity, in contrast to other languages, assumes a high position in a scale of values, a position in need of being defended. He goes on to note that loyalty sentiments probably bear some proportion to an actual or imagined threat to the language. Weinreich suggests that language loyalty might be viewed in a similar conceptual framework as those which anthropologists employ in the study of nativism.<sup>37</sup> To exemplify how language loyalty

---

<sup>34</sup> Webber, J. and Strubell i Trueta, M., The Catalan Language: Progress Towards Normalisation, p. 15.

<sup>35</sup> Weinreich, U., Languages in Contact, (The Hague: Mouton, 1976), p. 99.

<sup>36</sup> Weinreich, U., Languages in Contact, p. 100–101.

<sup>37</sup> Kroeber defines nativism thus: 'After two societies have come into sufficiently close contact for one to feel the other as definitely more populous, stronger, or better equipped, so that its own culture is in the process of being supplanted by the other, a conscious preservation effort or defense is often produced. Such reactions have been

situations might arise, Weinreich refers to Linton's analysis of nativistic movements in which he classifies cultural groups in contact in terms of objectively dominant or dominated and subjectively inferior or superior. It is frustrated superiority feelings that cause language loyalty to develop. This analysis is, obviously, described using rather dated terminology. However, the underlying principles of the analysis are still of relevance in modern language contact situations. Weinreich's description of how divergent reactions and the consequent resentful loyalty can be found in almost any kind of group contact congruent with a mother-tongue division (e.g. ethnic and cultural contact, immigrant and indigenous populations, lower and higher social strata) is particularly relevantly developed in his analysis of how the dominant group may split in terms of its economic relationships to the balance of power. He states that those individuals who occupy favoured positions in their own group and who feel this position to be threatened by culture change are more likely to exhibit sentiments of language loyalty than those in less favoured positions. The latter are more likely to assimilate.

Franco died in 1975 and there followed a transition period leading to the establishment of a democratic state. In the constitution of 1978, although Castilian remained the established language of the state, the official status of other languages, including Catalan and Basque, within their geographical areas was guaranteed under the statutes of Autonomy.<sup>38</sup> The experience of the Civil War and the subsequent oppression under Franco, despite conflicts between Anarchists, Socialists and Communists, laid the basis for a degree of co-operation and toleration between the Catalan autonomist project and democratic, radical and socialist programs.

---

called nativistic endeavors or revivals.' Kroeber, A., *Anthropology*, (New York, 1948), in Weinreich, U., *Languages in Contact*, p. 101.

<sup>38</sup> Webber, J. and Strubell i Trueta, M., *The Catalan Language: Progress Towards Normalisation*, p. 17.

Hobsbawn argues that while Catalanism's popular base was reinforced by opposition to the centralising dictatorships of Primo de Rivera and Franco, it still belonged to the middle classes, nobles, and intellectuals because 'in the militant predominantly anarchist working class both Catalans and immigrants remained suspicious of nationalism on class grounds.'<sup>39</sup> This may have been the case in and around Barcelona but was probably not so in the countryside where class consciousness was not so well developed. Nevertheless, he argues that under the Republic and the Franco dictatorship there was a reinforcement of mass Catalanism and this may have led to 'a mass linguistic shift to what is now not only a spoken idiom but the established and institutionalised language of culture.'<sup>40</sup>

Vallverdú points out why the linguistic situation of Catalonia is contradictory and heterogeneous. Catalonia continues to be economically advanced in relation to other parts of Spain. In 1980, while the province of Catalonia had 16% of the Spanish population, it had 20% of Gross Domestic Product; bank deposits and industrial production and per capita income were 30% above the Spanish average; of 1500 Spanish companies with annual sales over \$4m, 440 were in Catalonia.<sup>41</sup> Since 1979, Catalonia has had its own statute of autonomy and self-government. Catalan is recognised as the official language, although many Catalans would argue it is still not fully normalised. On the other hand, since the 1920s, Catalonia has seen a large influx of Castilian-speaking immigrants, who, due to the political climate under Franco, had no reason to learn Catalan. Due to this demographic change it is estimated that the number of Catalan speakers in Catalonia fell from 90% in 1939 to 60% in 1975.<sup>42</sup>

---

<sup>39</sup> Hobsbawn, E., *Nations and Nationalism since 1780*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 140.

<sup>40</sup> Hobsbawn, E., *Nations and Nationalism since 1780*, p. 140.

<sup>41</sup> Giner, S., *Social Structure of Catalonia*, (Sheffield: Anglo-Catalan Society, 1984), p 49.

<sup>42</sup> Vallverdú, F., *Treballs de sociolingüística Catalana*, 5, (1983) p. 19.

Vallverdú concludes that the language behaviour of the Catalan people cannot be described as diglossic although there is what Gardy and Lafont call diglossic functions in this behaviour<sup>43</sup>. For example, written communication was predominantly in Castilian. This was because many adults went to school under Franco and therefore never learnt to write formally in Catalan. Code-switching does not follow a clear distribution of functions, but generally occurs when the interlocutor does not speak Catalan. The use of the two languages in contact does not have a rigid distribution, as is typical of a diglossic situation, though undoubtedly diglossic functions and diglossic attitudes still remain in certain contexts. As there is no general consensus as to which is the high language and which is the low language, maybe the most appropriate way to describe the situation during the early days of Catalan language normalisation is to say that it was one of highly competitive, seesawing bilingualism of the unstable kind.

Another important hallmark of a typically diglossic situation is the question of language prestige. In a diglossic situation, the 'high' language would typically have the highest prestige associated with it. However, in Catalonia the reverse is true. Catalan, allegedly the lower language variety, has higher prestige than Castilian. Castilian is associated with the lower classes, due to the low economic and social status of the immigrant population. Rather than language substitution occurring in favour of Castilian, the language normalisation program has reversed this process so that Catalan is gradually replacing Castilian. Clare Mar-Molinero points out that Catalan '... fulfils all of the functions associated with High language, and in fact it could be argued that a diglossic situation exists in Catalonia for Castilian-speaking immigrants who use Castilian (and frequently a highly non-standard Castilian) as the low variety. Public life in Catalonia is

---

<sup>43</sup> Gardy, P. , and Lafont, R., '*La diglossie comme conflit: l'exemple occitan*', *Languages*, 61 (1981), p. 76.



almost entirely carried out in Catalan.<sup>44</sup> We can see that, over the centuries, the situation in Catalonia has never been either static or stable, but rather, has been and will continue to be conflictive and dynamic.

#### **1.4 Conclusion**

The relative strength of the central state in relation to the Catalan region, in terms of political and economic power, appears to be of vital importance when considering cultural hegemony and patterns of language usage. Competition between Catalan and Castilian reflects the political and economic fluctuations in relative power of the state and the region and the relative status of members of both ethnolinguistic groups within Catalonia. The historical importance of the Catalan language to the people of Catalonia, as a symbol of their distinctive identity, has meant that repressive policies implemented in order to impose the Castilian language have never succeeded in causing the total demise of Catalan. On the contrary, any attack on the Catalan language has only strengthened the will of the Catalans to protect their language and cultural identity. The implementation of language policies in the name of promoting bilingualism is better understood in the context of competition between ethnolinguistic groups over economic and political power. Moreover, the languages have been, and continue to be, used as tools to further nationalistic tendencies from both sides.

This point is particularly well illustrated by the political situation between the 1993 and 1996 general elections. During this period the Catalan nationalists were in the powerful position of holding the balance of power. The Socialist government could not govern without the support of the Catalan Nationalists. This meant that the Catalans were in a very

---

<sup>44</sup> Mar-Molinero, C., 'Language Policies in Post-Franco Spain: Conflict of Central Goals and local objectives?' British Studies in Applied Linguistics, 5, Language And Power. (1990), p. 57.

strong negotiating position as they could effectively block any proposed legislation that they did not like. They used this position of power to negotiate a better deal for Catalonia in terms of economic policy and further political autonomy. Language policy aimed at promoting the Catalan language was considered to be of prime importance in terms of achieving sufficient cultural and political hegemony to further the Catalan nationalist cause. The ethnographic research for this thesis was done in Igualada amongst the community at the time shortly following the general election of 1993. The Catalan nationalists did indeed manage to secure considerable economic and political gains for Catalonia though their success did not stop at the 1996 elections when the *Partido Popular* won but without an absolute majority. Again the Catalan nationalists held the balance of power. The traditionally centralist right-wing *Partido Popular* found it hard to swallow its pride and negotiate with the all-powerful Catalans. It was shortly after these elections that the Catalans passed the new legislation concerning Catalan normalisation. This legislation went far beyond the limits of the 1983 law in terms of enforcing the use of Catalan in many areas of public life. The importance of the Catalan nationalists in Spain as a whole and the impact of this on the political and linguistic situation within Catalonia during this period will be further discussed in chapter three, where the implications of the Catalans newly acquired political power will be looked at in more depth.



## **CHAPTER TWO: THE DYNAMICS OF ETHNIC RELATIONS IN CATALONIA**

This chapter is a review of some of the theoretical discussion that has developed in the last three decades on interethnic relations with regard to linguistic behaviour. Chapter one provided a discussion of bilingualism and diglossia with particular reference to Catalonia in the post Franco era. It was proposed that the best description of linguistic behaviour, during this transitional phase of normalisation of the Catalan language, was of a highly unstable see-sawing bilingualism with glottophagic tendencies. Chapter two looks in more detail at the dynamics of interethnic relations between Catalonia and the rest of Spain and between the two main ethnolinguistic groups within Catalonia. The changing power relationships between the ethnolinguistic groups are analysed in terms of various factors thought to influence a group's vitality and perception of alternatives to the present status quo. This is then related to the overall description of the state of bilingualism and patterns of linguistic behaviour.

Chapter three will expand and elaborate on the importance of the political context of ethnic relations by examining the period between 1993 and 1996 when the Socialist government was dependent on the Catalan nationalists in order to govern. The increased power of the Catalans within the Spanish state meant that the Catalans were able to negotiate increased power in terms of both national politics within Catalonia and of increased power of influence in the sphere of state politics. The increase in power of the Catalans during this period had considerable implications for the description of linguistic behaviour within Catalonia.

## **2.1 Language, identity and power relations**

Fishman<sup>45</sup> believes ethnicity is rightly understood as an 'aspect of a collectivity's self-recognition as well as an aspect of its recognition in the eyes of outsiders.' He sees ethnicity as being composed of three ingredients: paternity, which is an inherited state acquired from one's parents; patrimony, which is a state acquired through socialisation; and phenomenology, which is the meaning that an actor attaches to his or her being and behaviour. Fishman believes that ethnicity becomes important when contrast, opposition, boundaries and conflict are consciously recognised; in other words, in his view, ethnicity is always simultaneously characterised by both (internal) 'fusion' and (external) 'fission'.<sup>46</sup> When ethnicity becomes organised, it produces heightened ethnic consciousness and language loyalty.

In their article 'Towards a theory of language in ethnic group relations', Giles, Bourhis, and Taylor<sup>47</sup> outline what they consider to be the important structural variables likely to influence the vitality of ethnolinguistic groups. The vitality of an ethnolinguistic group is that which makes it likely to behave as a distinct and active collective entity in intergroup situations.<sup>48</sup> In other words, a strong vitality is necessary for a group to be dominant in terms of power relations. There are three main factors that affect an ethnolinguistic group's vitality. These are: firstly, status, which includes various categories such as economic, social, sociohistorical, and linguistic prestige; secondly, demography, which includes distribution and numbers; and, thirdly, institutional support, both formal and

---

<sup>45</sup> Fishman J., 'Language and Ethnicity', in Giles, H. (ed.), Language, Ethnicity and Intergroup Relations, (London: Academic Press, 1977), p. 16.

<sup>46</sup> Fusion refers to the process of coming together in terms of recognising similar features of identity and using these in order to strengthen group identity. Fission refers to the process of recognising differences between one's own group identifying features and those of another group.

<sup>47</sup> In Giles, H., Language, Ethnicity and Intergroup Relations, p. 308-318.

<sup>48</sup> Giles, H., Language, Ethnicity and Intergroup Relations, p. 338.

informal – this covers the mass media, education, government services, industry, religion, and cultural activities. Sociopsychological processes are believed to vary according to whether a group has high, medium, or low vitality in terms of these factors. A problem with this schema of structural variables is the lumping together of objective and subjective criteria. The relationship between these objective and subjective variables is of importance in terms of the overall dynamics of the politics of ethnicity.

There are different views and interpretations on how change in society comes about which have a bearing on the way we understand the dynamics of ethnicity. The analyses of Marx, Weber, and Woolard will be briefly discussed below.

Marx assumed that change was an inherent feature of society, this change being orderly in the sense that it was patterned and that it was the relationship of the people to the economic order which was the key to this patterning of change. Marx<sup>49</sup> claimed that all conflict and change in society could ultimately be traced back to the underlying class conflict, based on the opposing class interests arising from exploitation. In addition, these fundamental economic relations shape all other aspects of social structure. The state, laws and even religion come to reflect and justify the basic class relations. The 'superstructure' of ideas and social institutions comes to reproduce the economic base: 'the ideas of the ruling class are the ruling ideas in every epoch', Marx claimed, and 'the state is but the executive committee of the whole bourgeoisie.'

For Weber ethnic groups were status groups which cut across class lines, being drawn together by a shared lifestyle. This being the case it would appear essential to discuss the

---

<sup>49</sup> Marx, K., The Communist Manifesto, (Harmonsworth, England: Penguin Books Ltd, first published 1848, 1967).

relationship between the status group and the constituent social classes, that is, ethnicity and social class should be discussed in tandem. Weber<sup>50</sup> rejected the Marxist view that economic relations were always the explanation of social structure and the prime mover of social change. He believed that religious ideas had an independent historical influence, and that the realm of politics was usually the crucial controlling force in social change. In his essay 'Class, Status and Party', Weber emphasised that inequality in society might not be based on economic relations at all but on prestige or on political power, mobilised through a party. Social status, or prestige, may derive from economic power but may also derive from other sources. For Weber, social and historical analysis were needed to discover the real basis of inequality in a particular society.

Woolard<sup>51</sup> makes the point that cultural frames have social histories, and this demands that we ask how seemingly essential and natural meanings of and about language are socially produced. This demands a commitment to considering the relevance of social relations, and particularly of power relations, to the nature of cultural forms. Such a commitment does not entail an outmoded base-superstructure model, in which material life and relations are seen as primary and real and the ideological as derivative, predictable or illusory. Social relations and materiality are not presymbolic but rather are constituted, not just sustained, through symbolic activity.<sup>52</sup>

In the case of Catalonia it would seem evident that indeed social prestige and status are derived from economic factors. The political aspect is hotly debated and fought over, as is the ideological aspect. The manner in which the conflict over political and ideological

---

<sup>50</sup> Gerth, H. and Mills, C., *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1948).

<sup>51</sup> Woolard, K., edited by Schieffelin, B., Woolard, K., and Kroskrity, P., *Language Ideologies Practice and Theory*, p. 10.

<sup>52</sup> Thompson, J., *Ideology and Modern Culture*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990).

power is engaged by the people of Catalonia, and the effect this has on economic and social factors, is crucial to the overall success of the Catalan nation.

In Spain, since the death of Franco and the transition to democracy, the bourgeoisie or ruling class has disputed the benefits and drawbacks of decentralisation and the introduction of autonomous governments for the various regions. In Catalonia, the nationalists who have held power within Catalonia have tried to assimilate the Castilian-speaking immigrant population in order to strengthen the position of Catalonia as a nation and an autonomous region of Spain. Ethnic relations both within Catalonia and between Catalonia and the rest of Spain are complex to say the least. The Catalan ruling class obviously has an interest in retaining in Catalonia as much as possible of the wealth produced by Catalonia; whereas the ruling class outside of Catalonia would prefer to have a share of the considerable wealth produced by Catalonia. The tension between the central state government and the autonomous government of Catalonia, over both economic and political issues, is reflected in the interethnic relationships and language practices within Catalonia between native Catalan speakers and the Castilian-speaking immigrant population.

Giles' schema of structural variables is useful, to an extent, in terms of a synchronic description of ethnic group relations. However, if we wish to analyse a changing relationship, we need to add a diachronic perspective to the factors that influence an ethnic group's potential to be dominant. For this to be possible, it would be necessary to further explore the relationship between the subjective and objective variables thought to influence ethnolinguistic group vitality over a period of time. This extra dimension to the schema would allow an analysis of the rates of change of external political and economic structural variables influencing the present power relationships.

The status of an ethnolinguistic group includes various categories ranging from subjective attitudes to language to the more objective economic and political status of ethnolinguistic groups in contact. Woolard<sup>53</sup> looked at the way patterns of language acquisition, language choice and code-switching in interaction, and of language shift or change, depend on the association of particular language varieties with particular values. She used a 'quasi-experimental' measure of language attitudes to explore the value of languages in Barcelona. She then went on to consider the implications of these experimental findings for the evaluation of languages not only in Barcelona, but also more globally. Woolard identified two competing social dimensions of language use: on the one hand, solidarity values, and on the other, the status and prestige that are associated with the language varieties. One question addressed by her experiment is the relationship between the status and solidarity values of Catalan and Castilian.

The first problem she addressed is the concept of prestige and what it actually refers to. In order to address this problem, Woolard used Weber's<sup>54</sup> tripartite analytical distinction between a social order, an economic order, and a legal order through which power is allocated. Both the economic and legal orders are the domains of power, whereas the social order is more to do with the values of honour, prestige or esteem. The importance of this distinction, for Woolard, is that social honour or prestige, although connected to the different kinds of power, can be seen to be analytically distinct from them. Woolard concluded that if we were going to apply Weber's schema to language issues, we would need to measure prestige empirically, and not assume it directly from either economic or political power. In order to develop a theory concerning the way prestige passes from the social structure to the individual's mind and mouth, Woolard saw the need to make an

---

<sup>53</sup> Woolard, K., Double Talk: Bilingualism and the Politics of Ethnicity in Catalonia, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988).

<sup>54</sup> Weber, M., The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, (New York: Scribner, 1958),



explicit examination of the relationships among legal or political, economic and social dominance.

In Catalonia, power in the economic sphere and power in the political or legal spheres are distinct in their historical development and modern distribution. Castilian was for a long time associated with political dominance, whereas Catalan is associated with the economically dominant group. To explore the values of Catalan and Castilian, Woolard used what she calls a 'quasi-experimental' measure of language attitudes, known as the 'matched-guise' test.<sup>55</sup> The test consists of asking listeners to evaluate the personal qualities of tape-recorded speakers using the language variants in question. By holding context, text, and speaker constant and varying only the language used, the test allows an analysis of the effect of language choice on the impression a speaker makes.

Woolard found that 'the choice of language can enhance or detract from a speaker's self-presentation and basic claim to status.'<sup>56</sup> However, some speakers were accorded more status, honour or prestige than others, no matter which language they spoke. She found that individual features of a speaker could be more important than ethnolinguistic considerations in determining personal prestige. Where the choice of language was significant, it was found that the use of Catalan enhanced the perceived authority and prestige of a speaker rather than the institutionalised value of Castilian. Woolard therefore concluded that in the case of Catalonia, the Castilianist legal order was not able to secure linguistic prestige. She argued that it is the greater economic power of Catalans that is the basis for the assignment of linguistic prestige; 'it is "who" speaks a language rather than "where" it is spoken that gives it its force.' Presumably Woolard was referring to the past position of Castilian; in post-

---

<sup>55</sup> Lambert, W. E., 'The social psychology of bilingualism', *Journal of Social Issues*, 23 (1967), p. 1-109.

<sup>56</sup> Woolard, K., *Double Talk: Bilingualism and the politics of Ethnicity in Catalonia*, p. 121.

Franco Catalonia, Catalans not only have economic power but also have an autonomous government, which has control over local institutions legally, politically, and educationally.

She concluded, therefore, that in approaching the study of minority languages, we should not make assumptions about a language's prestige value on the basis of institutional hegemony. She went on to say that if we wish to effect changes in people's attitudes towards a language in order to affect their behaviour, we could not necessarily expect changes in institutional policy to be sufficient.

The high status value of Catalan relative to Castilian would seem to be based on the economic status of Catalan speakers relative to the poorer economic status of the immigrant population of Catalonia. This would suggest a tendency for the Castilian speakers to attempt to speak Catalan in order to be accepted by the outgroup. For example, a young member of the Castilian-speaking ethnolinguistic group who aspires to be a part of the Catalan community would undoubtedly speak Catalan when going for a job interview with a Catalan employer. However, the competing social dimension of solidarity that Woolard discussed is found to have the opposite affect, in that it acts as a brake by discouraging use of the outgroup's language due to solidarity with one's own group and lack of social acceptance by the outgroup. This point could be exemplified by the situation of a member of the Catalan ethnolinguistic group entering a bar in a Castilian-speaking *barrio*. The Catalan may order a drink and address the company in Catalan but it is unlikely that the clientele would respond or continue the conversation in Catalan on their own ground. Similarly, a member of the Castilian-speaking ethnolinguistic group entering a restaurant owned and frequented by Catalans may commence an interaction in Catalan or Castilian but whether their offer of conversing in Catalan would be taken up would probably depend on their apparent fluency in Catalan and whether the Catalans present wished to signal their acceptance of them as a member of the Catalan community.



On the question of solidarity, Woolard found that respondents reacted negatively to members of their own linguistic group using the outgroup language, though they were largely indifferent to the behaviour of the outgroup. Ingroup members were rewarded with increased solidarity for loyalty to the group's language, and were penalised for betrayal. For example when our hypothetical Catalan enters the bar in the Castilian-speaking *barrio* and addresses the company in Catalan, if one of the company knew him from work and continued the interaction in Catalan this might later lead to ridicule or sarcastic remarks from other members of his ethnolinguistic group who were present. In addition, it would not necessarily mean greater acceptance by the outgroup member. However, it appeared that outgroup members were not rewarded with increased solidarity when venturing to use the other language if it could be detected that they were outsiders. This would seem to suggest that both groups are capable under certain circumstances of exhibiting language attitudes associated with hard-shelled speech communities.<sup>57</sup> Thus ingroup members can enhance or reduce the feelings of solidarity they solicit by manipulation of language choice, whereas the outgroup cannot. From this it appears that there is no immediate reward of increased social acceptance from the outgroup for using their language, though there is risk of loss of support and solidarity from the linguistic group of origin.<sup>58</sup>

From the above, two points can be deduced: namely that institutional policy alone is not sufficient in terms of changing language attitudes, and that there is a lack of social

---

<sup>57</sup> This point will be discussed further below. The concepts of soft- and hard-shelled communities come from Saville-Troike, M., *The Ethnography of Communication*, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1982).

<sup>58</sup> My own research (discussed in chapters four and five) suggests that this analysis of solidarity values is rather more complicated than Woolard found to be the case. The two ethnolinguistic groups both demonstrated a range of language attitudes ranging from exclusion to acceptance of members of the outgroup using the ingroup language. The solidarity aspect of language choice is definitely important but to varying degrees for various subgroups of the two main ethnolinguistic groups in contact. The theoretical aspects of this variance in solidarity value will be discussed further below with reference to the penetrability of ethnolinguistic speech communities.

acceptance from the outgroup towards those who can be detected as not being native speakers. Both of these factors should hinder the progress of the Catalan normalisation process. The apparent success of these policies to date would suggest that the economic basis of Catalan's prestige, or some other factor, is sufficient to overcome these problems.

Woolard proposed that language attitudes are indirectly fed back to speakers in interaction by influencing the way in which listeners respond, and therefore influencing the outcome of exchanges. Speakers' behaviour is also affected by their own attitudes, since speakers are also their own auditors. For example a Catalan speaker who addresses a member of the Castilian-speaking ethnolinguistic group in a derogatory manner in Catalan, maybe presuming that the insult will not be understood, may not do so again if the insult is understood and another is flung back in Catalan which leads to a confrontational incident.

The high status and prestige found by Woolard to be associated with speaking Catalan boost the vitality of the Catalan ethnic group in at least one of the structural variables outlined by Giles, Bourhis, and Taylor. Status, one of the three main factors cited as influencing an ethnolinguistic group's vitality, is broken down into the categories of economic, social, sociohistorical, and language prestige. Woolard concluded from her research that Catalan holds a position of higher prestige than Castilian and believes this to derive from the superior economic status of the Catalan ethnolinguistic group. If we consider this in an historical context, we can see that socially and economically the Catalan ethnolinguistic group has not suffered in the same way it did politically. This holds with Woolard's analytical distinction between the political and economic domains of power, and the idea that the social domain has more to do with status and prestige. Thus status is not necessarily derived from both the economic and political domains but can be derived from either or both. Its derivation should be measured empirically.

Although Catalans are a minority ethnolinguistic group within Spain as a whole, they do not share many of the characteristics often associated with minority groups elsewhere. Whereas many minority groups around the world are considered to be economically, socially and politically oppressed and hence subordinate in these ways to their dominant or majority ethnolinguistic groups, the Catalans do not follow the norm in this respect. For anybody spending a relatively short period of time in Catalonia, it becomes apparent that, at least socially and economically, the Catalans were in no way subordinate to the Castilian population in Catalonia but, on the contrary, were generally speaking dominant in these fields.

The sociohistorical statuses of the two groups are quite distinct. People are generally eager to inform outsiders about the historical context of Catalonia due to the relatively recent transition to democracy and the accompanying struggles and strifes of both groups involved in this process. As sampled during the period of research undertaken in 1993; the Catalans are keen to recount the extreme repression that they had suffered under the Franco régime, particularly in linguistic and cultural respects. The fact that it had been illegal to use Catalan in public prompted many personal accounts of clashes with the authorities as examples of the severity of this situation. The Catalans are very proud of their historical status in terms of their relative wealth and modernity in relation to other regions of Spain. These circumstances are often explained in terms of the Catalan inclination towards hard work and thriftiness, personal traits believed to be praiseworthy and not shared by people from other parts of Spain.

The Catalans have a long and chequered history of struggles to defend, maintain and assert their existence as a collective entity. As a group that has a rich history as a collective entity, it is often convenient for them to highlight particular historical events as symbols of struggles, oppression or moral and physical valour. One such story is that of the drummer

boy from 'Coll de Bruc'.<sup>59</sup> Legend has it that during the period of the Napoleonic wars, a young Catalan drummer boy single-handedly defeated one of Napoleon's armies by simply standing at a strategic point and beating his drum. This caused an echo to reverberate around the valley. Napoleon, thinking that a huge army surrounded him, turned tail and retreated. Hence the battle was won by the bravery and resourcefulness of one small Catalan child. Other stories concerning accounts of civil disobedience against the persecution of Catalan under Franco are often recounted with great pride. These included communal silences on trains when ordered by police to speak Castilian and the clandestine private teaching of Catalan.

It would appear that symbols of linguistic oppression might sometimes carry as much mobilising power as those of victory. Giles<sup>60</sup> suggests that the number and type of historical symbols relevant to ethnolinguistic group members can be conducive to feelings of group solidarity, and as such, can contribute to the vitality of the group.

On the other hand, the Castilian section of the Catalan population is very aware of its relatively low sociohistorical status. They also are eager to recount their own story of poverty and political and economic oppression suffered under the *same* dictatorship. The difference was that the immigrants had lost their homeland and been forced to emigrate in order to find work and feed their families. The immigrants and their descendants were sympathetic to the suffering of the Catalans under Franco but also quick to point out that economically the Catalans had not suffered in the same way as other regions of Spain. The immigrants were also resentful of the stereotype of the Catalans being hard-working whilst

---

<sup>59</sup> A statue of the drummer boy 'de Bruc' can be found on the steps that go from Balmes to Monterols in Barcelona – near the Ronda del Grav. Mitre.

<sup>60</sup> Giles, H., Language, Ethnicity and Intergroup Relations, p. 311.

they were considered lazy. An often-heard remark is that it was the immigrants working for pittance in the factories that made the Catalans rich.

The second important structural variable that influences an ethnolinguistic group concerns the demographic distribution and numbers. Three factors needed to be investigated under the heading of group distribution: national territory, group concentration and group proportion. The Catalan ethnolinguistic group benefits from residing within its historical national territory. Until the large-scale influx of Castilian-speaking immigrants during the 1970s, the vast majority of the population of Catalonia was of Catalan origin. The immigration of such large numbers of Castilian-speaking ethnolinguistic people was considered by the Catalan population to endanger the Catalan language, especially as this was accompanied by anti-Catalan language policies vigorously enforced by the Franco régime. After 1975, the population of Catalonia was fairly evenly divided between Catalan-speaking and Castilian-speaking ethnolinguistic groups. In terms of absolute numbers the Catalan-speaking group only has a small advantage. However, if this is coupled with the fact that it resides within its historical national territory, this should increase its potential vitality in relation to the Castilian-speaking population due to their immigrant status. Lieberman<sup>61</sup> has shown that immigrant linguistic minorities usually assimilate more quickly into the dominant culture by losing their language than indigenous linguistic minorities who still occupy their traditional homeland.

If we consider group concentration we can see that the Catalan group has benefited from a high concentration of its own ethnolinguistic group within its own national territory until relatively recently. Although Catalonia has for a long time attracted immigrants from other regions of Spain and from abroad due to its relative wealth and high level of

---

<sup>61</sup> Lieberman, S., Language and Ethnic Relations in Canada, (New York: Wiley, 1970).

industrialisation, it was not until 1939 that political considerations also came into play. In the first years of the Francoist régime, defeat and political persecution heightened the oppressive atmosphere of much of rural Spain, which then sank into an appalling poverty by the 1940s. In the 1960–1971 period alone, 665,731 people, mostly Andalusians, Extremadurians and Murcians (i.e. southerners), had come to settle in Catalonia. Their spatial concentration meant that around 1975 nearly half (49%) of the Barcelona municipality was of non-Catalan stock, whereas in the province (the capital excluded) it was above 46%.<sup>62</sup> This uneven distribution also meant that entire neighbourhoods and suburbs that were ethnically and culturally Andalusian sprung up. Some of them, as for instance Cornellà, a Barcelona suburb, are quite large. Smaller immigrant enclaves were to be found in nearly all industrial towns.

Giles, Bourhis, and Taylor<sup>63</sup> state that the concentration of ethnolinguistic group members across a given territory, country or region contributes to group vitality. Widespread diffusion of minority group members as individuals may discourage group solidarity as often is the case with migrant workers. This would explain why, before the large-scale immigration of Southern Spaniards to Catalonia in the 1960s and 1970s, immigrants to Catalonia had been reasonably well integrated into Catalan culture and language. This large-scale immigration resulted in concentrated enclaves of Castilian speakers, the situation was not helped by the particular linguistic climate produced by Franco's repression of the Catalan language and culture. These were the circumstances that would contribute positively to the vitality of the immigrant group. Driedger and Church<sup>64</sup> found that minority group speakers who are concentrated in the same geographical area

---

<sup>62</sup> Giner, S., *The Social Structure of Catalonia*, p. 4.

<sup>63</sup> In Giles, H., *Language, Ethnicity and Intergroup Relations*, p. 313.

<sup>64</sup> Driedger, L. and Church, G., 'Residential segregation and institutional completeness: a comparison of ethnic minorities', *Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology*, 11, (1974), p. 30–52.



might stand a better chance of surviving as a dynamic linguistic community by virtue of the fact that they are in frequent verbal interaction and can maintain feelings of solidarity.

There are four factors that need to be investigated under the heading of group numbers, namely: absolute numbers, birth rate, mixed marriages, immigration and emigration. Absolute numbers simply refer to the numbers of speakers belonging to an ethnolinguistic group. It can be argued that the more numerous the speakers of a group are, the more vitality they will exhibit and the better will be the chances for that group to survive as a collective entity.

Catalan is generally thought of as being a minority language, although this notion is dependent on socio-political contexts. Danish or Norwegian are not characterised as such although they have fewer speakers than Catalan; presumably this is due to their status of being official languages of independent states. Thus, it would appear that the characterisation of a language as being a minority language has less to do with the actual number of speakers than with the relationship of those speakers to other relevant socio-political groups. In the case of Catalonia the other relevant socio-political group is generally taken to be the Castilian-speaking population of the rest of Spain.

In 1975 Catalonia had over 5.5 million inhabitants, while Spain as a whole had 35 million people. In Catalonia the population had grown by 37.15% between 1960 and 1972, in contrast with the overall figure for Spain that was 12.4%.<sup>65</sup> Giner believes this massive growth rate has mainly been due to immigration, rather than to the vegetative trends of the natives. He notes, however, that by 1972 this enormous growth rate had begun to diminish while other trends appeared: the birth rate all over Spain began to rise less steeply, while

---

<sup>65</sup> Giner, S., Social Structure of Catalonia, p. 39.



Catalan native birth rates, after a prolonged stagnation, began to rise. Immigration into Catalonia decreased, first because it was rechannelled towards other European countries and, later, when this came to a halt, because the general rural exodus itself showed signs of drying up. The world economic recession of the mid and late 1970s plunged Catalonia into especially high levels of unemployment, and ceased to make it attractive to would-be immigrants. However, by this time the demographic and linguistic map of the country had changed substantially.

It would appear that during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, up until the recession of the mid and late 1970s, Catalonia had enjoyed a period of high demographic growth, partly as a result of the general trend of movement to the coastal regions, and partly due to its high level of industrialisation in comparison with other central areas. This demographic growth would have increased the vitality of Catalans in relation to the Castilian ethnolinguistic group outside of Catalonia, except that this same growth, due largely to immigration, had important consequences for ethnolinguistic relations within Catalonia.

The last of the three structural variables believed to affect ethnolinguistic group vitality concerning institutional support refers to the degree of formal and informal support a language receives in the various institutions of nation, region or community. Informal support refers to the extent to which a minority has organised itself in terms of pressure groups. The assumption is that minority groups which have organised themselves to safeguard their own interests would have more vitality than linguistic minorities who have not organised themselves in this fashion. Some examples of this kind of organisation have already been mentioned as means of self-defence in the face of Franco's repression of Catalan language and culture. Many activities and organisations started during this period have evolved and continue to exist today, such as Catalan dancing societies and

mountaineering clubs. Today they are considered to be important in terms of their function of strengthening the sense of Catalan cultural and ethnic identity by safeguarding and reinforcing ground gained up to this point.

In a country whose culture was denied any status beyond that of a folkloristic curiosity, its continuation and normal practice became crucial. Mostly the urban middle classes took up this task. Giner<sup>66</sup> believes that this substratum of society had become, through a complex cultural process with its roots in the origins of the nineteenth-century literary *Renaixença* movement, the hegemonic culture of the Catalans. The clandestine private teaching of Catalan was one of the most notable activities started during this period. The importance of these clandestine classes is reflected today in the high-profile normalisation policies in schools and centres of adult education. A series of notable attempts to normalise the culture by legal means were made by people in the liberal professions. New publishing houses were launched. *Omnium Cultural*, a foundation for the wide support of diverse cultural tasks, was started in 1961. It was financed by popular subscription and obtained the support of a great number of 'apolitical' middle class citizens. *Omnium Cultural* sponsored Catalan language courses, book fairs, and every possible cultural effort. Finally, in the mid-1970s, a general Congress of Catalan Culture was prepared with the help of many private groups and individuals.

There was a tendency for opposition to Franco to take a spontaneous, civic, non-party form. This was partly due to the weakness of political organisations and partly due to the advantages of acting under 'non-political' labels or connections. There was a notable vitality of collective, non-partisan, democratic activity, which supported the fabric of Catalan society. Activity was greater on the cultural front, as this was seen as less dangerous, and

---

<sup>66</sup> Giner, S., *Social Structure of Catalonia*, p. 57.

included the organisation of folk dance associations (*esbarts*), choirs and mountaineering and sports clubs. No one was unaware of their 'Catalanist' implications. Though severely purged, most of these innocuous institutions and clubs managed to survive. Giner remarks that it was through this type of activity that the Catalans managed to heal the wounds inflicted on the popular collective self-esteem. These same institutions and organisations continue to be popular today and form an important part of Catalan identity.

The civic movement was an essential part of the condemnation that the régime suffered in Catalonia. This condemnation was consistently orderly and peaceful. One result of the people's unwillingness to support violence is that Catalonia today does not have a substantial terrorist movement demanding a separate state. Another is that the Catalan path towards democracy was able to summon support from very different social quarters by constantly playing on the established legality. The total result of all these informal institutional activities laid the basis for the more formal institutional measures that were to take place after democracy had been regained.<sup>67</sup>

At a more formal level, it would appear that groups which have little representation at the decision-making levels of State, business and cultural affairs should be less able to survive as distinctive ethnolinguistic entities than those who have organised themselves as political entities seeking permanent representation at the state's legislative and executive levels. The democratic constitution of 1978 proclaimed a State consisting of various autonomous regions and so also opened the doors for Catalans to participate in government, parliamentary life and institutions both shared with other sections of Spanish society and particular to Catalonia.

---

<sup>67</sup> Formal institutional support for the Catalan ethnolinguistic group is discussed further in chapter four.

The Spanish Constitution (1978) establishes that Castilian is the official language of the state and requires all citizens to know it. In addition, it guarantees the officiality of other Spanish languages within their geographical territory and in accordance with their Statutes of Autonomy. Catalonia's Statute of Autonomy (1979) described Catalan as its own language – '*la llengua pròpia*'. It proclaims that Catalan and Castilian are the two official languages of the region, and states that:

The *Generalitat* will guarantee the normal and official use of both languages, will adopt whatever measures are deemed necessary to ensure both languages are known, and will create suitable conditions so that full equality between the two can be achieved as far as the rights and duties of the citizens of Catalonia are concerned.<sup>68</sup>

The citizens of Catalonia, both Catalan and those from an immigrant background, were active in supporting the Catalan Statute of Autonomy. This was the beginning of an era of hope after the end of the Franco régime, when the Communist party was legalised and there were mass demonstrations calling for '*Llibertat, Amnestia i Estatut de Autonomia*' (liberty, amnesty and statute of autonomy). Catalans and non-Catalans alike embraced the movement for democracy and autonomy enthusiastically, although the question of normalisation of the Catalan language was central to this movement.

In 1983, the Language Normalisation Act was passed. All political parties represented in the Catalan parliament agreed that the text should be worked on jointly. The Bill was passed unanimously in April 1983: no votes were cast against it and there was only one abstention.

---

<sup>68</sup> Webber, J. and Strubell i Trueta, M., *The Catalan Language: Progress towards Normalisation*, p. 25.

The basic definition of linguistic normalisation was first set out by the Congress of Catalan Culture (1975–1977) in their final resolution; namely, ‘a process during which a language gradually recovers the formal functions it had lost and at the same time works its way into those social sectors, within its own territory, where it was not spoken before.’<sup>69</sup> The Department of Culture of the present *Generalitat* defined the aims of its language policies as being to ensure ‘that Catalan once again occupies its rightful place as Catalonia’s own language through a process of normalisation based on the general acceptance of this objective, the collaboration of everyone and with the aim of avoiding conflict or confrontation’.<sup>70</sup>

Language normalisation programmes can only be said to have succeeded where the language in question becomes used normally right across the entire spectrum of social life. In this respect, all of the target areas – public administration, media, education, commerce and industry, cultural and social sectors – are equally important. Nevertheless, there are certain key sectors where it is considered that normalisation must be achieved and must be seen to be effective in order to gain public support and therefore safeguard the overall success of the programmes. Education is one of these key areas; it teaches standardised and correct usage and at the same time can help to inculcate attitudes. State education is the responsibility of the *Generalitat* and as such was the focus of the earliest normalisation initiatives.

Towards the end of the Franco era, some Catalan was taught in schools due to the efforts of *Omnium Cultural*, a cultural, non-profit-making organisation once banned by

---

<sup>69</sup> Torres, J., Problems of linguistic normalisation in the *Països Catalans*, from the congress of Catalan culture to the present day, *International Journal of the Sociology of Language*, 47, ( 1984) p. 59–62.

<sup>70</sup> *Política Lingüística, Memòria del Departament de Cultura*, 1982, in Webber, J. and Strubell i Trueta, M., *The Catalan language : Progress towards Normalisation*, p. 26.

Franco. However, it was not until 1978 that Royal Decree 2092 marked the first important legislative step towards returning Catalan to the classroom by giving Catalan a legal status in schools. It made Catalan a compulsory subject in pre-school, primary, and secondary education (although this was not extended to the final year of secondary education and the upper levels in technical education until two years later). More importantly still, it acknowledged the possibility of Catalan-medium education.<sup>71</sup>

By 1983, the year of the Language Normalisation Act, a minimum presence of Catalan was guaranteed and provision had been made for at least one subject to be taught through Catalan in primary schools. The Language Normalisation Act responded to the need for a more co-ordinated approach by defining a series of minimum standards and the framework for continued change. In accordance with the status of Catalan as Catalonia's own language of education it stated categorically: 'education centres are obliged to make Catalan the normal vehicle of expression, both in internal activities, including those of an administrative nature, and in external ones'<sup>72</sup>. The teaching of Catalan was essentially a stepping stone, the intention being that Catalan should be used progressively more and more as pupils' mastery of it increased.

There remained for some time a degree of haphazardness in both the extent and the manner of teaching conducted in Catalan. Virtually all schools conducted some teaching in Catalan, but between the legal minimum of two subjects and the possible maximum of all subjects there were quite a number of variations. It was not until the 1986–1987 academic year that all primary schools became fully integrated in terms of using Catalan as a teaching

---

<sup>71</sup> Webber, J. and Strubell i Trueta, M., The Catalan Language: Progress Towards Normalisation, p. 34.

<sup>72</sup> Webber, J. and Strubell i Trueta, M., The Catalan Language: Progress Towards Normalisation, p. 34.



medium. This initial slowness reflects the difficulties, often practical (e.g. lack of text books, development of methodologies) which such a task faced.

Practical difficulties were compounded by the shortage of Catalan-speaking teaching staff. Officially-organised in-service training or *reciclatge* courses began in the academic year 1978–79. The Language Normalisation Act stressed that in accordance with the demands of their educational duties, all teachers must master both official languages. *Reciclatge* schemes were primarily designed as a supplement to a teacher's professional training, with the emphasis on stimulating oral proficiency. The obligation of teachers to demonstrate knowledge of, and ability in, Catalan proved to be a delicate subject: several courts found that entrance requirements for administrative posts which stipulated working knowledge of Catalan to be discriminatory against non-Catalan-speakers. However, a Constitutional Court ruling in February 1991 stated that it is legal to make working knowledge of Catalan a job requirement for prospective civil servants (including teachers) in Catalonia.

Perhaps the most effective way of achieving as quickly as possible the objective of full Catalan schooling was offered by the 'immersion' programmes. Begun in 1983–84, they were designed to deal with the specific socio-linguistic situation in the industrial belt around Barcelona and other areas with a majority of non-Catalan-speaking residents. Since children in these areas receive little contact with Catalan in their home environment, nursery schooling and the initial stages of primary education were conducted entirely in Catalan. The advantages lay in the conviction that, by immersing the child in a Catalan-speaking environment during this optimum age for language learning, Catalan would be learnt without damaging the child's spontaneous development in Castilian.



These programmes received widespread support from parents, but a group of parents did question whether certain articles of the Normalisation Act were in fact constitutional. The polemic developed around the right of a child to receive the early stages of education in his or her mother tongue. The Language Normalisation Act does state that infants have the right to receive their early instruction in their usual language, be it Catalan or Castilian. The problem was whether this education, in Castilian, could be adequately implemented in a Catalan immersion environment. However, in a ruling in March of 1994 the Superior Tribunal of Justice of Catalonia guaranteed the continuation of linguistic immersion. If parents ask for it, the pupil has the right to receive his or her education in Castilian until the age of seven and for two subjects to be taught in Castilian after this age. The judges have said that education can be carried out in the habitual language of the Castilian-speaking pupils by means of individual attention within the linguistic immersion classroom, although this was disputed by parents and some union officials. Thus, the Catalan authorities were 'faced with the option of either imposing the territorial language, as the basic teaching language, or respecting the child's culture and linguistic identity by teaching in the mother tongue'.<sup>73</sup> The Catalan situation seems to have intrinsic 'glottophagic' properties.

Again we can note a significant change in formal institutional support for the Catalan ethnolinguistic group related to the changing political climate in Spain generally, and specifically in Catalonia, over the last few decades. The vitality of the Catalan ethnic group in relation to institutional support can be seen to be increasing rapidly due to the policies of the autonomous government which is dedicated to reversing anti-Catalan policies implemented during the Franco dictatorship. These policies have been particularly effective in the fields of education, government services, and the mass media. Industry, religion and

---

<sup>73</sup> Esteve, J., 'Multi-cultural education in Spain: the autonomous communities face the challenge of European unity', *Education Review*, 44 (1992), p. 260.

cultural activities within Catalonia have always been strongly dominated by the Catalan ethnic group.<sup>74</sup>

It would appear that the Catalan ethnolinguistic group holds a strong position in terms of the structural variables concerning institutional support in comparison with the Castilian-speaking ethnolinguistic group within Catalonia. The Catalans have a long history of struggles with the Spanish state which appears to have strengthened their abilities to defend their identity and territory from the assimilating forces of the central state. The Castilian-speaking ethnolinguistic group within Catalonia has found itself in the awkward position of representing the enemy within because of the language it speaks. It could be argued that it benefited in terms of vitality from the institutional repression of the Catalan language during the dictatorship. However, the immigrants in Catalonia found themselves in the contradictory position of being victims of the same régime and so they put their support alongside the Catalans in demanding 'liberty, amnesty and statute of autonomy'. In effect, they were supporting a cause that would, in the long run, work towards reducing their own vitality by boosting that of the Catalan ethnolinguistic group.

When all the structural variables mentioned are taken into consideration and applied to the present situation, the overall picture that emerges suggests that the Catalan ethnolinguistic group would have a higher vitality than the Castilian-speaking ethnolinguistic group. This implies that, within Catalonia, the Catalan ethnolinguistic group has a greater potential to be dominant. Now if we consider in more detail the dynamics of group identity we can see that the vitality of an ethnolinguistic group in relation to other

---

<sup>74</sup> The Catalan bourgeoisie had to relinquish political power during the Franco era but managed to retain economic power and maintain control over religious and cultural activities, even if they were of clandestine natures.

ethnolinguistic groups is of importance in terms of the type of strategies for change that may be employed.

Tajfel<sup>75</sup> discusses the process of self-identification with a group in terms of psychological processes and then develops this with the intention of analysing varying strategies that the group might implement in order to maintain the status quo or to change the balance of power between the groups under analysis. His theoretical framework builds on the concept of vitality as outlined above. The psychological processes that are outlined are based on subjective appraisals made by members of both the outgroup and the ingroup. This discussion is useful in so far as it provides a framework for various strategies for change that may be used by ethnolinguistic groups in contact with each other. However, it still does not provide an adequate explanation for the relationships between the objective and subjective variables and their bearing on the psychological processes that follow.

Tajfel's theory of intergroup relations<sup>76</sup> involves an exposition of a sequence: social categorisation – social identity – social comparison – psychological distinctiveness. Individuals are considered to be active from the moment they are born in terms of defining themselves and the world around them. People are categorised into social groups; the value attached to that membership, whether negative or positive, forms their social identity. Social identity only has meaning in comparison with other groups. These intergroup social comparisons will lead individuals to perceive and behave in such a manner as to make their own group favourably distinct from other groups. So, group members try to make themselves superior on valued dimensions to members of a relevant outgroup in terms of material possessions, social power, abilities, personal attributes, and so forth. Positive

---

<sup>75</sup> In Giles, H., Language, Ethnicity and Intergroup Relations, p. 318.

<sup>76</sup> In Giles, H., Language, Ethnicity and Intergroup Relations, p. 318.

distinctiveness from the outgroup allows ingroup members to share a satisfactory social identity.

Two important questions arise from the postulates of this theory. First, under what circumstances will group members try to change the intergroup situation? Second, if change is desired what are the means by which change can be brought about? In terms of the theory, change will be desired when the existing intergroup relations provide members of a group with an unsatisfactory social identity. Members of the dominant or superior group will not be motivated to change the relationship between their group and the subordinate or inferior group. On the contrary, members of the subordinate group will be motivated to change their inadequate social identity for a more positive one. However, an inadequate social identity is not sufficient in itself to provoke change: members of the group must be aware of a cognitive alternative to the existing status relationship and, presumably, these alternatives must be considered to be politically realisable. Tajfel cites the factors thought to influence the perception of possibilities for change to be: stability or instability, which presumably refers to the political strength of those in power, and legitimacy and illegitimacy, which refers to the more personal beliefs of the community concerning the status quo. In the case of a disbelief concerning the possibility of change members of the group are thought to follow individualistic means to achieve social mobility or greater acceptance from the outgroup. An example of this sort of strategy is provided by women and blacks in western society who are trying to compete in a sexist and racist environment by modifying their cultural values, dress and speech styles so as to be more like those of the dominant group's.

There appears to be a problem with the above analysis in terms of the concept of an inadequate social identity. If intergroup social comparisons lead individuals to perceive and behave in such a manner as to make their own group favourably distinct from other groups

then it is difficult to conceive of how a group can have an unsatisfactory identity. Maybe it is more useful to think in terms of dissatisfaction with the balance of power between different ethnolinguistic groups. If one group believes it is being discriminated against by members of a more dominant group then it is likely to attempt various strategies to redress the situation.<sup>77</sup>

Once a subordinate group becomes aware of cognitive alternatives, how do they bring about changes in order to achieve a positive social identity (i.e. avoid discrimination)? Tajfel proposed three group strategies. The first of these (which many groups have used initially) is for the group as a whole to assimilate culturally and psychologically with the dominant group. The early immigrants to Catalonia from other parts of Spain before the mass immigration of the 1960s, who were relatively few in number and more dispersed throughout the community, provide an example of this type of strategy. A second strategy might be to redefine the previously considered negative characteristics of the group in a more favourable light. For example, the members of the Castilian-speaking ethnolinguistic group, who felt bitter at the stereotype of the lazy Andalusian, hence emphasised the fact that it was them who had made Catalonia rich by working for low wages in the factories.

---

<sup>77</sup> Ethnicity is only one part of social identity: self identification in terms of gender and/or class may reinforce, mitigate, resist or replace national, regional or ethnic identities. Miller, H. and Miller K., 'Language policy and identity: the case of Catalonia', *International Studies in Sociology of Education*, p. 126. This research project is particularly focused on ethnic identity, however, individuals or groups may not feel that their ethnic identity is primary over and above other forms of self-identification. There is a strong feminist movement in Catalonia as there is also a growing gay movement of which there are elements that resist the homogenization of Catalan normalization. There is a correlation between economic class and ethnic identity in that the majority of Castilian speaking immigrants and their descendants are of working class. The Catalan nationalist movement has its roots in the professional and ruling class. This correlation between class and ethnicity has made certain elements of the Catalan working class suspicious of nationalist policies on class grounds. There are also those originally from a Castilian speaking working class background that may reject their ethnicity of origin in order to adopt a Catalan identity as a means of improving their economic position in society.

The third strategy might be the creation of new dimensions not previously used in intergroup comparisons on which the group may assume a new positive distinctiveness from the other groups. For example, the women's movement claims to have created a new, more cohesive, system that does not require figureheads so prevalent among male-dominated groups.

A further strategy would be for group members to seek a positive social identity through direct competition with the outgroup. This strategy would generate conflict and antagonism between the subordinate and dominant group. It is in this sense that aspects of Tajfel's theory can be considered as dynamic and interactive. It is proposed that social action on the part of one group to assert itself will be met with stronger action from the other in an attempt to maintain or restore its superiority or distinctiveness.

In the present situation within Catalonia, the non-Catalan group could be said to have an unsatisfactory social identity in comparison with the more affluent and powerful Catalan group. It has been noted that the first wave of immigrants arriving in Catalonia assimilated relatively quickly both culturally and linguistically. This phenomenon could be explained by the relatively small number of Castilian incomers combined with these incomers' economic need to be accepted by the Catalan group. However, the second wave of immigrants was more inclined to try to maintain its ethnic distinctiveness. This could be explained in terms of increased economic security and increased numbers, both of which would raise the vitality of their group. But how do these factors affect the relationship between Catalonia as an autonomous region and the central government of Spain?

Another factor that needs to be considered is the response of the Catalan group to the new arrivals. The Catalan group's response to the now much larger number of immigrants could also be expected to be different. It seems probable that the Catalan ethnolinguistic



group would have been characterised by a more tolerant and less attentive rating of non-native-like performance produced by the relatively small group of first-generation immigrants. When the second generation of immigrants became a larger, more cohesive group, the Catalan ethnolinguistic group is likely to have become more hard-shelled as a means of protecting its identity. This aspect of the theory needs to be understood in a political context because the ideology of Catalonia as a nation promulgated by the *Generalitat* is inclusive in the sense of wanting to assimilate the non-Catalan speakers and hence build a stronger Catalonia. In this sense the Catalan ethnolinguistic group, aided by those members of the Castilian-speaking ethnolinguistic group who were willing to become Catalanised, was implementing competitive strategies in order to gain greater power within its own territory but also at the level of state politics. There was a backlash by certain sections of the Castilian-speaking ethnolinguistic group outside of Catalonia. This point will be further developed in chapter three which gives a more detailed account of the political manoeuvring that was happening between the 1993 and 1996 general elections. The impact of the political discourse on autonomy and language policy can only really be investigated by listening to what was said by members of both groups about the policies and looking at how patterns of linguistic behaviour changed. The private discourses of certain members of the speech community under study were investigated and are reported in chapter four. The Castilian-speaking ethnolinguistic group generally does not perceive cognitive alternatives to their present subordinate position within Catalonia, and hence individualistic means of attaining a more positive identity are utilised in preference to more conflictive strategies.

If we look at the situation of the Catalan ethnolinguistic group in relation to the Castilian-speaking ethnolinguistic group outside of Catalonia, the power relationship is



reversed.<sup>78</sup> Here the Catalan group finds itself in the position of having an unsatisfactory identity. However, cognitive alternatives are perceived to exist and hence competitive strategies are implemented in order to increase positive distinctiveness. The perception of cognitive alternatives is related to the relatively high vitality of the Catalan ethnolinguistic group coupled with a belief in the illegitimacy and instability of the current power relationship. A strategy of competing over control of economic and political factors has been implemented, not only internally (i.e. within the autonomous region of Catalonia) but also in the wider political context of Spain as a whole.

Factors relating to ethnolinguistic group vitality and strategies implemented to achieve positive distinctiveness are likely to be reflected in speech patterns of accommodation utilised by the interacting ethnic groups. If the structural factors influencing an ethnic group's vitality vary over time, it would seem probable that perceptions of social identity and of cognitive alternatives to the current power relationship between the groups will vary accordingly. We can expect an individual's choice of linguistic code and patterns of code-switching to be directly related to the above processes. So we can see how the changing power relationships between the ethnolinguistic groups concerned will affect the overall description of the state of bilingualism.

The way in which people change their patterns of speech or switch codes not only reflects their evaluation of the power relationship between their own and other ethnic groups. Choice of language can also be used as a tool in order to actively exclude or include

---

<sup>78</sup> In the sense that the Catalans are at least numerically a minority ethnic group in relation to Castilian speakers outside of Catalonia. However, after the 1993 general elections when the Catalans came to hold the balance of power, their influence in state politics was considerably increased, as was their power over internal affairs within Catalonia.

individual members of the speech community as well as expressing various attitudes to language and the interethnic situation.

It is useful here to consider Giles's<sup>79</sup> theory of speech accommodation given that it is concerned with the motivation and social consequences which underlie changes in people's speech styles. A basic postulate of the theory is that people are motivated to adjust their speech styles, or accommodate, as a means of expressing values, attitudes and intentions towards others. Giles proposes that the extent to which individuals shift their speech styles towards or away from the speech style of their interlocutor is a way of communicating approval or disapproval. A shift in speech style towards that of another is termed convergence, whereas a shift in speech style away from the other's speech style is termed divergence. Convergence generally occurs when approval is desired and is accompanied by a wish to integrate, providing the speakers have the linguistic repertoire to realistically accomplish this. Members of ethnic groups often use divergence, in the form of an accentuation of differences, as a symbolic tactic for maintaining their identity and cultural distinctiveness. They may also use convergence to signal a desire to integrate into or be accepted by members of another ethnic group. People continually modify their speech with others so as to reduce or accentuate the linguistic and social differences between them depending on their perceptions of the interactive situation.

The work of Giles and his colleagues as mentioned above has the potential to make use of the linkages between social psychology and other information. They have been concerned with the demographic, historical and social contexts. Husband and Saifullah Khan<sup>80</sup> point out the dependence of group vitality upon economic, social and political

---

<sup>79</sup> In Giles, H., Language, Ethnicity and Intergroup Relations, p. 321.

<sup>80</sup> Husband and Saifullah Khan, (1982), in Edwards, J., Language, Society and Identity, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1985), p. 156.

currents, and the danger that vitality theory involves little more than superficial attention to these. There are also problems with the relative weighting and the interdependence of the dimensions of vitality. There is clearly a need to draw upon context more fully in the establishment of subject vitality variables which may reflect too directly and too simply underlying objective factors deemed to be important. A specific problem which affects this approach is that questionnaire formats do not generally permit variable weighting of the assessment of relative item importance.<sup>81</sup>

Giles' theory of speech accommodation is particularly well developed in an anthropologically relevant way by Hervey, who outlines a framework of investigation whereby 'communities can be characterised, in an anthropologically relevant way, through the use of "symptomatic" attitudes related to language.'<sup>82</sup> He suggested that a correlation between attitudes to linguistic competence/performance and 'anthropological' features of communities is especially clearly illustrated in the case of what he terms the 'penetrability' of speech communities. The 'penetrability' of speech communities is assessed on a scale between 'open' (alias 'soft-shelled') and 'closed' (alias 'hard-shelled')<sup>83</sup> communities or groups. He was referring to the degree to which a given group allows, under specified conditions, members originally integrated into other groups to function as integrated members of the group in question. An example of this, in the case of immigrants from different regions of Spain residing in Catalonia, is the degree to which the Catalan ethnic group allows those immigrants to function as integrated members of the Catalan ethnic group. Hervey stated that there is, in principle, an infinite number of intermediate grades between a speaker who cannot avoid being instantly identified as an 'indigenous' member of a speech community and a speaker who cannot avoid being instantly recognised as being

---


<sup>81</sup> Edwards, J., *Language, Society and Identity*, p. 157.

<sup>82</sup> Hervey, S., 'On the penetrability of speech communities', *La Linguistique*, 27 (1991), p. 15.

<sup>83</sup> Saville-Troike, *The Ethnography of Communication*, p. 20-21.

'foreign' to that speech community. Hervey points out that the objective presence of 'non-native-like' features in the performance of a speaker is not in a constant ratio with the degree to which that speaker is identifiably foreign. He explains the reason for such discrepancies between objective and subjective ratings of foreign-ness in terms of a group's sensitivity and attentiveness, or tolerance and inattentiveness, to non-native-like performance. Hervey demonstrates how the objective incidence of non-native-like features is typically underrated by indigenous members of 'soft-shelled' communities, and equally typically overrated by members of 'hard-shelled' communities.

'Ingroup' attitudes to individuals judged to be outsiders by members of hard-shelled communities are broadly characterised by a triad of attitudinal features. These features are ranged along a cumulative continuum. For the sake of convenience this continuum can be scaled down to just three *ad hoc* categories.




(Hervey, 1991:19)

The mildest form of xenophobia symptomatic of minimally hard-shelled communities is believed to be no more than a clear marking of group-membership boundaries. In such cases, there is a tendency for indigenous locals to broaden and exaggerate their use of a local dialect or language, partly to genuinely increase incomprehension on the part of the incomers, and partly to emphasise a sense of local group identity from which incomers are meant to feel excluded. Hervey believes this type of distancing is perfectly consistent with

otherwise regular, frequent and relatively friendly relations between indigenous and incoming individuals, though it does represent a certain degree of impenetrability on the part of a hard-shelled local community. The example used by Hervey to illustrate this type of polite non-acceptance of outsiders, is that of local rural populations in Britain in their dealings with recently arrived inhabitants of 'dormitory villages'.

The second category of exclusion plus mistrust is thought to be typical of a less privileged group towards a more privileged one. The example of the relationship between the earlier (seventeenth century) wave of Chinese settlers in Taiwan and the more recent influx of Mainland Chinese is given to illustrate this less mild degree of xenophobia. The third and most extreme category on the scale above is said to be typical of relationships between various ethnic and/or religious sub-communities in a great number of the world's large cities. In such cases, to identify a speaker as not belonging to one's own speech community is thought to be not just a matter of recognising a foreigner but of spotting an enemy.

There is believed to be a proportionate, but skewed, correlation between the scale of xenophobic attitudes and the cut-off points between identifying speakers as 'native' or as 'foreign':



(Hervey, 1991: 21)

It is suggested that a measure of where members of a community place the cut-off point between 'native' and 'non-native' speakers is a fairly good index of the degree to which that community is hard-shelled.

'Impenetrability', it is pointed out, is not a simple bilateral relation between a given community and the outside world. This led Hervey to make a distinction between 'globally hard-shelled' groups and hard-shelled groups that are impenetrable only to certain specific groups of outsiders. 'In theory this means that hard-shelled communities differ not only in the intensity of the xenophobic attitudes that characterise them, but also the intensity of these attitudes may be, and commonly is, manifested in differing degrees to different groups of outsiders.'<sup>84</sup>

We could add further to this concept of hard-shelled groups that are impenetrable only to certain specific groups of outsiders by remarking that it is unlikely that the hard-shelled group will be unanimous in its reaction to members of other groups. It seems probable to

<sup>84</sup> Hervey, S., *La Linguistique*, 27, (1991) p. 22.

expect there to be subgroups and sections of the speech community that will differ in their assessment of the outgroup's relationship to their own group.

Hervey believed that two of the most salient linguistic-attitudinal markers of a soft-shelled community are:

1. a high degree of tolerance to departures from native-speaker norm shown towards speakers accepted as members of the speech community in question (i.e. speakers are treated as outsiders only if their linguistic performance is predominantly 'foreign');
2. treatment of the language of the community as an openly available commodity, rather than as a jealously guarded property with the corollary that attitudes to outsiders trying to learn the language are welcoming and helpful.<sup>85</sup>

Hervey separated the putative symptomatic characteristics of 'impenetrability' into two separate headings:

1. Features of language structure and language use,
2. Features of attitude to language.

Under the first heading, Hervey pointed out that the language of an 'impenetrable' community tends to be highly differentiated from any other language with which its speakers are in contact. Where this is not already the case these differences may have to be invented. It is also noted that resistance to language change from the outside in such groups balances receptivity to language change from the inside. Equally typically, it is said, an 'impenetrable' speech community will show a tendency to maximise the conceptual differences that result from processing experience through the medium of its language, as compared with processing it through other languages.

---

<sup>85</sup> Hervey, S., *La Linguistique*, 27 (1991) p. 28-29



Speakers belonging to 'impenetrable' communities are believed to often resort to an exaggerated form of their language-variety when speaking it in the hearing of outsiders. This type of ploy serves to widen the communicational gulf between insiders and outsiders, and to make it actually more difficult for the outsider to acquire proficiency in the language-variety of the group. A related ploy of making minimal allowances for the rudimentary efforts of foreigners to speak the language in question is believed to share similar purposes. For purposes of outward communication, members of 'impenetrable' communities are noted to resort to some form of 'bilingualism'. Major symptomatic attitudes of 'impenetrability' are said to consist of resistance to the attempts of outsiders to learn the language of the community, restricted recruitment of the speech community, and the 'naturalisation' of the cognitive structures of the language of the community.

Hervey concluded that 'both features of language structure and language use on the one hand, and features of attitude to language-related issues on the other hand, offer a number of symptomatic indices signalling social groups that are typically hard-shelled or "impenetrable". Similarly, soft-shelled or "penetrable" communities also display symptoms of a linguistic or language attitudinal kind.'<sup>86</sup>

Hervey's paper provides us with an analytical tool that can be used in categorising speech communities by an analysis of language usage and language attitudes. This type of analysis of a speech community can give us important additional information concerning reasons and motives that underlie changes in people's speech styles. Whereas Giles's theory of speech accommodation stresses accommodation as being the norm and hence implies that divergence is in some way deviant behaviour, Hervey developed the concept of speech divergence in relation to maintenance of group identity.

---

<sup>86</sup> Hervey, S., *La Linguistique*, 27 (1991) p. 33

In the Catalan case it would seem that the whole range of symptomatic language attitudes, from the most xenophobic hard-shelled type right through to the most relaxed soft-shelled type, exist in varying degrees for different sections of the speech community. The Catalan ethnolinguistic group arguably does not operate as a homogenous entity in that different sub-groups evaluate the interethnic situation in differing ways. The most hard-core Catalanists and nationalists could be said to exhibit speech strategies associated with the most extreme hard-shelled communities, as outlined by Hervey, when interacting with members of the Castilian-speaking ethnolinguistic group. However, even when considering this most hard-core group, strategies would vary depending on the social environment and purpose of the interaction. For example, if we imagine the scenario of a group of Catalan businessmen having a business lunch in a restaurant: a Castilian-speaking waiter attending their table is likely to receive the hard-shelled treatment, i.e. the businessmen would exaggerate the Catalan-ness of their speech in order to increase the communicational gulf between them and the waiter, and would make minimal allowances for the rudimentary efforts of the waiter to speak in Catalan. It is quite probable that the businessmen would resort to a bilingual alternative and order their food in Castilian while resenting that they feel this to be necessary. A less Catalanist member of the Catalan-speaking ethnolinguistic group would be likely to employ quite different linguistic strategies when interacting with a member of the outgroup. For example, in the context of a music bar with a mixed ethnolinguistic group clientele, a Catalan patron of the bar is likely to use more relaxed linguistic strategies of code-switching indiscriminately depending on the language abilities and preferences of individual customers.

The range of attitudes and strategies amongst the Castilian-speaking ethnolinguistic group towards members of the outgroup is equally diverse and again depends on the social context of the interaction. Certain sections of the Castilian-speaking ethnolinguistic group could be said to be characterised by the most extreme attitudes of hard-shelled groups. A

group of Castilian-speaking labourers working for a Catalan boss would be an example of this. This group of labourers may well accentuate their own particular dialect of Castilian in order to increase the communicational gulf between themselves and their boss when they consider it convenient. The same group may utilise quite different strategies in the context of an after-work drink in a local Catalan bar: some individuals from the group may continue the strategy of divergence as a means of expressing an anti-Catalan feeling, whilst other individuals of the group may accommodate by using Catalan in their interactions with members of the Catalan ethnolinguistic group in the bar as a means of expressing either solidarity with the Catalanist cause or as an attempt to be accepted by the native Catalans as a fellow Catalan.

It should also be noted that similar strategies of divergence and convergence apply between different sections of the Catalan population. For example a Catalan from Barcelona on holiday in Majorca may come across similar strategies of exclusion on the part of the Majorcan population. Different geographical regions of Catalonia have their own particular dialects which under certain circumstances may be exaggerated in order to increase the communicational gulf between themselves and an outsider.

There are as many possible different linguistic strategies that could be employed as scenarios and personalities that we can imagine. However, the concepts of convergence and divergence, combined with the analysis of language attitudes and linguistic strategies employed by different groups of the same speech community, whether it be considered open or closed in terms of penetrability, provide a useful tool for the analysis of speech behaviour and language attitudes in an interethnic context. These are relevant here because it is the everyday interactions between individuals and groups that actively construct the overall dynamics of ethnic relations and patterns of bilingualism or diglossia. What is missing is an

analysis of how the political context plays its role in the general scenario of language and ethnic competition. This issue is addressed in the following chapter.

So far, I have discussed separately the structural factors affecting the vitality of ethnolinguistic groups in contact, Tajfel's theory of intergroup relations and Giles' theory of speech accommodation. The attempts by Giles, Bourhis and Taylor to integrate these three topics with the aim of providing a framework for understanding the role of language for ethnicity and intergroup relations will now be outlined. The concepts which form the basis of this integration include social categorisation, social identity, social comparison, psychological distinctiveness, cognitive alternatives and group strategies for social change. Giles, Bourhis and Taylor propose that when the notion of vitality is connected with Tajfel's theory of group relations and with the accommodation perspective, a unified model for understanding language and ethnic group relations emerges. Even if this model is not valid without attaching the social psychological approach to other perspectives and disciplines, the resulting framework of analysis is useful as a description of some of the possible variables influencing linguistic interaction from a micro perspective before moving to look at the wider picture.

This review has been restricted to linguistic socio-psychological material on language and ethnicity. However, there is a broader literature on race relations and national identity which certainly considers language as one important (but not always present) marker for national identity, e.g. in both North and South America anti-imperial nationalist movements shared the language of the imperial powers – English and Spanish respectively. Markers of national identity might include political, economic, cultural, or geographical differences, e.g. Irish, Welsh, Latvian, etc.

Ethnic groups are considered to be an excellent example of linguistic categorisation since they are often found to manifest their distinctiveness from each other by means of separate languages or dialects. Language usage is central as a marker of group membership. A person's social identity involves self-evaluation which derives from being a member of a specific group. It has been suggested that ethnic group members identify more closely with someone who shares their language than with someone who shares their cultural background. Social comparison becomes important as one's identity only acquires meaning in relation to other existing or contrasting features of one's ethnic world. As Weinreich<sup>87</sup> has said: 'It is in the situation of language contact that people most easily become aware of the peculiarities of their language as against others, and it is there that the purity of the standardised language most easily becomes the symbol of group integrity. Language loyalty breeds in contact just as nationalism breeds on ethnic borders.' It is considered that language comparisons can sometimes act as a catalyst for the group to make intergroup comparisons in other, non-linguistic, dimensions.

It is proposed that the desire for psychological distinctiveness along valued dimensions is the outcome of the interplay among the processes of categorisation, identity and social comparison. Language choice can be used as a tactic to maximise the differences on a valued dimension between ethnic groups in the search for a positive distinctiveness. The desire of many linguistic groups around the world to maintain, or even to re-establish, their ethnic languages can be seen as a process whereby groups are comparing themselves with other groups in society and using language as a means of attempting to attain cultural distinctiveness. This must be highlighted so that we can appreciate the centrality of the process of Catalan language normalisation to the wider political context of nations within nations.

---

<sup>87</sup> Weinreich, U., *Languages in Contact*, p. 100.

## **2.2 Strategies for change**

An important determinant of the dynamics of intergroup relations is the extent to which members of a group perceive cognitive alternatives to the existing intergroup situation. Subordinate group members who do not perceive cognitive alternatives are thought to adopt individual strategies of assimilation into the dominant group by linguistic upward convergence. This means that they try to adapt their speech pattern to that of the dominant group and thus integrate into this group. In this case the vitality of the subordinate group is low: the situation is likely to be perceived as stable and legitimate, though this might not be the case since this situation could lead to language death. An example of this sort of behaviour might be of a member of the Castilian-speaking ethnolinguistic group in Catalonia attempting to speak Catalan in order to be accepted more into Catalan society. The success that members of the subordinate group enjoy, in terms of integrating into the dominant group, will be affected by the extent to which the dominant group members are prepared to accept members of this particular outgroup into their midst. If the dominant group is characterised by patterns of language usage and language attitudes associated with hard-shelled communities, then the subordinate group members will find it more difficult, or even impossible, to assimilate. However, if subordinate group members perceive cognitive alternatives to the existing status relationship, they are likely to possess a belief structure of social change. They consider the status relationship to be illegitimate and unstable. This situation usually occurs when the subordinate group is characterised by high vitality. They will want to achieve a positive social identity, which may involve group conflict, and will accentuate their distinctiveness by adopting linguistic strategies of downward divergence. An example of this sort of behaviour would be a Catalan who travels around Spain insisting on speaking Catalan in the presence of non-Catalans simply to emphasise his or her ethnicity and distinctiveness.



When dominant group members perceive no cognitive alternatives to the existing status relationship, they are likely, when interacting with subordinate group members, to maintain the status quo and hence their own ethnic speech pattern; their speech is characterised by non-convergence. An example of this sort of behaviour might be when a member of the Catalan ethnolinguistic group refuses to speak Castilian to a non-Catalan speaker in, say, the context of a shop: the Catalan shopkeeper attends the customer in Catalan even though the customer makes his or her request in Castilian.

On the other hand, when dominant group members perceive cognitive alternatives their speech patterns will depend on how they construe the intergroup situation. A dominant group member who believes the situation to be unjust could well converge downwardly, e.g. switch to Castilian when speaking with a member of the Castilian-speaking ethnolinguistic group even if the Castilian speaker can speak Catalan. However, a dominant group member who wishes to maintain superior status relationship is more likely to upwardly diverge in speech patterns, e.g. try to increase the communicational gulf by speaking Catalan in a fashion that makes it less comprehensible, i.e. using a particular dialect or an archaic type of code. It is hypothesised that, if this dominant group member considers the subordinate group to have a high vitality and therefore perceives the status relationship to be unstable, a higher degree of upward divergence will be employed.

In essence it is argued that the awareness of cognitive alternatives in an intergroup situation will influence the speech strategies adopted by dominant and subordinate group members in interaction with each other. It is considered that the perception of cognitive alternatives is formed on the basis of three independent factors: namely, perceived stability-instability, legitimacy-illegitimacy and high-low vitality. It should be pointed out that it is misleading to consider ethnic groups as homogeneous wholes given that various subgroups within them react to an intergroup situation in various, sometimes conflicting, ways.



Giles, Bourhis and Taylor refer to Tajfel's theory in order to outline group strategies for social change. They look at the strategy of assimilation. This refers to a subordinate group as a whole taking on the characteristics of an outgroup in order to achieve equality with that group. A common problem with this strategy is a feeling of loss of identity by the subordinate group, which can also be accompanied by lack of acceptance by the dominant group. A further strategy is that of redefining previously negatively considered characteristics. This is often accompanied by pride in the ethnic language and a wider usage in public and formal domains. Tajfel has suggested that the awareness of cognitive alternatives leads subordinate groups not only to redefine existing group attributes but also to search for new dimensions within which to compare themselves favourably with the dominant group. Strategies of group redefinition and creativity on the part of the subordinate group may develop into strategies of competition between the ingroup and the outgroup. This may well be the case especially when there exists a real conflict of interest based on unequal distribution of scarce resources such as control over political, economic, cultural and linguistic affairs.

In the case of an ethnolinguistic subordinate group residing in its historical national territory, one strategy that can be used is that of promoting a national consciousness and desire for self-rule. Esteva Fabrigat<sup>88</sup> believes that nationalism moves the development of ethnic identity into a political context by perceiving one's ethnicity to be in competition with that of another individual or other ethnic group. The notion of nation is believed to fundamentally transcend that of ethnic group in the sense that first the ethnic group must develop its identity in relation to other ethnic groups, and then it must develop a desire for political institutions of self-government. In order for this political process to develop, the ethnic group must have an ambition to compete politically with at least one other ethnic

---

<sup>88</sup> Esteva Fabrigat, C., *Estado, Etnicidad y biculturalismo*, (Barcelona: Ediciones Peninsular, 1982), p. 7.

group. The direction in which this process develops will depend partly on the state of interethnic relations, as outlined above, and partly on the political stance, or counter-strategy, taken by the dominant ethnic group. This is important because a carefully negotiated balance of power can ensure a peaceful transition in political systems whereas, where agreement can not be found, often the result is violence, at least for certain sections of the ethnic groups concerned.

Tajfel's dynamic approach recognises that the dominant group will not remain passive while the subordinate group attempts to reduce the dominant group's superiority and distinctiveness. Strategies will vary depending on the particular situation. Some examples include manipulation of ethnolinguistic vitality factors, bilingual programmes aiming for assimilation rather than cultural pluralism and, more extremely, government legislation imposing the dominant group's linguistic values on minority groups. If there is a political need or desire to avoid an escalation in the conflictive nature of interethnic relations, concessions may be made by means of a redistribution of power.

This theoretical overview involves an integration of three independent elements: a taxonomy of ethnolinguistic vitality, Tajfel's theory of intergroup relations, and Giles's theory of speech accommodation. If this theoretical overview is used to analyse a language contact situation, it is necessary to introduce the political aspect and understand the context of social interaction. The relationship of the objective and subjective variables needs to be investigated to gain an understanding of how they relate to the balance of power.

It would seem that the linguistic behaviour of any given ethnic group will be affected partly by structural factors relating to the vitality of that group, partly by perceptions of positive or negative identity in comparison to another group, and partly by perceptions of cognitive alternatives to the present status relationships. In the case of two or more ethnic

groups interacting in a language contact situation, patterns of language choice and code-switching can provide useful information as to the relative power positions of the ethnic groups. If a remarkable change in linguistic behaviour is noted, this could be interpreted as a reflection of the changing status of power relations within the speech community or at least as a signal that a desire for change is present and that choice of linguistic code is being used as a strategy to provoke change. The above would suggest that static descriptions of a speech community in terms of bilingualism and diglossia without some theoretical mechanism that allows for an analysis of the dynamics of ethnic interaction would not always be appropriate.

### **2.3 Strategies for change in Catalonia**

In Catalonia, the circumstances affecting speech accommodation are complicated by the unequal ability of the two ethnic groups to accommodate. Due to Franco's linguistic assimilation policies, the Catalan group as a whole is bilingual in the sense that they have the linguistic ability to use both Castilian and Catalan. This does not mean that every individual in this group will have an equal ability in the two languages: those living in rural, more isolated regions of Catalonia will generally have a more limited knowledge of Castilian. Although Franco's linguistic policies were extremely repressive, the reaction of language loyalty by the Catalan ethnolinguistic group was equally strong. The Catalan language was illegal and all education was carried out in Castilian yet, in spite of this, the Catalans managed to organise clandestine schools for teaching Catalan, as well as other clandestine activities organised to safeguard the vitality of the Catalan language.

The non-Catalan group is not so uniformly able to use both languages. The ability of an individual from this group to speak Catalan will depend on various factors relating to perception of social identity and motivation to integrate into the Catalan ethnolinguistic group. This means that when a Catalan and a non-Catalan are conversing it will not always

be clear at the beginning of the interaction whether the non-Catalan is able to use Catalan effectively or not. In the past, before the Catalan normalisation programs were considered to have had much impact, this meant that Catalans had to switch to Castilian (upwardly converge), whether they wanted to or not, in order to communicate adequately. Over time there has obviously been an increase in at least passive knowledge of Catalan by the non-Catalan population and, with the increasing success of Catalan teaching programmes, more and more non-Catalan group members are able to use Catalan actively,<sup>1</sup> and so are able to use a strategy of upward convergence in their speech pattern if desired. The influence of Catalan television channels has also been very influential in terms of Castilian speakers having a good passive knowledge of Catalan. Many popular programmes are broadcast in Catalan so that even if a viewer is not a native Catalan speaker he or she is likely to watch a fair amount of programmes in Catalan.

However, it is generally the case, at least at present, that the Catalan ethnolinguistic group has more options open to it when it comes to speech accommodation, though this is generally not seen as an advantage since, frequently, this implies that it has to use Castilian when its preference would be to use Catalan. Many Catalans claim that they cannot express themselves well in Castilian or that they find it difficult. This reluctance to speak in Castilian could be interpreted by the interlocutor either as a real limitation in linguistic ability or, more probably, as a means of expressing a desire to maintain his or her ethnic distinctiveness and superiority. Similarly, if a member of the Castilian ethnolinguistic group resident in Catalonia demonstrates a reluctance to switch to Catalan when conversing with a member of the Catalan ethnolinguistic group, this could be interpreted as being due to either linguistic inability or to a desire to maintain his or her ethnic distinctiveness and to express a dissatisfaction with the status quo of power relations. The relevance of this point is that it would not always be clear, even to someone with inside knowledge of the speech

community, exactly what the motives are for any one particular code-switch. There is always the possibility of ones' intentions being misinterpreted.

The strategies of linguistic convergence or divergence used by the ethnic groups when conversing are further complicated by the solidarity value attached to language choice. In line with Woolard's discovery that ingroup members could enhance or reduce the feelings of solidarity they solicit by manipulation of language choice, it would appear that the ethnic mix of people in the immediate vicinity of the conversation would also influence the interlocutors' choice of language. A member of the Castilian-speaking ethnolinguistic group may be motivated to switch to Catalan when conversing with a Catalan ethnolinguistic group member, in order to express a desire to assimilate with this group but, if this would mean losing solidarity with members of his or her own group who are present, he or she will find himself or herself in a dilemma as to which language to use.

This application of a theoretical apparatus to the language contact situation in Catalonia is not as straightforward as an overview of the theory may suggest. One of the reasons for this is that the subordinate ethnolinguistic group in Catalonia, the non-Catalan population, allies linguistically with the dominant Castilian-speaking population outside of Catalonia. Whereas the Catalan ethnolinguistic group is dominant in terms of ethnic relations within Catalonia, they are subordinate in terms of being a linguistic minority group in Spain as a whole. However, the historical experience of the Castilian-speaking ethnolinguistic group, who were dispossessed and suffered great political and economic repression under the Franco dictatorship, allows a certain amount of political sympathy with the Catalan population, who, though they did not suffer economical repression to the same degree, did suffer politically and linguistically. The importance of this point lies in the fact that a shared struggle against a common oppressor can do much for uniting people from different ethnolinguistic and social groups and lay a foundation for unity, at least over



certain issues, and co-operation. Equally importantly is the history of struggle between various ethnic and social groups which brings about a clear sense of alliance and conflict at various levels of society.

The immigrant population of non-Catalans in Catalonia has been blamed for the relatively slow recovery of Catalan since the reaffirmation of its official status in 1978. Webber and Stubell i Trueta<sup>89</sup> claim that 'close and constant contact with non-Catalan speakers has adversely affected language consciousness in Catalonia.' These same authors hold the opinion that it would be 'utopian' to contemplate the possibility of reinstating Catalan as the exclusive language of the *països Catalans* in the near future, i.e. language death of Castilian in Catalonia. They believe it is more realistic to make a positive case for 'additive bilingualism' as being the least detrimental policy that could be pursued. However, this is opposed by the more radical nationalists, on the grounds that a second language perpetuates a threat to the survival of their own demographically restricted language.

The political importance of Catalonia to the rest of Spain was accentuated by the general election results of 1993 and 1996. The central government was reliant on the support of the Catalan autonomous government in order to form a majority. This gave the Catalans an increased vitality in relation to the external Castilian population. Cognitive alternatives were thus perceived as possible because of the instability of the political situation, the increasing vitality of the Catalan group and a belief in the illegitimate status relationship. The Catalan ethnolinguistic group appeared to have opted for a strategy of competing with the outgroup over control of various structural variables that affected their group vitality. Competition was largely over the status of the Catalan language both within Catalonia and outside of Catalonia, economic issues and further political autonomy. Policies

---

<sup>89</sup> Webber, J. and Stubell i Trueta, M., The Catalan Language: Progress Towards Normalisation, p. 19.

aiming at 'normalisation' of the Catalan language were implemented in the institutional sectors of the mass media, education and government services.

If we look at the ethnic relations within Catalonia the status relationship was different again. The Catalan ethnolinguistic group was in the dominant position and the Castilian-speaking, non-Catalan, ethnolinguistic group was in the subordinate position. A section of the subordinate group, in this case, could be said to not perceive cognitive alternatives to the present status relationship on the grounds that their speech patterns are generally characterised by upward convergence (using Catalan when the interlocutor is from the Catalan ethnolinguistic group) motivated by a self-oriented desire to assimilate in order to increase their chances of upward social mobility (socio-economic success). This is reflected in parents' expressed desire for their children to learn Catalan and thus improve their future job prospects. However, this tendency towards assimilation is not uniformly embraced by the non-Catalan ethnic group. Even those who wish their children to learn Catalan at school for instrumental reasons will not use Catalan in the home or in the non-Catalan community. A section of this subordinate group will not accommodate linguistically to the dominant group either because they do not wish to or because they cannot. Of course, it could be argued that they cannot precisely because they do not wish to.

The Catalan ethnic group, however, could be said to perceive cognitive alternatives to its superior status on the grounds that its speech patterns are characterised by upward divergence, in the sense that it is increasingly common for a Catalan speaker to insist on using Catalan even when the interlocutor is incapable of using Catalan. Though strictly speaking, according to Giles, this would be termed non-convergence, where previously the norm in this situation was characterised by downward convergence (speaking in Castilian), a change towards non-convergence (refusing to use Castilian) could be perceived as upward divergence. This speech pattern is most probably due to the general political situation being



considered unstable. Hence the future status of the Catalan language is perceived to be continually endangered by any change of policy coming from the central government in Madrid.

In the case of Catalonia, ethnic group relations are not only affected by internal factors but also by what is happening in the wider political arena of Spain as a whole. External political manoeuvring will not necessarily influence ethnic groups in a homogeneous fashion. For example, the backlash to the success of the Catalan government in the 1993 general election, which consisted of criticism of Catalan language policy, particularly in education, gave the Castilian-speaking ethnolinguistic group within Catalonia a boost in terms of vitality and provoked a section of this group to complain bitterly about the status of Castilian in the education system and even to try to take legal action against the minister responsible. At the same time, other sections of the Castilian-speaking ethnolinguistic group in Catalonia reacted to the same polemic by supporting the Catalan education policy due to the supposed right-wing nature of the criticism.

It appears that the interethnic relations in a speech community such as Catalonia cannot be analysed in isolation. In order to fully understand the nature of linguistic interaction resulting from the various factors that influence the power relationship of the ethnolinguistic groups interacting within the speech community, it is essential to also apply the theoretical analysis to the wider context of ethnic relations beyond the speech community. If this analysis is to be of any practical use to the making of language policy, a diachronic analysis of the interethnic situation should be coupled with a synchronic analysis. Hopefully, once the connection between internal and external ethnic group relations have been analysed in the current and historical context, it should be possible to hypothesise about how changes in any of the relevant variables influencing the state of ethnic interaction

might effect the future balance of power, and hence the Catalan language normalisation process.

The following chapter will look more closely at the power relationship between the two ethnolinguistic groups in a political context. The change in relative power positions of the two ethnolinguistic groups provoked by the results of the general elections of 1993 will be discussed along with the impact they had on language policy. Chapters four and five will discuss the implications of the political context on language behaviour and language attitudes between the years 1993 and 1996 as found by the fieldwork research carried out during this period in Catalonia.

### **CHAPTER THREE: THE DECLINE OF THE SOCIALISTS AND RISE OF THE CATALAN NATIONALISTS**

This chapter provides a narrative account of the political relationship between the Spanish state and the autonomous region of Catalonia from 1993 to 1996. It provides the political context to the debate over Catalan language policy, which is further discussed in the ethnography. The purpose of this chapter is to provide an account of the political framework that can be used to shed light on the debate over language policy and language attitudes held by the Catalan population of native and non-native Catalan speakers. It is important because of how this context affects patterns of language usage and cultural hegemony. The relative strength of the central state in relation to the Catalan region, in terms of economic and political power, appears to be of vital importance when considering these issues. Ethnic group relations are not only affected by internal factors but also by what is happening in the wider political arena. A brief outline of the position of the political parties prior to this period helps to contextualise the political climate and highlight the problems faced by both the Socialists (*PSOE*) and the Catalan nationalists as they formed the precarious alliance that enabled *PSOE* to hold onto power after losing its majority in the 1993 general elections.

The state discourse on issues of autonomy and language policy is shaped by the historical context and the necessity of negotiating over policies in order to hold on to political power. Similarly, Catalan discourses on autonomy and language policy are a product of the historical context and a response to the discourse of the state and the opposition.

The political partnership of the Socialist government and the Catalan nationalists was founded on necessity and a common interest. Although an alliance between a socialist party and conservative nationalists would seem an unlikely state of affairs, a number of factors

aided this rather uncomfortable partnership. The facts that Franco had been such a die-hard centralist and that his most effective opponents had been separatists created a powerful association in the public mind between regional nationalism and freedom, on the one hand, and between national unity and repression, on the other.<sup>90</sup> The figurehead of Catalan nationalism, Jordi Pujol<sup>91</sup>, had been imprisoned under Franco for his defiance of the prohibition against singing the *Cant de la senyera* in the *Palau de la Música Catalana*. Pujol's public defiance of Franco and his self-declared commitment to social democracy and modernisation of Spain all helped legitimise his alliance with the Socialists. The Socialists were trying to capture the centre left vote and leave behind their more radical past. This meant following free market doctrines in the style of other western social democratic parties. *PSOE*'s economic policies were more in line with those of the centre-right nationalists than with those of a more traditional socialist tendency.

### **3.1 The collapse of UCD and rise of PSOE**

The transfer of power from Adolfo Suárez<sup>92</sup> *UCD* to Felipe González<sup>93</sup> *PSOE* in 1982, marked the gradual disintegration of the centre-right of the Spanish political spectrum. The military coup of the previous year provoked a lack of confidence in the governing *UCD*.

---

<sup>90</sup> Hooper, J., *The New Spaniards*, (London: Penguin Books, 1995), p. 40.

<sup>91</sup> Jordi Pujol, born 1930, became President of the *Generalitat* of Catalonia in 1980 when he won its first autonomous elections. He was leader of *Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya* (*CDC*) and of the ruling coalition *Convergència i Union* (*CiU*). (Sánchez, Á., *Quién es Quién en la democracia española*, (Barcelona: Flor del Viento Ediciones 1995), p. 268).

<sup>92</sup> Adolfo Suárez, born in 1932, became president of the Spanish Government (1976–81) after Franco's death. He founded the *UCD* in 1977 in order to present himself as a candidate for president in the first democratic elections on 15 June, which he won. He also won the elections of 1979. (Sánchez, Á., *Quién es Quién en la democracia española*, p. 340–3).

<sup>93</sup> Felipe González, born in 1942, became president of the Government from 1982 until 1996. He became General Secretary of *PSOE* on 14/10/1974 at the party congress held in Suresnes, France. (Sánchez, Á., *Quién es Quién en la democracia española*, p. 161–4).

Under the leadership of Suárez *UCD*, had become seriously divided. By the end of 1980, against a backdrop of army sedition and turmoil in Euskadi, Suárez was seriously concerned about the situation inside *UCD*.<sup>94</sup> The Christian Democrat wing went on the attack. The *críticos* wanted to swing the party to the right towards emulation of the Italian *DC*, a move which was opposed by Suárez. Having decided that there could be no real unity in *UCD* under his leadership, he felt that there was no alternative to his resignation. Suárez announced his departure in a television broadcast on 29 January 1981.<sup>95</sup> The internal divisions of *UCD* had gone too far to be resolved by Suárez's departure. His replacement by Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo,<sup>96</sup> the vice-president of the Cabinet, could hardly be seen as a new dawn. When Calvo Sotelo finally addressed the *Cortes* on 21 February 1981, it was in an atmosphere charged with wild rumours about an imminent military coup. He declared that the transition from dictatorship to democracy was complete and he effectively offered a government programme of retrenchment. Although he received a simple majority of 169 votes to 158 against and 17 abstentions, his performance did not gain him the overall majority of 176 votes necessary to confirm him as president. The would-be president was obliged to wait two days for a second vote of investiture for which only a simple majority was necessary. The voting had just begun on 23 February when a group of civil guards under Colonel Tejero arrived at the *Cortes* and held the entire membership of the assembly hostage.

---

<sup>94</sup> Busquets, J., Aguilar, M., Puche, I., *El Golpe Anatomía y Claves del Asalto al Congreso*, (Barcelona: Editorial Ariel, 1981), p. 17-20.

<sup>95</sup> Preston, P., *The Triumph of Democracy in Spain*, (London and New York, Methuen and Co. Ltd., 1986), p. 185-88.

<sup>96</sup> Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo, born 1926, became President of the Government 1981-82 and president of *UCD* in its last stage after the departure of Suárez. He had participated actively with Suárez in the formation of the *UCD* and gone on to be minister in two Cabinets before becoming vice-president in 1980-81. (Sánchez Á., *Quién es Quién en la democracia española*, p. 87).

After the attempted coup, which failed, there was a new mood of national co-operation. The new Prime Minister, Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo, yielded to the pressure of Spanish conservatives and halted the transfer of power to the autonomous regions. Offers were made by Felipe González, Manuel Fraga<sup>97</sup>, and Santiago Carillo<sup>98</sup> to support the government in the *Cortes*. There was also an agreement that the relatively rapid progress towards regional autonomy, which had so incensed the military, should be slowed down. This eventually led to the passing of the notorious *LOAPA*. The *LOAPA* was sanctioned by the votes of the party in government, the *UCD* and the *PSOE*. This contributed to a deterioration of the image of the *PSC-PSOE* in Catalonia. Only the *CiU* stood against the *LOAPA* in the Spanish Parliament. The *PSC* representatives did not even present the amendments their party had produced against the *LOAPA*.<sup>99</sup> The Basque and Catalan regional governments managed to freeze the *LOAPA* in 1982. However, it was evident that during 1981 Spain was a democracy under hostile surveillance.<sup>100</sup> The tension emanating from the state's recognition of diverse nationalities and regions resulted in a withdrawal of

---

<sup>97</sup> Manuel Fraga Iribarne, born 1922, was Minister of Information and Tourism (1962–69) under Franco. He became a member of parliament for *AP* in the *Cortes* (1977–79), and then he became a member of parliament for *Coalición Democrática* (1979–82), then leader of *Coalición Popular* (1982–86). After the election results of 1986 he left the presidency of *CP* and *AP*. He later returned to preside provisionally over the formation of the *PP* (1989) when he nominated his successor, José María Aznar. He then took refuge in his homeland Galicia where he obtained absolute majorities, in the autonomous elections of 1989 and 1993 (and subsequently), to govern the *Xunta* (the regional government of Galicia). (Sánchez, Á., *Quién es Quién en la democracia española*, p. 139).

<sup>98</sup> Santiago Carrillo, born 1915, was the general Secretary of the *PCE* (1960–82). In 1985 he abandoned the *PCE* and founded *el Partido de los Trabajadores de España*, which was dissolved in 1991 to become integrated into the *PSOE*. Carrillo was one of the most influential politicians in the transitional years and, when the *PCE* was legalised on 9/4/77, he became a close advisor of Suárez. (Sánchez, Á., *Quién es Quién en la democracia española*, p. 94–6.)

<sup>99</sup> Guibernau, M. and Rex, J., 'Nations without states: Catalonia, a case study', *The Ethnicity Reader Nationalism, Multiculturalism and Migration*, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1997), p. 141.

<sup>100</sup> Preston, P., *The Triumph of Democracy in Spain*, p. 205.



confidence in the new model. The state perceived the endorsement of difference as a threat to its integrity.

*UCD's* disarray reached its most dramatic point at the end of July when it began to break up into its component parts. Suárez decided to leave and form a new party, to be called *CDS*. This prompted Sotelo to call general elections for September before Suárez and the other defectors could consolidate their new parties. The self-destruction of the *UCD* was matched by internal feuding in the Communist Party (*PCE*) which was undergoing a collapse, hence removing a source of potentially damaging criticism of the *PSOE's* ever more moderate line. The only substantial challenge to the *PSOE* left came from Fraga's *AP*. The falling apart of the *UCD* represented the shift from the centre to the centre left of the political spectrum. *UCD* had sold itself as the safe option but after the coup the voters obviously decided to go for a party with a more genuine commitment to reform.<sup>101</sup>

The elections of 28 October 1982, which took place after the attempted coup, did not deter the population from giving the *PSOE* a substantial mandate.<sup>102</sup> The fear of military intervention after the shambolic coup had been largely overcome, leaving the path clear for more radical reforms. The Socialists received 48% of the votes cast. *é* came second with 26%. *UCD* limped home behind the Catalan regional with 6%. The *PCE* dropped from 11% to 3.6%. Ironically Adolfo Suárez, having played the historic role of helping to dismantle Francoism and opening the way to democracy under *UCD*, would go on to play the equally historic role of helping to dismantle *UCD* and opening the way to substantial change under the *PSOE*.<sup>103</sup>

---

<sup>101</sup> Hooper, J., *The New Spaniards*, p. 50.

<sup>102</sup> Hooper, J., *The New Spaniards*, p. 50.

<sup>103</sup> Preston, P., *The Triumph of Democracy in Spain*, p. 225

In the general election of 1982 the *PSC-PSOE* obtained the majority in Catalonia, 36.5% of the votes. However, in the Autonomous Election of 1984, the *PSC-PSOE* received only 30% and the *CiU*, which had obtained 22.2% in the general election, now received 46.6%. This initiated a voting pattern in which Catalans vote 'Socialist' in general elections but support the nationalist *CiU* in regional elections.

By the general elections of 1986 the *UCD* had disappeared. The centre-right was regrouping under the *AP*. This then became *PP* in 1989–90, which was led by many ex-members of *UCD*. The disappearance of *CDS*, the disunion of the central right and disillusionment with *PSOE* over corruption allegations, contributed to the relative success of *PP* in the elections of 1993, which marked a new found unity of centre and right under the leadership of Aznar.<sup>104</sup> The *PSOE* lost some of its left-wing vote to *IU*. The new found unity of the centre right and the disunity of the left caused González and the *PSOE* to lose their overall majority and to require parliamentary support in order to govern the country.<sup>105</sup>

### **3.2 The Socialist government's loss of overall majority**

In June 1993, the Socialist government, which had been in power in the *Cortes* since 1982, won the general elections but lost its overall majority. This meant a new era of Spanish politics had begun: the Socialists would now have to look for support outside of their own party in order to govern Spain. Felipe González' success in the last four general elections

---

<sup>104</sup> José María Aznar, born 1953, became president of the *PP* in 1989. He was a member of parliament for the *AP* (1982–87), and then became president of the autonomous region of Castilla y León (1987–89). He was the *PP* candidate for President of the Government in the general elections of 1989 and 1993, and then became president in the elections of 1996 (and 1999). (Sánchez, Á., *Quién es Quién en la democracia española*, p. 54).

<sup>105</sup> 'The last absolute majority gained by the Socialists, in 1988, was a mirage, produced by the disunion of the central right which could not last long.' (Castro, C., *La Vanguardia* (15/6/97), p. 14).

had diminished considerably, largely as a result of the rise of *PP* and the disappearance of *CDS*. *PP* managed to gain the votes from the centre to the right wing of the political spectrum, though neither the destruction of *UCD* nor the scandals associated with *PSOE* had been sufficient to bring about a change of government.<sup>106</sup>

### **3.3 PSOE negotiates with the Nationalists**

González, having lost his majority, was now looking to form a government through a coalition. His stated aim was to form a stable and pro-European Government. The offer was mainly directed at the Catalan and Basque nationalists. Julio Anguita's<sup>107</sup> opposition to the Maastricht Treaty made a coalition with *IU* impossible, although for historic reasons: in theory, both were left-wing parties, so this would have been a logical coalition. However, the Nationalists had reservations about forming a coalition.<sup>108</sup> Spain entered a recession

<sup>106</sup> In mid-1988, the González government was confronted with a potentially catastrophic scandal. An organisation calling itself the *Grupos Anti-Terroristas de Liberación (GAL)* claimed responsibility for the murder of 24 people in the south-west of France. Subsequent press investigations accumulated evidence to suggest that *GAL* had been organised by two Spanish detectives. The key question remained: were they acting on their own initiative or on orders from above? The *GAL* affair came in the wake of a succession of petty scandals involving the Socialists' inability, or unwillingness, to draw a line between what they were entitled to in their private and official capacities: González took his family holiday on board Franco's old yacht, Vice-president Alfonso Guerra commandeered a military jet to avoid a traffic jam on the way back from his Easter holiday, Pilar Miró was accused of using the party's money to buy clothes and jewellery for herself and presents for her friends. (Hooper, J., *The New Spaniards*, p. 62-3).

<sup>107</sup> Julio Anguita, born 1941, became the Co-ordinator of *IU* in 1989. He was the mayor (elected leader of the City council) of Córdoba (1979-1986), the only communist mayor to hold office in the capital of a province since the civil war. He was elected General Secretary of *PCE* in 1988. (Sánchez, Á., *Quién es Quién en la democracia española*, p. 37).

<sup>108</sup> 'Jordi Pujol ... guaranteed that his party would not enter a coalition government with *PSOE* nor would he subscribe to a permanent pact for the duration of the parliamentary term ... Pujol is only in favour of wide agreements in the area of economy and policies relating to autonomy, because he is not confident that *PSOE* can carry out other commitments'. (*El País*, 'Pujol says that he will not form a coalition with the *PSOE*', 4/6/93, 525: 1).

towards the end of 1992 and beginning of 1993. This was provoked partly by international markets and was also partly due to the economic policies of the Socialists which were to privatise many state companies. However, although shares in public enterprises were sold off, the government invariably retained effective control. The pro-European politics of the Socialists meant that a plan for the reform of the labour laws was being considered along with a cut in welfare spending to help bring the Spanish economy in line with the conditions for entry into the single European monetary system.<sup>109</sup>

Post-electoral manoeuvres on the part of the political parties concerned proved difficult to resolve. The Catalan nationalists put off their decision as to whether to form a coalition whilst the Basque nationalists clearly refused the coalition option but said they would consider the possibility of forming pacts over legislation. In the second round of negotiations over forming a coalition government, the Catalan Nationalists played hard to get.<sup>110</sup> The Catalan nationalists were not willing to give their support to the Socialist party for nothing. Jordi Pujol, the leader of *CiU* and president of the *Generalitat*, was only prepared to lend his support to the Socialists at a price. He wanted 15% of the *IRPF* (income tax) levied in Catalonia to stay in Catalonia.

The economic policies implemented by the Socialists were more akin to the conservative Nationalists' economic policies than that of their fellow Socialists of *IU*.

---

<sup>109</sup> The leaders of the Catalan and Basque nationalist parties both demonstrated reluctance to form a coalition government with *PSOE*, as offered formally by Felipe González, on account of fear of economic failure of socialist policies that would reflect badly on their own parties. 'There was also a fear of the repercussions of the internal divisions within *PSOE* and that accusations of corruption against their possible colleagues would get out of hand'. (*El País*, 'Fear of economic failure stops the nationalist parties *CiU* and *PNV*', (21/6/93), 526: 1).

<sup>110</sup> 'The Catalan leader said that his coalition (*CiU*) was prepared to not even support the vote of confidence in favour of González if Catalonia does not receive 15% of the *IRPF*'. (*El País*, 'Political Manoeuvres', 25/6/93, 527: 12).

However, an alliance between a so-called Socialist government with the conservative Catalan ruling party was fraught with contradictions, which would eventually be the downfall of the Socialist government. An important repercussion of this pact for Catalan nationalism was the effective silencing of the Catalan Socialists who could do very little to counteract the conservative nationalist rhetoric of Jordi Pujol while their own party was so dependent on his parliamentary support. The inability of the Catalan Socialists to be critical of the policies being implemented by the nationalists meant that the debate over language policy was largely limited to that of the *Generalitat* and the right-wing anti-Catalan attack mounted by the opposition. The public discourse on language policy became polarised.

The new political power of the Catalan ethnolinguistic group, added to their already considerable economic power, gave them a great boost both within Catalonia and without. The Catalans implemented competitive strategies to gain further political power and increase the usage of the Catalan language within Catalonia. They were now in a position to start some hard bargaining to achieve greater gains for Catalonia in terms of autonomy and also to strengthen their internal policies of stepping up the Catalan normalisation process.

Felipe González finally managed to strike an agreement. He was given the vote of confidence he needed in order to form a government. The Socialist government was voted in by 159 votes, including 17 from *CiU* and 5 from *PNV*.<sup>111</sup> Not all the regional autonomies were in favour of the 15% *IRPF* but the government found they were forced into guaranteeing this in order to gain sufficient support for the budget.<sup>112</sup> 15% of the *IRPF* was

---

<sup>111</sup> *El País*, 'The Basque nationalist party refuses to enter into a coalition government due to lack of guarantees', (12/7/93), 529: 1.

<sup>112</sup> 'In the last few days Jordi Pujol increased the pressure on the government by assuring them that *CiU* would not support the budget if it did not guarantee the 15% *IRPF* and if the government did not change its economic

a relatively good deal for Catalonia because the standard of living and GNP of Catalonia was, and continues to be, high in comparison to other regions of Spain.<sup>113</sup> Manuel Chaves<sup>114</sup>, president of the *Junta* (regional government) of Andalusia, and Juan Carlos Rodríguez Ibarra<sup>115</sup>, president of the regional government of Extremadura, both of *PSOE*, raised objections to the 15% *IRPF* on the grounds that this was not enough money for their regions which were relatively poor and needed more financial support. Gabriel Cañellas<sup>116</sup>, president of the Balearic Islands, was also unhappy about the proposal because of its relatively low population but high GNP. The disagreement was about the way in which the proportion of the *IRPF* was distributed between the autonomies and regional governments. The Catalans complained of having to support the poorer regions out of their own pockets whilst some other regions were unhappy about Catalonia having relatively more money when it was already considerably wealthier than the other regions of Spain.<sup>117</sup>

---

policy concerning the support of business.' (Tobarra, S., 'The M.P. Saavedra promises Jordi Pujol that there will be changes in policies concerning the autonomous regions', *El País* (30/8/93), 536: 9).

<sup>113</sup> Ironically it should be noted that the Catalans got 30% of the *IRPF* in 1996 when Aznar needed them in order to form his government.

<sup>114</sup> Manuel Chaves, born 1945, was Minister for Employment (1986–90) and Socialist president of the Andalusian regional government since 1990. (Sánchez, Á., *Quién es Quién en la democracia española*, p. 102).

<sup>115</sup> Juan Carlos Rodríguez Ibarra, born 1948, was president of the Extremadorean regional government since December 1992 and leader of the Extremadorean Socialist Party since 1988. He was a member of Congress for the first two parliamentary terms before deciding to return to his regional community. (Sánchez, Á., *Quién es Quién en la democracia española*, p. 291).

<sup>116</sup> Gabriel Cañellas, President of the Balearic Islands 1983–1995, member of *PP*. (Sánchez, Á., *Quién es Quién en la democracia española*, p. 93).

<sup>117</sup> During September 1993 the government was not able to come to any agreement over the *IRPF*, Catalonia rejected the propositions of the Government, and the Balearic Islands, Andalusia and Extremadura raised objections. By October the Government appeared to be coming round to the Catalan point of view. 'The Catalan nationalists of *CiU* seem to have found a greater receptivity on the part of the Government concerning their



The 15% of the *IRPF* was not the only negotiating point for the Catalan nationalists who had found themselves to be in a very strong position. The process of normalising the Catalan language and the language policies that the *Generalitat* were implementing in Catalonia, especially in schools, became highlighted. Issues related to education in Catalan received a high profile in the national press.<sup>118</sup>

In December 1993, both the Basques and the Catalans demanded more control over their own policies concerning external affairs. Jordi Pujol asked for the right for the autonomous regions to represent the state in a conference of European Union Ministers.<sup>119</sup> Jordi Pujol was already interested in increasing Catalonia's influence in Europe. The support that the Socialists needed to govern was not going to be given without conditions. The Catalan nationalists wanted more control over their own autonomous region, more influence over state economic policy and more influence over foreign affairs. The Catalan ethnolinguistic group was clearly implementing strategies of direct competition with the dominant Castilian-speaking ethnolinguistic group represented by the Central government.

Many nationalists have regarded the process of European unification as a solution to the internal problems of Spanish national and ethnic diversity. The idea is that European political union will involve a surrender of power 'downwards', to the regions, as well as

---

demand for the 15% *IRPF* and an increase of powers for the autonomous regions, which has gained support for González' cabinet in the coming crucial parliamentary debates.' (*El País*, 4/10/93, 541: 11).

<sup>118</sup> Towards the end of September an article appeared in *El País* concerning Catalan language normalisation. It was confirmed that psychologists were in favour of the benefits associated with the immersion schemes. *El País*, 'The *Generalitat* confirmed that Catalan will normally be the vehicular language of education in Catalonia', (27/9/93), 540: 16.

<sup>119</sup> 'Jordi Pujol's formula would mean more opportunities for the nationalists to participate in Spanish foreign policy' (Oppenheimer, W., 'Euskadi demands its own foreign policy, Jordi Pujol asks that the autonomous regions have powers to represent the State', *El País*, 20/12/93, 552: 13).

'upwards', to a new supra-national entity, so the only divisions that will make sense will be those which separate Europe from the rest of the world and those which coincide with its natural, cultural and ethnic divisions.<sup>120</sup>

This new balance of power between the state and Catalonia as an autonomous region meant that the Catalans now had a powerful negotiating tool. This enabled them to increase their control both within Catalonia and in Spain as a whole. They could effectively approve or block any legislation that the state government wished to pass. The principle opposition party and certain conservative sections of the Castilian-speaking population outside of Catalonia were not happy about the position of power that the Catalan government was enjoying both internally and externally.<sup>121</sup>

### **3.4 The backlash to the Catalans' power**

The conservative Madrid-based press joined in the debate and criticism of language policy. *ABC* insinuated that Jordi Pujol was implementing policies that persecuted the Castilian-speaking population of Catalonia in the same way that Franco persecuted the Catalan population.

---

<sup>120</sup> Hooper, J., *The New Spaniards*, 436–7.

<sup>121</sup> Josep Antoni Durán i Lleida, the leader of the political party *Unió Democràtica*, when interviewed by *Cambio 16* defended the linguistic policies of the *Generalitat*. When it was pointed out to him that Aznar believed Felipe González to be weak when dealing with the Nationalists, he responded: 'That's his mistake: first they portray us as devils and then, with comments such as these, what Aznar is trying to say is watch out, this man is governing with devils and this is dangerous for the country. But Aznar should be aware that if tomorrow he wins the elections, the first thing he will have to do is call the devils to run his government...' (Duran i Lleida, J., *Cambio 16*, (28/2/94), 1.162: 30). This was a particularly foresighted remark considering the results of the 1996 elections and the pact formed between the *PP* and *CiU* thereafter.

The hostile reaction to the Catalan language policy of conservative politicians from outside of Catalonia was reflected in a smaller way by Castilian-speaking parents inside Catalonia. Many people came together to form a group (*Cadeca*) which co-ordinated those who defended the Castilian language. *Cadeca* demanded that the *Generalitat* respect their language of origin, Castilian.<sup>122</sup> Antonio Tercero, the vice-president of *La Cervantina*, an association that aims to protect the Castilian language in Catalonia, remarked that in the 1970s towards the end of the dictatorship, 'I had friends... studying pedagogy that were sure that teaching in another language that wasn't the mother tongue was traumatic for the children, evidently they referred to Catalan and they were right. Today many have positions in the *Generalitat* and they assure us of the contrary when the maternal language is Castilian.'<sup>123</sup>

The dominant Castilian-speaking ethnolinguistic group outside of Catalonia reacted against the competitive strategies of the Catalans by attacking the policies of Catalan normalisation. The Castilian right-wing press, in a national dialogue on Catalan issues, represented certain sections of the Castilian-speaking ethnolinguistic group. This counterattack was taken up rather weakly by a section of the Castilian ethnolinguistic group within Catalonia. Although the different political parties within Catalonia represent various positions on Catalan nationalism and autonomy, all are basically pro autonomy and have a strong Catalan leadership. The attack from outwith Catalonia mainly served to unite them in their support of Catalan issues in the face of a right-wing attack.

1994 started off with the Catalan language and the normalisation process remaining in the political forefront. Whilst the different factions of the Catalan Socialist Party (*PSC*)

---

<sup>122</sup> *Cadeca* claimed not to be against bilingualism, but against the monolingualism that was being enforced on their children in the education system.

<sup>123</sup> Gomez, J., 'Language in the dock' *Cambio* 16, (28/2/94), 1.162: 27.

fought over power and control of the party at the congress of Catalan Socialists, it remained apparent that the main problem was the pact between Pujol and González.<sup>124</sup> In the mean time the leader of the *Partido Popular* in Catalonia, Alex Vidal Quadras, gained in popularity, particularly among the immigrants and least nationalist sections of the Catalan society, at the expense of the Socialists.

The *CiU*, the *PSC*, the *PSUC* and the *ERC* are the major political parties in Catalonia. They offer differing interpretations of Catalan nationalism and present distinct images of Catalonia and its relation to Spain, proposing alternative projects for the future. The *PSC* represented a different kind of Catalanism to *CiU*. Whereas *CiU* were interested in winning further autonomy and home rule for Catalonia and were in favour of a clear distinction between the 'historical autonomies' and the other regional areas of Spain, the Catalan Socialists tended to be more in favour of Catalanism in the form of federalism with all the regions of Spain equally recognised. Socialist and Communists envisage a development of the Autonomous Communities System that would turn Spain into a federal state. There have been some differences between the two parties in terms of the degree of autonomy Catalonia should enjoy, and a slightly different emphasis given to Catalan national identity. The *PSC* and *PSUC* (later merged into *IC*) showed great concern for the integration of immigrants from other parts of Spain and regarded Catalan culture as one in which indigenous and immigrant elements should merge, giving rise to a distinct and new identity. The Communists' discourse emphasised Catalonia as a nation integrated within the single state of Spain. The Catalan communists defined Spain as a multinational state and pointed out that recognition of sovereignty and national trends are the initial conditions for a

---

<sup>124</sup> The leader of the Catalan Socialists remarked 'to seduce the electorate here (in Catalonia) with our own message of socialism is an impossible mission whilst González and Pujol are seen sitting together on the sofa'. Santos, C. and Gomez, J., *Cambio 16*, (21/2/94), 1.161: 26.

democratic advance towards a federal union. They regarded the Autonomous Communities System as a step in the process leading to federalism.

On 27 January 1994, the day of a general strike in Spain, more than ten years after the *Ley de Normalización Lingüística del Catalán* was passed unanimously by parliament, an article in *El Periódico* reported that the Supreme Tribunal was examining the possibility that three articles of this law were unconstitutional.<sup>125</sup> If the Supreme Tribunal decided that these articles were unconstitutional, this decision would affect not only the linguistic legislation of Catalonia but also the other five autonomous regions that have a state of co-officiality between Castilian and the language specific to their particular region.<sup>126</sup>

### **The Generalitat's response to the debate on language policy**

The announcement that the Supreme Tribunal remitted three articles of the of the Catalan Language Normalisation Law to the Constitutional Tribunal provoked a strong reaction from the *Generalitat* who emphasised the importance of language policy as fundamental to

<sup>125</sup> The first article in question was 14.1, which declares Catalan to be the appropriate language of education. The Supreme Tribunal doubted this on the basis that, in the autonomous regions, where there are two official languages there should also be two languages of education. In 14.2 it is indicated that children have the right to primary education in their first language. It is questioned if this right is refused in later stages of education, and if this is the case, whether it is contrary to the Constitution, which establishes that the official language of the state is Castilian and that other languages will be official in their autonomous regions, without the obligation to know them. The Supreme Tribunal also questioned article 14.4 which states that all children have to be able to use Catalan and Castilian correctly by the end of their primary education, and article 15, which states that they will only be awarded the certificate of satisfactory completion of basic education if they have a sufficient level of both Catalan and Castilian. Concerning article 20, which stipulates that Catalan is the normal vehicular language of expression in school, the Supreme Tribunal asked whether this relegates Castilian to an abnormal status. (Peirón, F. and Marchena, D., 'The Public Prosecutor believes that the Catalan Normalisation Law is constitutional', *La Vanguardia*, (11/2/94), p. 10).

<sup>126</sup> Carbó, I., 'Pujol accentuates the fact that the Catalan language is the key to the Generalitat's policies in Catalonia and in Spain', *Avui*, (31/1/94), p. 3.

the state of the autonomies and particularly to the politics of the *Generalitat*.<sup>127</sup> Jordi Pujol defended the immersion programs and language policy in schools generally, on the basis that Catalan in Catalonia continues to be in an inferior position relative to Castilian. He stated that the object of language policy was to ensure that everyone in Catalonia knows both Catalan and Castilian. He believed this could be achieved through education and with time.<sup>128</sup> His second major argument in defence of language policy was that he wished at all costs to avoid a situation of having two separate language communities, each sending their children to separate schools. In response to the Supreme Tribunal casting doubt on whether the Catalan Language Normalisation Law could generate discrimination, Pujol emphasised the aim of achieving an increased knowledge of Catalan without detracting from people's proficiency in Castilian.<sup>129</sup> Certain parallels could be drawn between the paternalistic rhetoric promoting bilingualism used during the Franco period and the line of argument used by Jordi Pujol, although he is actually arguing for equality within a democratic framework as oppose to repression of a language within a dictatorship.

José M. Álvarez Suárez<sup>130</sup>, general secretary of the *UGT*, pointed out that the normalisation of Catalan in schools by means of linguistic immersion was highly rated by the majority of parents and professionals all over the world. He argued that, in the same way as the normalisation law of 1983 was established, the progressive use of Catalan in schools

---

<sup>127</sup> Jordi Pujol pointed out 'this law is the cornerstone of the policies of the *Generalitat*, not only in relation to Catalonia but also in relation to the rest of Spain' (Gomez, J., 'Pujol says that Catalan is a cornerstone of the *Generalitat*'s policies', *Cambio 16*, (28/2/94), 1.162: 26).

<sup>128</sup> 'Pujol is confident that The Constitutional Tribunal will support The Catalan Normalisation Law passed in 1983' *El País*, 31/1/1994, p. 22.

<sup>129</sup> 'After eleven years of this law being implemented it has contributed to the increase in knowledge of Catalan, without harming knowledge of Castilian.' (Carbo, I., *Avui* (31/1/94), p. 3).

<sup>130</sup> José María Álvarez, born 1956, General Secretary of the Catalan *UGT* since 1990 (Sánchez, Á., *Quién es Quién en la democracia española*, p. 29).



was carried out with the agreement of parents, teachers, and institutions, and therefore had always contributed to and promoted *convivencia*<sup>131</sup>

The criticisms of Catalan language policy from, first, the Madrid press, then, the group of parents who wanted the right to have their children educated in Castilian, and last, the Supreme Tribunal questioning the constitutionality of the Catalan Language Normalisation Law, provoked discussion on language normalisation issues in many arenas of social life. Accusations of anti-Catalanism were rife. Joan Guitart<sup>132</sup>, the Minister for Culture of the Catalan Government, went as far as to suggest that if the Constitutional Tribunal declared the Normalisation Law unconstitutional it would be necessary to change the constitution. He announced the intentions of the *Generalitat*: 'not only will we maintain the present linguistic policy, but that it will be further developed in the future.'<sup>133</sup> He then reported to the Parliament, in very vague terms, the outline of the new plan.<sup>134</sup> There is a

---

<sup>131</sup> Álvarez Suárez, J., 'The Catalan language in schools' *El Periódico*, (20/2/94), p. 23.

<sup>132</sup> Joan Guitart, born 1937, has been a member of the Catalan *Generalitat* since Pujol became president in 1980, first as Minister for Education then as Minister for Culture. He has been actively involved in the promotion and implementation of the Catalan normalisation process. (Sánchez, Á., *Quién es Quién en la democracia española*, p. 173.)

<sup>133</sup> Sabriá, S., 'The Catalan Government gives a new push to the normalisation of Catalan,' *El Periódico*, (18/2/94), p. 3.

<sup>134</sup> The new plan, which has been formulated in order to further promote the use of Catalan, consists of five parts: First, to extend the use of the Catalan language. To ensure that all citizens will be able to express themselves and be attended in their own language in all activities public or private, individual or collective, spoken or written: in other words, to guarantee a linguistic option. Second, to promote the Catalan language in the whole of Spain, the objective being to obtain recognition of Catalan as a language of the state; in addition, promotion of the teaching of Catalan in Spanish universities and to empower its presence in the diplomatic representations of the state. Third, to co-ordinate the institutional use of Catalan. 'To obtain a satisfactory co-ordination of all programmes of linguistic normalisation: between the departments of the *Generalitat*, the different administrative bodies, the public and private institutions of each sector, and all mediums of communication.' Fourth, to co-ordinate the institutionalisation of linguistic normalisation programmes with other communities

clear pattern of any attack on the Catalan language especially coming from outside of Catalonia being met by an even stronger resolve to defend its position and, in this case, strengthen it. This type of remark illustrates clearly how an attack from without in the context of the political climate of the time only served to strengthen and unify Catalans of a wide variety of political persuasions.

The *Generalitat* reacted to the controversy over language policy by asserting its conviction that nothing that had been done was unconstitutional and that all concerned had supported the implementation of the Catalan Language Normalisation Law overwhelmingly. The implication was that any complaints had come from a small minority, which was latched onto by the supposedly anti-Catalan Madrid press and blown out of proportion for political reasons. The *Generalitat* did not halt or hesitate in any way but seemed determined to carry on formulating the proposal for the reform of the Catalan Language Normalisation Law. The proposed reform was said not to be in any way connected to the polemic but, on the contrary, was intended to strengthen policy by enforcing implementation of what was already within the objectives of the 1983 act.

Only one month later the Superior Tribunal of Justice of Catalonia put an end to the doubts concerning the legality of linguistic immersion in Catalan.<sup>135</sup> Education in Catalan

---

where Catalan is spoken which would mean extending the linguistic agreement between the Catalan *Generalitat*, the Valencian *Generalitat*, and the government of the Balearic Islands. Last, to increase the international presence of Catalan: 'In the international context, especially in Europe, to situate the Catalan linguistic community on an equal status with other similar communities'. (Sabriá, S., 'Central points of the plan', *El Periódico*, 18/2/94, p. 3).

<sup>135</sup> 'The Superior Tribunal of Justice of Catalonia guaranteed in a ruling the continuation of linguistic immersion, however, it took its limits into account. If parents ask for it, the pupil has the right to receive his or her education in Castilian until he or she is seven years old.' (Alós, E., 'Castilian on the menu', *El Periódico*, (6/3/94), p. 24).

without separate classrooms for Castilian-speaking children was ruled to be legal, as long as minimum requirements were respected: If parents require it, education can be conducted in Castilian until the age of seven and two subjects taught in Castilian after this age. The judges said that education could be carried out in the habitual language of the Castilian-speaking pupils by means of individual attention within the linguistic immersion classroom.<sup>136</sup>

From the newspaper debate of this period, it became obvious that the normalisation of Catalan was moving into a new stage. Whereas previously Catalanisation of education had been gradual with stated objectives, now these objectives were going to be enforced. The enforcement of certain policies had obviously provoked a certain amount of valid concern about the availability of resources and possible discrimination that might result and cause a backlash to the normalisation process itself. It also became evident that there was a political agenda on a wider level that was taking advantage of local uncertainties and using these as a platform for political manoeuvring at the level of state.

The ethnographic research carried out for this thesis, which explores language attitudes in the sphere of education, took place in this political climate. It would seem probable that the political manoeuvring of political parties at this time had some bearing on the language attitudes of educationalists, teachers, pupils and parents. The discourses on language policy as expressed by the Catalan population were rooted in the wider political

---

<sup>136</sup> Angels Gonzalez, General Director of Education of the *Generalitat*, informed the school directors of the lines along which individualised attention in Castilian should be conducted. 'Attention to these pupils should be carried out by means of diverse organisational strategies that are compatible to their specific learning needs with consideration of appropriateness to the class group: the teacher should produce materials in the habitual language, organisation of flexible groups or individual attention when necessary.' (Alós, E., 'Castilian on the menu' *El Periodico*, (6/3/94), p. 24).

and historical context. Catalan language policy became a symbol of Catalan power not only within the autonomous region but also in relation to the balance of power between the state and the autonomous regions of Spain. Certain sections of the two ethnolinguistic groups were implementing competitive strategies, particularly over language, the balance of power between the state and the region was changing and hence the discourse on language became political and heated. The alignment of different sections of the Catalan community with various strands of this discourse was being renegotiated. Patterns of ethnolinguistic interaction were changing – linguistically and politically this was a dynamic period of change.

### **3.6 The Socialist government faces many corruption scandals**

By May of 1994 the Socialist government was seriously embroiled in scandals concerning corruption.<sup>137</sup> This meant that they became more and more dependent on the Catalan nationalists in order to remain in power.<sup>138</sup> The succession of scandals that followed for the Socialists deflected the attention of the media away from Catalan language policies, though the conditional support of Pujol never ceased to be at the centre of attention. Pujol concentrated more on ensuring an economic policy that he believed would be beneficial for Spain and, of course, Catalonia.

---

<sup>137</sup> Luis Roldán, born 1943, was General Director of the *Guardia Civil* from 1986 to 1993. Accused of and investigated for corruption, he fled the country in April 1994. His escape from justice prompted the resignation of Antoni Asunción, the Minister for Internal Affairs. He was accused of appropriating 1.187 million pesetas. (Sánchez, Á., *Quién es Quién en la democracia española*, (1995), p. 296).

<sup>138</sup> The Catalan nationalist Miquel Roca met with a Socialist member of parliament in the gallery that goes around the houses of Parliament. The Socialist commented 'Are you putting your boots on (getting ready to give us a good kicking)? The response of Roca could be considered a precise political commentary of that time: 'No you are putting them on for us.' (Santos, C., 'I'll get out the way', *Cambio 16*, (16/5/94), 1.173: 19).

In May of 1994, Pujol and González met to reaffirm their pact. The scandals and resignations that were plaguing González meant that he needed reassurance from Pujol that he still had his support. Likewise, Pujol needed to be assured that González was not going to abandon his post but was going to battle on in the direction they had agreed, particularly in relation to economic policy. Pujol knew that this support was causing certain problems at home but obviously considered that the role of state politician had some compensations.<sup>139</sup>

Jordi Pujol demanded spectacular resignations, drastic and immediate decisions, and explanations to be made in Parliament. Whilst González reorganised his government from top to bottom, Julio Anguita (the leader of *IU*) and José María Aznar (the leader of *PP*) reminded him that the only dignified solution would be for González to abandon his position. There was some speculation in the press as to the motives behind Pujol's support of the Socialist government. It was suggested that he was more concerned with neutralising the Socialist opposition in Catalonia so that his control over the *Generalitat* would be guaranteed.<sup>140</sup> Those that appeared to be most happy with the situation created by the support of Pujol for González were the Conservatives. Enrique Lacalle of the *Partido Popular* noted that many members and voters of the *CiU* who were unhappy about the Pujol-González pact were showing renewed interest in the *PP*.<sup>141</sup>

### **3.7 The European and Andalusian elections**

The European elections of 12<sup>th</sup> June 1994 and the Andalusian elections of the same day brought about a new era of politics for the Socialists. The Socialists lost the European

---

<sup>139</sup> Gómez, J., 'United for the moment', *Cambio 16*, (16/5/94), 1.173: 20.

<sup>140</sup> 'His voice is the only voice that appears to represent Catalonia within the Spanish state ... His dream of becoming eternal in the power of Catalonia, to be recorded in history as the president that did the most for his country, each day comes nearer.' (Gómez, J., *Cambio 16*, (6/6/94), 1.176: 27).

<sup>141</sup> *Cambio 16*, 6/6/94, 1.176: 26.

elections by a larger margin than they had thought possible. The *PP* won 40% of the vote leaving the Socialists 30%. In Andalusia, traditionally the Socialists' strongest region, they only held onto 38% of the vote with the *PP* winning 34%.<sup>142</sup> The results of both elections for the Socialists were worse than even Aznar had dared to hope for. González appeared to be losing control of the political situation.<sup>143</sup>

The situation was serious for the Socialists. However, González was not prepared to entertain any drastic change in course. He continued to rely on Pujol who was still enabling him to govern by not withdrawing the support of the Catalan nationalists.<sup>144</sup> However, Anguita remarked that carrying on as if nothing had happened could be the worse line of action for the party.<sup>145</sup>

The outcome of the Andalusian elections meant that *PSOE* needed the support of *IU* in order to govern effectively in Andalusia. Pujol became nervous in case the renewed importance of *IU* for the Socialist government might persuade them to change political or economic policy. The hostility between *CiU* and *IU* meant that González was stuck in the middle of a tug-of-war and had to choose which way to give.<sup>146</sup>

---

<sup>142</sup> Santos, C., *Cambio 16*, (20/6/94), 1.178: 17.

<sup>143</sup> 'The worst situation for Felipe González ... is that he is no longer in control of his future, nor his government, nor his party. The key to the future depends on Pujol. Guerra, who can depend on the loyalty of fifty-odd MPs, has another copy of this key. Since the 12th of June there exists yet another copy of this key which is in the hands of Anguita, leader of the United Left (*IU*).' (Santos, C., *Cambio 16*, (20/6/94), 1.178: 17).

<sup>144</sup> 'It is in Pujol's interest that the present status is prolonged for as long as possible so that he can reap the harvest of his support.' (Santos, C., *Cambio 16*, (27/6/94), 1.179: 16).

<sup>145</sup> Anguita pointed out that 'In *PSOE* there is a clamour for a turn to the left and the pact with Pujol is not seen in a good light' (Santos, C., *Cambio 16*, (27/6/94), 1.179: 16).

<sup>146</sup> 'The message and advice from Pujol was that if he continues to maintain economic policy, "which is considered to be leading out of the economic crises", then he could count on their support. In which case they wouldn't



The general elections of 1993 put *PSOE* in a precarious parliamentary situation. For González, the only possible alliance was with the Nationalists, given that they agreed over a centre-right social and economic policy. So the reform of the labour market identified the Socialists and Nationalists as political and economic allies. The alliance with *CiU* represented both a failure and a means of survival for González. Thanks to Pujol, González was able to maintain power and a parliamentary majority but this was a precarious and particularly unstable situation as he was unable to integrate the nationalists into the government of Spain. Pujol was not prepared to commit himself and his party to an unconditional support of the Socialists as this would have detracted from the negotiating power he hoped to gain over Catalan issues.<sup>147</sup>

The failure of González in the European and Andalusian elections meant that the support of the Nationalists was even more necessary, not only in parliament, but also in \_\_\_\_\_, in order to maintain the government. However, the intervention of Pujol led to some humiliating episodes for the government moving the centre of decisions from the Moncloa Parliament to the *Generalitat*. González made the most of the criticisms from Anguita and Aznar over the pact with *CiU*, by turning them into an incapacity of *PP* to understand Catalonia, and a paranoiac vision of Catalonia on the part of Anguita. This was an unexpected present for Pujol whose political action has always relied on the creation of the 'exterior enemy'. González tried to achieve with Spain the same as Pujol had achieved with Catalonia: to be identified with the Spanish State and represent it personally. By so doing,

---

mind if *IU* had a certain weight in the political decisions concerning Andalusia. "But to vary the general direction of policy in order to maintain a local political space would not be well received or accepted. González should decide what is most convenient".' Gomez. J., *Cambio 16*, (27/6/94), 1.179: 25.

<sup>147</sup> It was not in Pujol's interest to integrate into the Spanish government as this would mean abandoning the historical ambiguity between Barcelona and Madrid, the enemy exterior to Catalonia, which has been so important in terms of building a sense of Catalan identity (Alonso de los Ríos, C., *Cambio 16*, (1/8/94), 1.184: 32.

any attack on him or his policies appeared to be an attack on the only solution to the problem of national-regional Spain. However, it was pointed out in the press that this strategy could backfire by causing Pujol to become nervous about his support at home in Catalonia.<sup>148</sup>

### **3.8 Pujol as representative of Catalonia**

Towards the end of August and in the first half of September 1994 Jordi Pujol and Catalonia became the target of many criticisms and controversial comments. However, the polemic appeared to reinforce his position in Catalonia and hence made his support of González even more expensive. On 11 September 1994, *La Diada* (national Catalan day), Julio Anguita, the leader of *IU*, made a controversial comment comparing Pujol's nationalism to that of Franco.<sup>149</sup> Jordi Pujol did not appear to be too upset about the criticisms – he knew how to make the most of them. Not only did they emphasise the confusion over his persona and Catalonia, it also meant that he could sell his support to González at an even higher price.<sup>150</sup>

The criticism from Julio Anguita, the leader of *IU*, and the response it produced in Catalonia only goes to show how any attack on Pujol could be construed as an attack on

---

<sup>148</sup> 'González is too enthusiastic in his defence of Pujol from supposed hatred emanating from the Andalusians, Extremadurians, Socialists, *PP* supporters and militants of *IU*. So much enthusiasm makes Pujol suspicious, so much so that he may feel obliged to escape the protecting embrace of González simply for fear of being strangled by love'. Alonso de los Rios, C., *Cambio 16*, (1/8/94), 1.184: 33.

<sup>149</sup> 'The self interested policy of confusion that Jordi Pujol uses to compare any attacks on his person or his policies as being attacks on all of Catalonia is exactly the same as Franco did when democratic international opinion attacked his régime and he invited the Spaniards to defend Spain. It's the same method. We haven't advanced much.' Anguita, J., *Cambio 16*, (12/8/94), 1.186:34.

<sup>150</sup> Yet *CiU* lost votes in the 1996 elections. Pujol's support of González did have some repercussions on his popularity within Catalonia.

Catalonia and served to unite Catalans of many political persuasions against the 'exterior enemy'. This attitude is exemplified by the response of Rafael Ribó<sup>151</sup>, the leader of IC<sup>152</sup>, a colleague of Anguita in Catalonia, who came out in defence of Pujol and against Anguita simply because such an attack by someone from outside Catalonia could not be defended by another Catalan. Pujol came to be viewed by some as personally representing Catalonia.<sup>153</sup> It seemed that any criticism of Pujol from outside of Catalonia only served to strengthen his position within Catalonia and seriously damage the credibility of the opposition to Pujol within Catalonia.<sup>154</sup>

The whole debate over language policy in Catalonia at this time suffered from the same problem. The fact that the right-wing opposition opened the attack on Pujol's language policy meant that any left-wing opposition to Pujol within Catalonia was not in a position to criticise for fear of being construed as being anti-Catalan, anti-autonomy and therefore anti-democratic. In this sense one can see how the political polarisation of the

---

<sup>151</sup> Rafael Ribó, born 1945, president since 1987 of *Iniciativa per Catalunya*. Member of congress since 1993 as a member of the federal parliamentary group IU-IC, of which Julio Anguita is President. (Sánchez, Á., *Quién es Quién en la democracia española*, 1995, p. 284.)

<sup>152</sup> Ribó and IC left IU in 1997 because of political disagreement between Anguita and Ribó.

<sup>153</sup> 'Pujol represents the nation and Anguita is from outside of Catalonia, and hence incapable of understanding something as complicated as Catalonia, because those that are not Catalans do not have the sensitivity to interpret what happens inside Catalonia ... Rafael Ribó can criticise Pujol but not somebody from outside of Catalonia'. (Alonso de los Rios, C., *Cambio 16*, (26/9/94), 1.192: 30).

<sup>154</sup> Rafael Ribó in an interview for *Cambio 16* said 'We are trying to criticise Pujol for confusing his persona with that of Catalonia and so hide the problems behind the national question ... So when Julio Anguita compares Pujol to Franco it means all our criticism loses credibility. To finish off he assures us that he is defending a class position whilst *Iniciativa* is trapped by the national issue... when in fact he is defending the other national option: the Spanish one. In effect he is leaving the field open for Jordi Pujol.' (interview by Casal, S., *Cambio 16*, (26/9/94), 1.192: 32).

discourse on Catalan normalisation was able to channel ethnolinguistic loyalties and forge a tentative union between different sections of the ethnolinguistic groups within Catalonia.

1995 started well for the pact between the Socialist government and the Catalan nationalists. Pujol appeared to be prepared to continue his support of González.<sup>155</sup> Pujol was still able to push for new legislation that was favourable for Catalan autonomy. In March the President of the *Generalitat* asked for more distinction between regions and nationalities.<sup>156</sup> However, towards the end of March *CiU* became divided over continuing support for the Socialists. Josep Antoni Durán i Lleida, the leader of *CDC*, the party which is allied to *CiU*, wanted to finish the pact with González and establish a timetable for the general elections. This meant the end of the united front of Jordi Pujol's party in relation to supporting the Socialist government. However, Pujol had not finished yet and continued to support the government despite the crisis of the peseta and further scandal concerning Roldán, the Director of the *Guardia Civil*.<sup>157</sup>

### **3.9 Local and regional elections prove hazardous for the Socialists**

In April the electoral battle for the autonomous regions and town councils began. Felipe González declared his intention to form pacts with *IU* in town councils, as had happened previously, and thought that this policy of alliances would not endanger the parliamentary pact between *PSOE* and the Catalan nationalists. However, Jordi Pujol declared that an

---

<sup>155</sup> 'The President of the *Generalitat* of Catalonia and of *CiU*, Jordi Pujol, has promised personally his support of the Government of Felipe González for the length of the parliamentary term; which would be until June 1997.' (*El País*, 23/1/95, 609: 1).

<sup>156</sup> 'Jordi Pujol in his next appearance before the Senate will show that the reform going through the high chamber should take account of the "double composition" of Spain between regions and nationalities, an euphemism for nations, he added, "which doesn't fool anybody".' (Paster, C., *El País*, (27/3/95), 618: 15).

<sup>157</sup> González's weakness meant that Pujol's dream, that the *Generalitat* should become 'the state' in Catalonia, could become real. (Horcajo, X., *Cambio 16*, (27/3/95), 1.218: 36).

alliance, outside of the town councils or autonomous regions, between Socialists and *IU* would provoke a rethinking of the support of González's Government.<sup>158</sup>

On Sunday 28 May, Spain decided to punish *PSOE* by voting for the right. *PP* gained a victory over the Socialists and won in most of the town councils and autonomous regions.<sup>159</sup> The election results provoked further debate as to whether Felipe González should continue as leader of the Socialist party and the Government, whether he should change the most burnt-out ministers of his cabinet, or if he should just continue as if nothing had happened. The electoral failure of *PSOE* did not provoke the promise of any great changes from González.<sup>160</sup> The blow to the Socialists was not so serious that it was considered a foregone conclusion that they would lose the next general election even after all the scandal and controversy of the last year.<sup>161</sup> *PSOE* found it impossible to reach a

---

<sup>158</sup> 'Jordi Pujol announced his fear that a possible pact between *PSOE* and *IU* in order to govern town councils and autonomies would have repercussions on the socio-economic policies of the government that would introduce changes contrary to the criterion that the Catalan nationalists defend and that justify their parliamentary support of Felipe González. The President of the *Generalitat* predicted that *IU* would not give their support to *PSOE* free and warned that a situation of this sort could condition the support of *CiU* of the Government from the first of January 1996.' (*El País*, 8/5/95, 624: 15).

<sup>159</sup> 'The *PP* were the most voted for in 17 of the 20 principal Spanish cities and in 10 of the 13 autonomous regions that held elections ... Spain finds itself in a difficult political situation to manage.' (*El País*, 29/5/95, 627: 11).

<sup>160</sup> 'The General Secretary of *PSOE* has opted for a strategy of continuing with the general direction of policies. The President of the government affirms his leadership by not opting for any great change in direction and explains the electoral failure in terms of a loss of support from the centre of political opinion.' (*El País*, 5/6/95, 628: 1).

<sup>161</sup> 'It's clear that the setback suffered by the Socialists on the 28 May is very important. But it is also clear that it wasn't as serious as the right would have liked.' (Orozco, R., *Cambio 16*, (12/6/95), 1.229: 5).

global agreement with *IU* over the formation of pacts in order to govern the town councils and autonomous regions.<sup>162</sup>

The failures of the Socialists in the autonomous and local elections provoked a reaction in the left wing of Spanish politics. *IU*, the principle party to the left of *PSOE*, found itself divided internally: the reformists were in favour of pacts with *PSOE*, whereas the others, who came from *PCE*, believed this to be unthinkable as they wished to distance themselves from, and hence benefit from, the unpopularity of *PSOE*.<sup>163</sup> The instability and the problems associated with the governing Socialist party meant that the left had to rethink its position and strategies for the next general election and probable defeat of *PSOE*.

The reluctance of *IU* to form coalitions with *PSOE* in the autonomous and local elections provoked accusations, from *PSOE*, of pacts between *PP* and *IU*. *PSOE*'s secretary of political relations, José María Benegas<sup>164</sup>, who was also the leader of the Socialists in the Basque Country, thought that *IU* did not want to form a pact with *PSOE* and believed that Anguita and Aznar agreed to favour *PP* in some of the autonomous communities. José María Benegas stated, in an interview with *Cambio 16*, that he did not

---

<sup>162</sup> 'Julio Anguita managed to impose his will over negotiating political pacts with *PSOE*, "each case should be negotiated separately" and that there would be no preconditions over pacts with either the Socialists or *PP*.' (*El País*, 12/6/95, 629: 1).

<sup>163</sup> 'The coalition, that was born in 1986 to go beyond a sinking *PCE* and a *PSOE* in crisis, has turned into a divided party, governed by old leaders of the *PCE*.' (*Cambio 16*, 26/6/95, 1.231: 38).

<sup>164</sup> 'Txiki' José María Benegas, born 1948, was secretary of *PSOE* for ten years (1984–94). In 1994 he became responsible for political and institutional relations. (Sánchez, Á., *Quién es Quién en la democracia española*, 1995, p. 68).



believe it was incoherent to form pacts at a regional level with *IU* and to have a pact with *CiU*.<sup>165</sup>

Mariano Santiso, the co-ordinator of the presidency of *IU*, denied that they had formed pacts with *PP*. In his opinion, *PSOE* was paralysed by the scandals, and was further weighed down by Felipe González. He went on to assert that *IU* had not formed pacts but had acted in order to best defend its own candidates and programmes. He confirmed that the strategy of *IU* was to continue to consolidate a left alternative to the ruling Socialist party.<sup>166</sup>

### **3.10. The Catalan nationalists waver in their support of the government**

Towards the end of June 1995 it became apparent that problems were emerging which might jeopardise the Catalan nationalists' support of the Socialist Government. The problem arose over the issue of abortion. The Socialists proposed a new fourth category, which would include socio-economic reasons, should be decriminalised. The proposed reform was forcefully opposed by *UDC*. However, the problem appeared to be more general as Pujol commented that it seemed that some of the Socialist ministers no longer wanted the support of the Catalans. According to an article in *Cambio 16* headlined '*Divorcio a la catalana*',

---

<sup>165</sup> Benegas said that: 'in this administration we have had agreements with *IU* at a municipal and regional level, and at the same time, we have looked for the only parliamentary support that was possible. In politics one has to differentiate between what one would like to do and what one is able to do. With *IU* it is impossible because of their opinions about economic and European policy. Their strategy, which has been a failure in these elections, implies a destruction of the left opposition. If they wish to destroy, and undermine, and situate themselves in the camp of the ideological right, they cannot at the same time form pacts with us. Moreover, it is a mistake to categorise the nationalists as parties of the right; they are inter classist.' (Pérez, J., *Cambio 16* (26/6/95), 1.231: 40).

<sup>166</sup> Pérez, J., *Cambio 16*, (26/6/95), 1.231: 41.

the main culprit was the Minister of Transport José Borrell<sup>167</sup>, who was considered by the Catalans to be 'the most centralist of all the government ministers and the most anti-autonomy. Josep Sánchez Llibre, from *UDC*, remarked 'he holds jacobin tendencies, which makes it very difficult to work with him.'<sup>168</sup> Josep Antoni Durán i Lleida, the president of the government committee of *Unió Democràtica*, spoke out against Borrell and the government in an interview with *Cambio 16*.<sup>169</sup>

Antonio Elorza, professor of political thought, commented on the historical and modern day relationship between the Spanish state and Catalonia in an article titled 'An Historical Imbalance'. He traced the roots of the modern Catalan nationalist sentiment to its politics, which were typified by a profound reaction against the central state (as represented by Madrid) and its archaic economic and political institutions. However, at the same time there is a realisation that the modernity of Catalonia needs, primarily for economic reasons, a transformation of Spain, whose market depends on Catalan industry; hence the desire for an active intervention in Spanish politics that is modernising and at the same time laden with conservatism.<sup>170</sup>

The support of the Catalan nationalists became progressively less certain. The failure of the Socialists in the municipal elections, the proposed reform of the abortion law, and

---

<sup>167</sup> Josep Borrell, born 1947, who was minister for public works and transport since 1991 then won the nomination for the presidency of the *PSOE* in April 98, though he later gave it up to Zapatero.

<sup>168</sup> Horcajo, X., *Cambio 16*, (26/6/95), 1.231: 32.

<sup>169</sup> He stated that José Borrell 'always seems to be against our plans. I think that the government is using the issue of abortion to convince the voters that it is moving to the left.' Durán i Lleida was reported to believe 'that the Government can't keep its promises to *CiU* because it's aware of its weakness and lack of internal cohesion.' However, he still appeared to be in favour of the Government continuing in power in order to continue various pending policy reforms for at least a few more years. (*Cambio 16*, 26/6/95, 1.231: 36).

<sup>170</sup> *Cambio 16*, 26/6/95, 1.231: 37.

fresh concerns over scandal all contributed to a climate of uncertainty.<sup>171</sup> The following week Jordi Pujol made public the coalition's intention to terminate the pact of global support of the government due to the scandal surrounding the illegal telephone tapping carried out by the Spanish secret services of various public figures.<sup>172</sup>

### **3.11 The Socialists face further corruption scandals**

July 1995 brought fresh scandal and embarrassment for the government. An article in *Cambio 16* entitled 'Conspiracy or Witch Hunt' reported the González government's latest crisis, the publication of telephone conversations which had been recorded by the secret services.<sup>173</sup>

A further article in *Cambio 16* likened the political situation to a game of chess:

'... where the white queen, Felipe González, finds himself in check and has to move. But by so doing, he exposes his castle, Narcís Serra. The black queen attacks, then someone unknown who promises to reveal their identity who is helped by castles such

---

<sup>171</sup> 'Jordi Pujol declared that the case of *CESID* and the measures adopted as a consequence of this scandal could condition Catalan support and the stability of the central government ... Pujol insinuated that Narcís Serra should resign.' (*El País*, 19/6/95, 630: 13).

<sup>172</sup> *El País*, 26/6/95, 631: 1.

<sup>173</sup> 'Isolated against an accusing opposition, Felipe González wants to demonstrate that there is a conspiracy against the state, meanwhile José María Aznar warns that he will not permit a witch hunt because of the publication of telephone conversations recorded by the secret services. The succession of scandals and the possible break down of the pact formed with the Catalan nationalists could bring forward the date of the general elections.' The case of *CESID*, the illegal telephone tapping discovered to have been carried out by the secret services, was reported to have divided the country. 'On the one hand, there are those that believe that there exists a plot or conspiracy against the State; on the other hand, there are those that fear a witch hunt of security agents and journalists that have published taped conversations illegally. Then, there are those that reject both hypotheses and contemplate, gravely, the discovery of the most serious scandal of the Socialist era.' (Perez, J., *Cambio 16*, (3/7/95), 1.232: 18).

as Mario Conde and Javier de la Rosa. The pieces are on the board. The illegal telephone tapping carried out by the Spanish secret service are the last throes of a battle between the government and the opposition, who demand resignation for the scandal, and the treachery of police and spies. The Socialists believe that businessmen such as Conde or De La Rosa are manoeuvring against them.<sup>174</sup>

González managed to defuse the crises of the illegal telephone tapping of *CESID* by firing the Vice President Narcís Serra and the Minister of Defence, Julián García Vargas. This measure left the opposition and some Socialist members of parliament unsatisfied: they were hoping for a broader remodelling of the Government. González was saved from an untimely end due to the scheduled beginning of the Spanish presidency of the European Union. Pujol did not want the European presidency disrupted by more scandal.<sup>175</sup>

The problems faced by the socialists over corruption allegations and failing support in the regional elections only served to strengthen the negotiating power of the Catalans over both internal policies and matters of state economics. Pujol became famous for his clever manipulation of the situation to the benefit of the Catalan population. Although there was a certain amount of external criticism over the situation most Catalans, even those that would not vote for him, held a certain admiration for his clever manipulation of affairs. So how did all this political manoeuvring and negotiating affect the way the ethnic groups in Catalonia were relating and interacting on an every day basis? The success the Catalans were enjoying

---

<sup>174</sup> *Cambio 16*, 3/7/95, 1.232:24.

<sup>175</sup> 'It would not be convenient for Pujol if the European presidency is disturbed by more internal scandals. So whilst it lasts, he will continue to support the Government, or so he will try, in order to extract the pieces of the puzzle that are missing from his jigsaw of Catalan autonomy and start the campaign of the Catalan elections with his basket full of concessions, laws modified to his and his genuine supporters' liking, and a 1996 budget tailored to his image and likeness.' (*Cambio 16*, (10/7/95), 1.233: 14).

resulted in a strengthening of the structural variables thought to influence ethnolinguistic vitality. The Catalans were gaining further control over their own affairs, more money was staying within Catalonia, and they were gaining more control over external affairs affecting Spain as a whole. The normalisation process was stepped up and there was very little resistance from the Castilian ethnolinguistic group within Catalonia, who seemed to be concentrating on learning Catalan so that they could reap some of the rewards of being a part of this successful new nation. The disunity on the left and allegations of corruption did nothing to help the relative strength of the ruling Socialists. Alternative discourses on Catalan nationalism and language policy were silenced as Pujol managed to monopolise this discourse, greatly helped by the criticism emanating from out with Catalonia from both the right and left wing of the political spectrum.

### **3.12 The European Presidency buys time for González**

Jordi Pujol was reported to be obsessed by the synchronisation of the Spanish political timetable with that of Europe. He considered it a matter of survival that Spain should reach 1999 having met all the demands of Europe. In order to achieve this aim he proposed prolonging his support of González to guarantee stability for the length of the European presidency. In return Pujol wanted general elections to be called for the following spring and a remodelling of the executive of the Socialist party to reflect the political responsibilities implied by the *CESID* scandal. Pujol recognised that prolonging his support of González would mean a sacrifice for himself and *CiU*.<sup>176</sup> It would seem that Pujol was more inclined to go for the long-term European success story rather than short-term support from his electorate.<sup>177</sup>

---

<sup>176</sup> 'A political rupture now would be convenient for us in terms of electoral popularity.' (Horcajo, X., *Cambio 16*, (10/7/95), 1.233: 20).

<sup>177</sup> Horcajo, X., *Cambio 16*, (10/7/95), 1.233: 20

Pujol knew that he would be held jointly responsible for the success of the European presidency.<sup>178</sup> Pujol, during the last couple of decades, has tried to make it clear that 'Catalonia will be international or it will not be.' He is reported to have sacrificed personal prestige for the sake of promoting the Assembly of European Regions (*ARE*). The Maastricht Treaty opened up a new route for the *ARE*, which Pujol supported rather than other more state-centred visions of Europe. Pujol was said to be obsessed with ensuring that Catalonia was included in the group of leading regions that were the motor behind Europe.<sup>179</sup>

Pujol insists on the European character of Catalonia, a feature that allows him to combine tradition and the cultivation of Catalan identity with a desire to overcome parochialism and appear as a modern European option. As early as 1964 Pujol wrote that 'Catalan nationalism has to be a form of European nationalism.'<sup>180</sup> He regards the European integration of Catalonia as a major challenge that requires constant modernisation. 'Catalonia's contribution to Europe', argues Pujol, 'stems from its capacity to offer a new concept of the European nation based upon culture, a good standard of living, strong identity and the ability to live within a larger political unity.'<sup>181</sup> According to Pujol, 'the development of this new concept of a nation capable of strengthening itself and confident enough at the same time, to accept a role as being a part of a larger political organisation, constitutes one of the most urgent challenges facing Europe.'<sup>182</sup>

---

<sup>178</sup> 'Everyone in Europe knows that González is only able to govern with the support of Pujol. This makes the Catalan President jointly responsible for the success or failure of the European presidency.' (*Cambio 16*, 10/7/95, 1.233: 20).

<sup>179</sup> *Cambio 16*, (10/7/95), 1.233: 20.

<sup>180</sup> Pujol, J., *Fer Poble, fer Catalunya*, *Construir Catalunya*, (Portic: Barcelona, 1980), p. 121.

<sup>181</sup> Pujol, J., *La personalitat diferenciada de Catalunya*, (Generalitat de Catalunya: Barcelona, 1991), p. 74.

<sup>182</sup> Pujol, J., *La personalitat diferenciada de Catalunya*, p. 32.



González answered the demands for early general elections at the beginning of July.<sup>183</sup> By this time González appeared to be resigned to having to give up his government before he had hoped in order to smooth the way for the European presidency. González said that he wanted to negotiate the date for the next general elections. Although he would have liked to hold the elections when they were due, in the summer of 1997, he was prepared to bring them forward to the spring or autumn of 1996 in exchange for a cease-fire from the opposition.<sup>184</sup> This was interpreted as meaning that González was prepared to face the fact that he would probably lose the next general election.<sup>185</sup>

Jordi Pujol made a positive evaluation of the years of collaboration with the *PSOE*, especially in economic policy:

‘The results of these policies have been very good for all of Spain, but above all for Catalonia ... On the question of policies concerning autonomy the balance has been less brilliant than in economic policy, but, this does not mean that it has not been good, especially if one considers that since the era of great change, between 1980 and 1982, this moment has been when the most advances have occurred in achieving more self rule [...]’ Pujol emphasised as being of most importance the financing of the autonomous regions (15% of the *IRPF*), the financing of the health service, the

---

<sup>183</sup> ‘The President announced that he would start a round of consultations over a timetable for the coming general elections that would take place in the spring or autumn of the following year. “All would depend on the stability of the Government.” ... Jordi Pujol replied by asking that the President close parliament not any later than the 31 December and that he fix the date for elections during the last week of February or the first week of March.’ (*El País*, 10/7/95, 633: 1).

<sup>184</sup> An offer of bringing forward the date of the general election was made... ‘in exchange for the continued support of the Catalans, voting in favour of the proposed budget. And also that the opposition, both to the left and to the right, should be quiet, no provoking of scandals or rocking the boat for the duration of the European presidency.’ (*Cambio 16*, (24/7/95), 1.235: 29).

<sup>185</sup> *Cambio 16*, (24/7/95), 1.235: 29.

distribution of the cohesion fund (three aspects that have benefited all the autonomous communities), the remodelling of the Catalan police force, the consolidation of the policy of normalisation of the Catalan language and the composition of the new autonomous legal system. Two types of serious actions, added Pujol, have endangered these policies, the constant problem of political scandal and anti-Catalanist and even anti-Catalan campaigns.<sup>186</sup>

Political life was seriously disturbed on 20 July 1995 by accusations made by Ricardo García Damborenea, ex-socialist leader in the Basque Country, when he accused the president of the government and other leaders of the Socialist party of knowing about the actions of the *GAL*. According to his testimony, he had talked with González on various occasions about 'the dirty war against *ETA*'. The President did not delay in denying his accusations.<sup>187</sup> Jordi Pujol appeared to believe González but demanded explanations. He said that 'if it had not been for the European presidency, the general elections could have been called for October or November, but they would have to wait solely for this reason.'<sup>188</sup>

By August Pujol found himself under pressure from members of *CiU* to hold the general elections before the autonomous elections. 'For the nationalists there is no doubt that if the autonomous elections are fought on Catalan issues Pujol would not have a rival. But they are aware that the *PP* would be the principal beneficiaries if they are held in a political situation dominated by the sinking of the Socialist Government.'<sup>189</sup>

---

<sup>186</sup> Pastor, C., *El País*, (10/7/95), 633: 12, 13.

<sup>187</sup> *El País*, (24/7/95), 635: 11.

<sup>188</sup> *El País*, (24/7/95), 635: 12.

<sup>189</sup> Company, E., *El País*, (21/8/95), 639: 12.

In an interview with *El País* Jordi Pujol talked about what would happen to his nationalist policies if the *PP* won the next general election. The interviewer commented that he had been accused of threatening to become more radical in terms of nationalist policy if the *PP* won. Pujol replied:

That is not true. It is well known that I have always rejected radicalism because it opens the door to division and intolerance. No one could deny that one of my main priorities has always been *convivencia*. On the other hand maybe someone wants to create a radical image of me. I spoke about strengthening Catalan identity. The truth is that in the declarations that I made recently I didn't speak about becoming more radical, but about strengthening the conscience and signs of Catalan identity. This of course in the bounds of harmonious relations within Catalonia, which I have always defended, these ideas do not contain anything bad.<sup>190</sup>

### **3.13 Pujol breaks the pact with González**

Pujol was not pleased by González' refusal to bring forward the general elections. 'The president of the *Generalitat* of Catalonia, Jordi Pujol, on Saturday 9<sup>th</sup> September formally broke the alliance that had been maintained for two years with the Socialist Government of Felipe González ... The Catalan leader wanted González to recognise the convenience of dissolving parliament immediately and holding the general elections as soon as possible. Pujol did not clarify if he would support the budget or not.'<sup>191</sup>

The government responded by threatening to freeze the agreement of the 15% *IRPF*. This provoked a surprise attack from Jordi Pujol. 'The president of the *Generalitat*, Jordi Pujol, tightened the screws on Felipe González in order to force him to call the general

---

<sup>190</sup> Delclós, T., *El País*, (28/8/95), 640: 12, 13.

<sup>191</sup> *El País*, (11/9/95), 642: 1.

election immediately. The Catalan nationalists surprised the press and public opinion by announcing that they would throw out the proposals for the 1996 budget.<sup>192</sup>

### **3.14 The opposition prepares for the coming general election**

Meanwhile the main opposition party was preparing to win new support in areas of resistance to the *PP*.<sup>193</sup> Triás de Bes, an ex-member of *convergència*, who was appointed as head of the electoral campaign in Catalonia, confirmed that *PP* and Aznar took on board various points concerned with Catalan politics such as the defence of institutions of the autonomous government, the history, the official character of the Catalan language and the development of the Catalan Language Normalisation Law, the culture and distinct nature of Catalonia, inserted in a clear political project of Spain. With this affirmation, the *PP* assumed a Catalanist thesis that they hoped would gain them the vote of moderate right-wing Catalans and, moreover, smooth out differences with *CiU*.<sup>194</sup>

Triás de Bes himself recognised that perhaps he was not the best person to be the interlocutor between *PP* and *CiU*. His criticisms of the pact between Pujol and *PSOE* and his opposition to the application of the Catalan Language Normalisation Law were enough to not ingratiate himself with the president of the *Generalitat*. Some political analysts saw

---

<sup>192</sup> *El País*, (18/9/95), 643:1.

<sup>193</sup> The *PP* knows that if it wants to become the principle parliamentary force in Spain, a good many of its seats should be won in Catalonia, where until now it has had very limited success. Various problems have been in the path of electoral success in this autonomous region: the lack of a solid leader (various faces have come and gone in the various elections); the idea that it is a State party in favour of unification, which is not very attractive to the Catalan nationalist right, or even the more moderate electorate; and the long shadow of *CiU* and/or Pujol [...] The *PP* wants to catalanise its image and look for a possible collaboration of *CiU* in a hypothetical electoral win in the general elections without an overall majority.' (Gafarot, X., Barcelona, *Cambio 16*, (4/9/95), 1.241: 30.)

<sup>194</sup> Gafarot, X., Barcelona, *Cambio 16*, (4/9/95), 1.241: 30.

Trías de Bes as a front to the action of catalanising *PP*. Meanwhile, the necessary dialogue with *CiU* was established by means of *Unió* and the figure of Josep Antoni Durán i Lleida. The operation mounted by *PP* in Catalonia caused some concern among members of *CiU*, though they warned that *PP* still would have to change much of its political ideology before it would come near to the Catalanist way of thinking. As *PP* attempted to capture the right-wing nationalist vote, the Socialists also tried to catch some of the nationalist vote by picking Joaquim Nadal, a leader with a stronger nationalist message, for the next autonomous elections. With both the Socialists and *PP* after the nationalist vote, Pujol became afraid of losing his hitherto uncontested absolute majority. The strategies of the opposition meant that *CiU* highlighted nationalist sentiment and national issues in their own electoral campaign.<sup>195</sup>

In an interview with *Cambio 16*, Trías de Bes indicated that pujolism had reached its summit and was on the way down and also that the Socialist cycle was over. He was optimistic concerning the progress that could be made by the *PP* in Catalonia.<sup>196</sup> Josep Antoni Durán i Lleida, also interviewed in the same issue of *Cambio 16* affirmed that 'if *PP* or *PSOE* win the elections, *CiU* should be ready for the implications for the governability of Spain.'<sup>197</sup>

The front page of *Cambio 16* on 25 September highlighted the problems associated with the extreme nationalists in the Basque country and in Catalonia.<sup>198</sup> *Cambio 16* asked if this was an isolated incident or if it was indicative of a growth in nationalist violence:

---

<sup>195</sup> Garfot, X., Barcelona, *Cambio 16*, (4/7/95), 1.241: 30.

<sup>196</sup> *Cambio 16*, (4/7/95), 1.241: 32.

<sup>197</sup> *Cambio 16*, (4/7/95), 1.241: 33.

<sup>198</sup> Under the headline 'The New Terrorists' it was reported that the law of the jungle was being enforced in towns and cities of Spain. 'The *batasuneros* incite their supporters to take the streets of the Basque Country by

The movement for independence is felt with some force in some areas of the Catalan society, above all amongst the youth, which has translated into a significant increase in votes for *ERC*. Amongst the rank and file of *ERC* and in some other organisations parallel to *CiU*, a radical ideology is being propagated by those who desire independence. In a recent questionnaire many members of *Convergencia* who hold town council positions and all members of *ERC* came out in favour of independence for Catalonia.<sup>199</sup>

After the attacks on the leaders of *PP* in Catalonia, Aznar commented: 'They are sewing seeds that finish with molotov cocktails, they believe that all those that disagree with them are the enemy.' Aznar followed by warning that 'whatever happens in the coming months and whatever attempts are made to increase the tension of political life by looking for confrontation and trying to obtain electoral favour, we are not going to enter into this sort of game.'<sup>200</sup> It would seem that all the competition for the Catalan nationalist vote between the various political parties along with the unstable Socialist Government gave the extreme nationalists a confidence that they had not displayed for some time.

The *ERC* is the only political party which claims independence and seeks to create a new state, the Catalan Republic. The nationalism of *ERC* distinguishes itself from the other political options and challenges the Spanish Constitution and the Catalan Statute of Autonomy. In the regional election of 1995, *ERC* increased its number of votes but lost its place as third political force in Catalonia after *CiU* and *PSC*, in favour of the *PP*. The *ERC's* message is addressed to the 10 million inhabitants of the Catalan Countries. Angel

---

violence and stone throwing. The extreme Catalans imitate the warriors of *Jarrai* and mob conservative politicians and their seats during the celebration of the *Diada*.' (*Cambio 16*, (25/9/95), 1.244: 22).

<sup>199</sup> Garfarot, X. and Fernandez, J. M., *Cambio 16*, (25/9/95), 1.244: 26.

<sup>200</sup> Garfarot, X. and Fernandez, J. M., *Cambio 16*, (25/9/95), 1.244: 27.



Colom, one of the party's main ideologists and among those to abandon *ERC* in 1996 to found the Independence Party with Pilar Rahola, has the conviction that a nation cannot survive without its own state.<sup>201</sup> The *ERC* does not actively and openly encourage violence, though there is a section of their young supporters that might have a tendency in this direction should the circumstances allow.

1996 started with the decision on the part of *PSOE* to go into the general elections with Felipe González once again as their candidate. However, the nation was preparing for a change in power and a new era in Spanish politics.<sup>202</sup>

*PP* had always been associated with the right wing of Spanish politics. However, on 21 January 1996 during the seventh congress of *PP*, their president announced that 'the *Partido Popular* is no longer a party of the right but of the centre.' *Cambio 16* asked 'where is the right wing of five million votes?' Of course they are still there in *PP*. *PP*, assured of its support amongst the traditional right wing, then started to try to win the centre vote that it would need to win the forthcoming elections.<sup>203</sup>

---

<sup>201</sup> Guibernau, M., and Rex, J., *The Ethnicity Reader*, p. 142.

<sup>202</sup> *Cambio 16* predicted 'the next general elections will mark the beginning of a new era. Not even the fact that Felipe González will present himself as candidate of *PSOE* for the seventh time can delay the change of direction that Spanish politics will take in the coming years.' (Franquesa, J. G., *Cambio 16* (1/1/96), 1.258: 22.) 'If they win, as the opinion poles suggest, or if they lose, *PP* will be the key to the next year. In preparation for their win, the political parties, the unions and business dedicate themselves to planning their strategies ... Nineteen years after the first democratic general elections, the Spanish right wing gets ready to occupy, for the first time, the government of the nation. All the opinion polls, conducted by government bodies or private companies, predict victory for *PP* in the coming general elections that will be celebrated in March. The best hope of the Socialist party, after thirteen years of political power, is to reduce as much as possible the size of the victory for *PP*'. (Soriano, M., *Cambio 16*, (8/1/96), 1.259: 26).

<sup>203</sup> Pérez, J. and Ramírez, F., *Cambio 16*, (5/2/96), 1.263: 20.

At the end of February 1996 Felipe González, in an interview with *Cambio 16*, said 'the right could still have a big surprise and not win these elections.' 'This morning, 21 February, the radio announced that an opinion poll in Catalonia gave signs of an important recuperation of support to the Socialist Party of Catalonia (*PSC*), and in general to *PSOE*, in the whole country. González replied 'I had the same impression when I was in Catalonia. I thought it was very impressive to have ten thousand union representatives in a very significant meeting [...] I have an intuition that things are changing, and changing quickly.' Later in the interview he was asked 'Is there a right dressed up as lamb of the centre in this country or where is the right ring actually?' In his reply, González indicated that there was no significant right wing beyond *PP*, and that Aznar's strategy of capturing the centre votes was a way of hiding the right-wing politics that have always been fundamental to *PP*. He went on to remark that *IU* was benefiting *PP* by splitting the left vote, 'The more *IU* grows, more certain *PP* becomes that it will govern.'<sup>204</sup>

*PP* won the elections, although without an overall majority. Once again the support of the Catalan nationalists was needed in order for the country to be governed only this time it was needed by the conservative *PP*, who had been so quick to criticise the Catalans for their support of the Socialists.<sup>205</sup> *PP* now had to pay the price of all the criticisms it made of the González/Pujol pact and its associated critique of other Catalan issues, such as the process of normalisation of the Catalan language. Aznar would have to swallow his pride and build some bridges with the Catalans if he wanted to take up his Presidency.<sup>206</sup> Almost overnight

<sup>204</sup> *Cambio 16*, (4/3/96), 1.267: 24.

<sup>205</sup> 'Aznar has to form a pact with Jordi Pujol if he wants to be president of the Government and clear a minefield that has been laid over the last three years. The price will be high, but there are not any alternatives other than to negotiate or new elections.' *Cambio 16*, (18/3/96), 1.269: 18, 19.

<sup>206</sup> 'Aznar appeared the following day a disconcerted man that had won the elections with a very small margin to confront a large political enemy. *PP* won 156 seats, *PSOE* 141, *IU* 21, *CiU* 16, *PNV* 5, *CC* 4, *BNG* 2, *HB* 2 and one MP for *ERC*, *UV*, and *EA*. The vice secretary of *PP*, Rodrigo Rato, looked for the support of the nationalist

Aznar became a convert to the Catalan cause. The night before the election results were announced, *PP* supporters were chanting '*Pujol enano habla castellano.*' The next day Aznar admitted that he spoke Catalan with his wife in intimate moments. It was not long before Pujol had secured 30% of the *IRPF*.

The calculated and timely withdrawal of Catalan support for the González government on the grounds of corruption and scandal meant that they could maintain their position of power within the Spanish state. Their position had gone from strength to strength: Aznar could not govern without their support. The *PP* opposition to and criticism of Catalan policy under the Socialists only meant that they would now have to grovel and beg forgiveness for past errors of judgement. By giving his support to Aznar, Pujol would be able to get rid of what up to that moment had been the principle opposition to further autonomy for Catalonia. Ironically it was not until the beginning of 1998 with the *PP* in power, supported by the Catalan nationalists, that the reform of the Normalisation law was completed by the drafting of the new law which enforces and strengthens the policies that were initiated in 1993 and which were so outspokenly criticised by the *PP*.

It would appear that the Catalan ethnolinguistic group within Catalonia, during this historical period, was enjoying a high vitality. They were obviously unsatisfied by the balance of power between the Catalan region and the state. The political leaders of Catalonia were aware of the possibility of change and hence implemented a competitive strategy in order to improve the circumstances within Catalonia in terms of further autonomy and also to increase their political influence in Spain as a whole. Sections of the

---

parties in order to establish Aznar as president of the Government. *CiU* resisted until *PP* had cleared up and defined what was going to be its model of State of autonomous regions, also various other issues relating to European integration, fiscal reform, industrial competitiveness, social contract for working conditions and the future of the welfare state. (Perez, J. and Plaza, C., *Cambio* 16, (18/3/96), 1.269: 18, 19).

Castilian-speaking ethnolinguistic group outside of Catalonia were obviously unhappy about the Catalans' new-found political power and mounted a counterattack on the policies of the *Generalitat*. Ironically, this counterattack did very little in terms of damaging the Catalans, but rather united various sections of the Catalan community, including many of the native Castilian-speaking population, against what was seen to be a right-wing anti-Catalan attack on policies considered to be fundamental to the process of decentralisation of the Spanish state. This point is illustrated by Rafael Ribó's defence of Jordi Pujol when Julio Anguita compared Pujol's nationalism to that of Franco. Any criticism of Pujol from outside of Catalonia only served to strengthen his position within Catalonia and seriously damage the credibility of the opposition to Pujol within Catalonia. Ribó and the *IC* left *IU* in 1997 because of political disagreement between Anguita and Ribó.

The above example illustrates how patterns of fusion and fission between the two ethnolinguistic groups in contact in Catalonia have been influenced by the political manoeuvring of their leaders. It also demonstrates how the wider political issues concerning Spain as a whole has had an impact on interethnic dynamics both within Catalonia and outside of Catalonia. The question is how much of the political manoeuvring carried out by the politicians and community leaders had an impact on those living in the Catalan communities. The following chapter will look at what some of these people had to say about the process of normalisation.

## **CHAPTER FOUR: ETHNOGRAPHIC STUDY OF LANGUAGE POLICY IN SECONDARY EDUCATION IN IGUALADA**

### **4.1 Introduction**

The previous chapter provided a narrative of the political context in which language policy in Catalonia was a fundamental issue for the Catalan autonomous government's support for González's Socialist Government. This chapter explores what some of the people of Catalonia, who were directly affected by language policy, thought and felt about the process of Catalan language normalisation within the context of what was happening politically between 1993 and 1996. The increased political power of the Catalans, the competitive strategies implemented during this period and the reaction to this new power by sections of the Castilian ethnolinguistic group meant that the issues surrounding Catalan normalisation were very prominent in the press. The public debates concerning autonomy and Catalan normalisation were picked up by the community at large and discussed in many informal and formal contexts. The research carried out in the community of Igualada was intended to discover how changes in the balance of power between ethnolinguistic groups and their political representatives were affecting the dynamics of ethnic relations and the overall pattern of linguistic interactions. The subsequent and final chapter will attempt to further analyse the relationship between the public political discourse on language policy and the private and personal discourses reported in this chapter.

Central to the ethnographic research carried out for this thesis is the concept of language attitudes and how these are related to ethnic relations in a particular community in Catalonia. The methodologies chosen to investigate these aspects of language attitudes included a range of approaches: collection and examination of the discourse that was occurring in the national and local newspapers throughout the period of the research, a case study of the secondary schools in Igualada, which primarily consisted of semi-structured

interviews with educationalists, teachers, pupils and parents, and participant observation of the local community.

Edwards<sup>207</sup> makes two important points about investigations of this kind. These are: firstly, there is often inconsistency between assessed attitudes and actions presumably related to them; and secondly, there is often confusion between belief and attitude; strictly speaking, attitude includes belief as one of its elements. A subject's response to the question, 'is a knowledge of Catalan important for your children?' indicates a belief. To gauge attitude would require further probing into the respondent's feelings about the expressed belief. For example, someone could believe that Catalan was important for his or her children, yet he or she could loathe the language and all its associations. An ethnographic approach to research methods was chosen as a means of exploring in depth the effects of language policy on people's daily lives. Ethnography offers one valuable set of techniques for connecting linguistic forms with particular cultural practices. An ethnography, in the words of Alessandro Duranti<sup>208</sup>, is the written description of the social organisation, social activities, symbolic and material resources, and interpretive practices characteristic of a particular group of people. Such a description is typically produced by prolonged and direct participation in the social life of a community and implies two apparently contradictory qualities: an ability to step back and distance oneself from one's own immediate, culturally-biased reactions so as to achieve an adequate degree of objectivity and the propensity to achieve sufficient identification with or empathy for the members of the group in order to provide an insider's perspective – what anthropologists call the emic view.

---

<sup>207</sup> Edwards, J. *Language, Society and Identity*, p. 139–140.

<sup>208</sup> Duranti, A., *Linguistic Anthropology*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University press, 1995), p. 85.



This research concentrates on language policy in education because this is the crucial area of policy most likely to affect the attitudes of the future. Secondary education was targeted for two reasons: firstly, all the students have already been taught in Catalan all through their primary education and, therefore, would have some opinion as to the success or failure of the language policies they have already experienced; secondly, having had this previous experience, they and their teachers are better able to form an educated opinion of the progress of language policies in their secondary schools.

The research was carried out in Igualada for various reasons, one of which was that it is a fairly typical medium-sized town with a well-established immigrant population living side by side with the Catalan population. Igualada, along with its immigrant *barrios* situated around the outskirts, has a total population of around 60,000, of which about 24,000 come from other regions of Spain. Catalonia as a whole has a population of around 6 million of which about 40% come from other regions of Spain. So, demographically speaking the proportion of Catalans to immigrants in Igualada is reasonably representative of the situation in Catalonia as a whole. The exception is Barcelona whose sociolinguistic situation, due to its size and status, is naturally influenced by other factors.

The choice of methodologies used to carry out this research was largely conditioned by the sort of information that was desired. A quantitative statistical analysis was not considered to be useful for the sort of investigation of language attitudes that was intended, so a qualitative approach was taken. There is obviously a need for a combination of approaches to language attitude assessment. In particular, given the decontextualised nature of much social psychological work, both direct and indirect methods should be supplemented with real-life observation. This issue is further discussed below. A discussion on methodological approaches at this point is useful for clarifying the sort of information

that was sought and also to point out some of the pitfalls and problems associated with retrieving this information.

#### **4.2 Discussion on methodological approaches**

In the case of investigating language attitudes, first, one needs to clarify exactly what is meant by attitude. A first attempt to systematise the concepts related to attitude was made by Agheysi and Fishman.<sup>209</sup> These authors discerned the two opposing theoretical positions of (1) mentalists and (2) behaviourists. For the mentalists, attitude is concerned with neural states and mental dispositions that are not directly observable but related to behaviour and verbal responses that can be solicited systematically with the help of appropriate stimuli. Attitude is considered to be an independent variable, like a constant latent psychological structure, that is not affected by circumstantial factors of the situation in which the participants are observed. On the other hand, behaviourists consider attitude to be a dependent variable, actual behaviour and responses that are observable in determined social situations and objectifiable by means of statistical methods. Bierbach<sup>210</sup> drew attention to what she considers to be an important conceptual difference between these two approaches of postulating the internal structure of attitudes. The first, monocomponential, reduces attitudes to an affective factor and is predominant in the behaviourists' position; the second, multicomponential, corresponds more to the mentalist conception. This is well illustrated by Lambert.<sup>211</sup> According to Lambert, attitudes are composed of three different basic components:

1. The cognitive component: all that one knows consciously about a language;

---

<sup>209</sup> Agheysi, R. and Fishbein, M., 'Language Attitude studies: A brief survey of methodological approaches', *Anthropological Linguistics* 12 (1970), p. 137–157.

<sup>210</sup> Bierbach, C., '*Les attitudes Lingüístiques*', in Bastardas, A. and Soler, J. (eds), *Sociolingüística i Llengua Catalana*, (Barcelona: Empúries, 1988), p. 159.

<sup>211</sup> Lambert, W., 'The social psychology of bilingualism', *Journal of Social Issues*, 23 (1967), p. 91–109.

2. The affective component: feelings that one has related to the language unconsciously (the language, forms of speaking and the linguistic community);
3. The intentional component: elements that direct a predisposition to act.

According to Bierbach<sup>212</sup> this differentiation between the components is not always made clear in the studies carried out by Lambert. The method used by Lambert and his collaborators (the matched guise technique<sup>213</sup> are directed at the second component mentioned. Moreover, he does not make explicit how the three components are interrelated. Ajzen and Fishbein<sup>214</sup> discuss the problem of how to make explicit the relationship between attitude and action; they propose the theory of reasoned action. This theory proposes that the intention of a person to act in a certain manner (e.g. speak the language *x* to a interlocutor *y* in the situation *z*) is determined by his or her beliefs about the consequences of the form of action chosen and by his evaluation of these consequences. Bierbach puts it more directly: a linguistic variety is chosen with the purpose of improving one's work situation, in order to establish a positive personal relationship, in order to present oneself as an intelligent person, etc. The subjacent subjective norms that are implied by this reasoning depend on how people conceive of others' expectations, and at the same time the motivation one has to fit in. This is important because as a researcher it is necessary to form an understanding of these subjacent subjective norms in order to make sense of the choices that are made in terms of language use in any particular interaction.

Unfortunately, despite the advantages of this simplicity and the plausibility of these criteria, this model explains only one part of the attitude complex: the one that would orient

---

<sup>212</sup> Bierbach, C., *Les attitudes Linguistiques*, p. 159.

<sup>213</sup> This technique is discussed further below.

<sup>214</sup> Ajzen, I. and Fishbein, M., *Understanding Attitudes and Predicting Social Behaviour* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1980).

linguistic behaviour to choice between varieties or alternatives of behaviour. This would not be a small task but it is not sufficiently clear that the personal criteria for behaviour can be as rational as that and, especially at a methodological level, it is not clear whether conscious reasoning extracted by means of a questionnaire or an interview based on hypothetical situations, proposed after all by the investigator, can reproduce real and verifiable behaviour. Finally, there remain other important aspects such as the perception and evaluation of the language and the way others speak, linguistic varieties judged as representative of different social and ethnic groups, the formation of sociolinguistic prejudices and stereotypes, the basis and origin of judgements concerning aesthetics, logic, etc; all of these are concerned with language in a global sense. The above reasoning is questioned by another theoretical approach to the problem which tries to be more specific about the object to which the attitudes are related: Kolde,<sup>215</sup> studying the different forms of bilingualism and language contact situations related to migrations within the frame of a multilingual state, Switzerland, postulates that attitudes always refer to social objects and contribute to defining them and constituting them as such. At the same time he proposes to distinguish between:

1. languages viewed globally: these are considered to have distinctive qualities and characteristics (in terms of aesthetics, expressivity, logic, difficulty, utility, etc);
2. use of varieties/languages in contact, in particular situations and by particular people;
3. social or ethnic groups, defined amongst other aspects by their linguistic variety or language.

It is clear that these three aspects can be confused. For example, a certain opinion about a language can express or hide a prejudice about the ethnic group that speaks that language. An opinion that a language is not modern may be connected to an opinion of the

---

<sup>215</sup> Kolde, G. *Sprachkontakte in gemischtsprachigen Städten* (Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1981).

ethnic group that speaks the language as being rather traditional or underdeveloped. In this case it is equally important to distinguish between different ways/forms of expression/manifestation of attitude. According to Kolde, these can be systematised along the following lines:

1. behaviour (for example, reactions, verbal or otherwise to a foreign accent, or regional variety);
2. verbalised opinions (preferences, judgements, beliefs, etc); and
3. stereotypes or collective clichés: widely spread in a community, these not only express prejudice but also encourage and actively form prejudice against social and ethnic groups.

Attitudes, then, function as much at a productive level (orienting one's own behaviour) as at a receptive level (perception/valorisation of others' behaviour). Another important aspect, about which everyone agrees but which has had little consequence for the majority of studies undertaken on attitude, is the fact that attitudes, as social phenomena that refer to social objects, are acquired through the process of socialisation. As is demonstrated in one of the first studies on the evaluation of French and English in Quebec, undertaken by Lambert *et al.*,<sup>216</sup> the stereotypes prevalent in the two linguistic communities that attribute less value to French and more to English, only start to emerge from approximately 12 years and become accentuated during the process of schooling. This implies certain questions and directions for research, such as, for example: the causes and origins of attitudes; how they are formed and spread in a particular social context; how they are related to one's own experiences and/or traditions and ideologies of the social groups of reference. The discourse on normalisation at the period of this study was largely centred on

---

<sup>216</sup> Lambert, W., Hodgson, R. and Fillenbaum, S., 'Evaluating reactions to spoken languages', Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 60 (1960), p. 44-51.

education and the amount of use of Catalan as a vehicular language in the schools. The relationships of the young generation of both ethnolinguistic groups were undergoing rapid change in the schools and communities of Catalonia if only with respect to the rapid increase in the use of Catalan in many different social contexts.

The research methods depend on the questions that one wants to ask and the conception of the object of study; on the other hand, the results and knowledge that can be obtained depend on the methods used to obtain them. Bierbach believes this question to be particularly thorny in the field of attitudes, as a consequence of their natural complexity and because they are not directly observable, but only inferable through an analysis of what is considered to be their manifestations.

The questionnaire is an instrument of research on attitudes that has been much used and has the longest tradition. Questionnaires may include open questions of the type 'what do you think of the use of the vernacular language in school?' or 'how would you react if the vernacular language was used in textbooks?' According to an article by Agheysi and Fishman<sup>217</sup>, this type of question stimulates those answering the questions to express themselves freely with reference to the proposed object, without directing them in a determining way: they are only oriented by the directives 'what do you think?' or 'how would you react?' Bierbach<sup>218</sup> points out that these authors forget that the denomination of the linguistic variety in question could influence the response and express an attitude, i.e. terms such as '*patois*', 'Creole' or even 'vernacular' are not value-free. Maybe even more important, the inferences of these questions could be quite ambiguous. For example, do the questions refer to a real situation or a hypothetical one?

---

<sup>217</sup> Agheysi, R. and Fishman, J. *Anthropological Linguistics*, 12.

<sup>218</sup> Bierbach, *Les attitudes Linguistiques*, p. 164.



A central methodological problem with questionnaires, whatever type of question or affirmation, whether open or closed, when posed outside of a communicative context, is that responses can be interpreted in various ways. Then, when evaluating the questionnaire, there is no way of finding out how the questions were interpreted. Agheysi and Fishman<sup>219</sup> believe that this method has more drawbacks than advantages, at least with the open-type questions. The advantages are considered to be that the researcher can reveal unforeseen or unexpected attitudes; the drawbacks, according to these authors, are found in the way the questionnaire is written: questionnaires tend to be very laborious for those being questioned who have to formulate in written form that which could be expressed in more detail orally. Apart from the problems already mentioned, there is also the problem of comparing answers. Large-scale questionnaires are most suited to closed-type questions, which solicit yes or no answers or propose various scaled alternative answers from which the person answering the questionnaire has to choose. Many studies of this sort which combine questions about use with questions about opinions and attitudes<sup>220</sup> have been carried out on language attitudes in Catalonia.<sup>221</sup> The censuses that have been carried out in Catalonia have included questions about attitude, using closed-type questions. Although the problem of interpretation remains valid, there have been many efforts to minimise the problem by choosing the terms used very carefully and by formulating the questions in a manner to

---

<sup>219</sup> Agheysi, R. and Fishman, J. *Anthropological Linguistics*, 12.

<sup>220</sup> Vallverdú points out the problem of bias in some of these questionnaires, bias which may be produced by the favourable attitude towards Catalan held by the researchers. The problem is more general in the case of attitudes extracted by means of declarations about use of languages that are not explicit in the questionnaire. (Vallverdú, F., *Aproximació crítica a la sociolingüística catalana*, Barcelona: Ediciones 62, 1980), p. 180

<sup>221</sup> See, for example, Bastardas, A., *La bilingüïtzació de la segona generació immigrant*, (Barcelona: La Magrana, 1985), and Solé, C., 'La immigració a Catalunya', *Perspectiva Social*, 23 (1986), p. 7-144. HERE

minimise any bias. Bierbach comments that questionnaires, rather than reflecting a linguistic reality, actually reflect forms of self-representation.<sup>222</sup>

The nature of questionnaires calls for a certain amount of introspection, and normally the most conscious aspects of attitude are addressed, e.g. questionnaires ask for rational choices and decisions, or imply rational arguments, which means they probably reveal controlled or censored attitudes. Each person filling in a questionnaire will try to present himself or herself as a rational and coherent person (written questionnaires permit the possibility of total self-control and self-censorship). In order to avoid this sort of distortion or partiality, more indirect methods have been developed, especially for situations of linguistic conflict where there might be motives for not revealing one's true attitude or feelings if they might be considered irrational or prejudicial. This is worth considering given that it is difficult to judge how much of what someone says is what they actually think, and how much is calculated to influence the interaction one way or another.

The most sophisticated and efficient method of detecting collective prejudice was created by Lambert<sup>223</sup> in the context of linguistic conflict in Quebec in the sixties. Called 'The Matched Guise Technique' (MGT), it is an original type of test designed to evaluate varieties or languages that coexist in a conflictive manner in a community. The test presents the judges (from the community in question, classified along lines of sex, age, first language, etc) with examples of the respective languages. The language presented is normally a piece of text that is read in order to maintain the contents and the linguistic form constant. Other than the voice, the judges do not have any information about the speakers. Above all, they do not know that each speaker presents the two linguistic varieties: the manner in which

---

<sup>222</sup> Bierbach, *Sociolingüística i Llengua Catalana*, p. 165.

<sup>223</sup> Lambert, W. E., 'The social psychology of bilingualism', *Journal of Social Issues*, 23, (1967), p. 91-109.

they are presented prevents the judges from realising that each speaker performs twice. By means of a questionnaire, the judges are asked to attribute to each voice characteristics of personality, social status, intelligence, attractiveness etc. The test is applied many times to a variety of participants. The results confirm not only prejudicial stereotypes towards the dominant group held by the minority or socially weaker group in respect of the positive cliques of the dominant group, but also demonstrate how negative evaluations appear, sometimes more strongly, in self-evaluation by members of the discriminated group. However, this varies depending on sex, age and social class. This sort of test also allows us to see that stereotypical attitudes are reinforced by means of education, particularly for the middle class. According to the studies of Lambert and others, it is the adolescent children of middle- and upper-class families who most clearly reproduce the dominant linguistic attitudes.

The MGT, with various modifications, has been used in many European countries to investigate interdialectic attitudes (the evaluation of contrasting dialects or regional accents). In Catalonia, Pueyo<sup>224</sup> compared examples of recorded text in occidental and oriental Catalan (from Barcelona and Valencia). Those doing the test had to choose from a list of qualitative adjectives, as in those used in the differential semantic test. This technique is halfway between a test and a questionnaire and was first designed by Osgood and his collaborators.<sup>225</sup> It was designed initially to measure the affective values of whatever concept was under investigation. The design of this type of test could be criticised for obliging the participants to apply pre-established categories, which possibly would not

---

<sup>224</sup> Pueyo, M. 'Vikings in pagesos: Una batussa continuada. Assaig per a un estudi de les relacions interdialectals en català', *Treballs de Sociolingüística Catalana*, 3 (1980), pp. 83-102.

<sup>225</sup> Osgood, C., Suci, G. and Tannenbaum, P., *The Measurement of Meaning* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1957).

otherwise be used to qualify languages (or other concepts) and hence might not provide a true reflection of the attitudes of the participants.

It would appear that there are problems associated with most types of methods for evaluating attitudes, which is why it was considered important for the research for this thesis to utilise a range of methods rather than relying solely on the interviews. The participant observation of the community provided a background knowledge and understanding of social interactions and relationships, which enabled me to identify a range of different interactive strategies and the meanings associated with those strategies.

Bierbach<sup>226</sup> believes that the most important instrument for investigating attitudes, from a qualitative rather than a quantitative point of view, is the interview, especially when this is combined with observation and recording of 'natural' communication. It is the only way that the informer can control the terms of the exchange and it allows the interviewer to discover the meaning of any affirmations made. The interview offers the possibility for the interviewee to reason, explain and express his or her preferences and ways of acting. These can then be related to the factors that the interviewee considers being relevant. (These do not always correspond with the correlations identified by the investigator.) Both interlocutors in the interview are able to ask for clarification of questions or answers or any complementary information that may be desired. In this way, the open<sup>227</sup> interview is the research method most similar to natural communication. Bierbach illustrates this point by referring to the many and frequent conversations about language and linguistic behaviour (both one's own or that of others) that occur in Catalonia. For instance, when an obviously

---

<sup>226</sup> Bierbach, C. *Sociolingüística i Llengua Catalana*, p. 168.

<sup>227</sup> Bierbach only refers to the open type of interview in this context as she considers the closed type of interview to be more akin to a questionnaire although it is performed orally. There are, however, varying degrees of open interview, such as the narrative interview or the directed interview.

foreign person enters into interaction with a Catalan the obvious initial questioning about where one comes from is frequently followed by questions concerning language usage in your part of the world, followed by a detailed description of the Catalan situation. If the interlocutor shows any interest in this matter the conversation can develop along very intricate lines of comparison and analysis. At the time the research was carried out, issues concerning Catalan normalisation were very prominent in people's minds due to the extensive coverage by the media of the current political debates. The public debate was carried on by members of the community in various social contexts. It was not uncommon to hear conversations about identity, language usage, and a political commentary in many informal social settings such as the bars, the staff rooms, people's homes, the playground, etc. The special conditions of the interview, i.e. a form of communication that is more asymmetrical than other methods, along with the fairly fixed roles, makes the interview method less rigid than other empirical forms of investigation.<sup>228</sup>

On the other hand, clearly, the evaluation of textual material of this sort (taped interviews and literal transcripts) is much more arduous than that of standardised questionnaires. The more open the interview (the closer to the perspective and focus of the interviewee) and the more profound the interview, the more complicated is the task of comparing results. For this reason, the interview technique is not suited to the questioning of large numbers of the population chosen along lines of representation, but is suited to

---

<sup>228</sup> The influence of the situation in which the interview takes place on the information obtained is a problem that affects all sociolinguistic investigations. (See Labov, W., 'The observer's paradox' in: Labov, W., The Social Stratification of English in New York City, (Washington D.C.: Centre for Applied Linguistics, 1966).) Other sociolinguists have elaborated on this problem (see Lafont, Couderc, Marconot and others). Giles *et al.* give some examples of how certain variables of the interview situation condition the results obtained. For example, tests carried out in a formal context, such as a school, strengthen the tendency to overvalue the prestigious variety, while an informal interview situation has the opposite effect. Also, the criteria for evaluation can vary depending on the environment of the interview or test.



groups of a reduced size, preferably of people who participate in communal social activities (at the level of family, *barrio*, work, cultural or political activities, etc) and who are oriented by their own systems of values and norms.

When working with smaller-sized groups of people, it is easier to observe linguistic behaviour and everyday communication. This means it is possible to control, up to a certain point, the correspondence between information obtained from the interview and real behaviour. Bierbach comments that the information obtained through direct methods (such as questionnaires and interviews) consists of self-representations based on introspection and expressed through forms of metalinguistic judgement. When one is investigating forms of behaviour, there is always the problem of validity: does what is said in the interview actually correspond to real behaviour? The important point is to be able to compare hypothetical situations talked about in the interview or questionnaire with situations of natural communication, and it is always preferable to combine diverse methods of research (e.g. interview and participant observation) and to have a good knowledge of the empirical sociolinguistic context. Bierbach remarks that it is also interesting to combine an internal knowledge (as a member or participant of the social group in question) with an external perspective of the non-member: 'it is the stranger looking in that can make one aware of habits and values and motivate an explanation of them'<sup>229</sup>.

There are, however, situations that are not accessible to observation or direct questioning, for example, when we are interested in the diachronic historical dimension of attitudes. In such cases we have to rely on written documents, of both literary and political natures, in order to reconstruct the terms of the public discourse on linguistic matters and attitudes (either explicit or implicit). This process, however, involves a work of

---

<sup>229</sup> Bierbach, C. *Sociolingüística i Llengua Catalana*, p. 170.



interpretation, which draws on textual structures and uses all the historical information accessible in order to understand their social significance. According to Schlieben-Lange,<sup>230</sup> the study of linguistic attitudes should be a central part of historical sociolinguistics. The study of written sources is interesting not only for its historical dimensions but also as a spontaneous expression of the present day (e.g. letters to daily newspapers). Such letters also are of interest as elements of public discourse about language that reflect and direct collective attitudes.<sup>231</sup>

All methodologies involve a step from description to interpretation. What is important is to provide representations of the dialogues and discourses produced by various members and groups of the community that are relevant and which should be understood in the light of the historical and contemporary social context. The researcher should be aware that the manner in which this information is sought could affect the overall picture that is painted.

#### **4.3 Description of methodologies used in ethnographic research**

The research utilised various methodologies. Bearing in mind the problems associated with different methodological approaches, and the particular type of information that was desired, it was decided to choose the following methods.

1. Collection and examination of the discourse that was occurring in the national and local newspapers concerning normalisation policies generally and in particular education policies. A range of newspapers, including national and local Castilian language papers, Catalan language papers, and newspapers associated with both the right wing and left wing of the political spectrum, was scanned for relevant material. Once the articles that were considered to be relevant to my research had been located,

---

<sup>230</sup> Schlieben-Lange, B., '*Quelques remarques sur les problèmes méthodologiques de la conscience linguistique dans l'histoire*', *Colloque International d'Etudes Occitanes* (Montpellier, 1984), p. 273–284.

<sup>231</sup> Bierbach, C., *Sociolingüística i Llengua Catalana*, p. 171.

it was then a matter of picking out themes that were prominent and relevant to the research. The debate on language policy conducted in the newspapers not only informed my understanding of the situation but also provided a focus for discussion in the interviews with teachers, pupils and students.

2. A case study of the secondary schools in Igualada was chosen as a means of capturing the more personal perspective – possible only if one is dealing with relatively manageable numbers of informants. By concentrating on the schools in the area where I was living it was hoped that my previous knowledge of the local area and the relationships that I already had would serve as a base from which my research could be extended.

Three secondary schools in Igualada were therefore visited, each of which, at the time, had a different status. One was an *Instituto*: this is where the more academically advanced students go, selection depending on their performance in primary education which finishes when they are fourteen years old. The second school was a *Formación Profesional (FP)*: at this type of school, education is oriented to more technical or vocational courses. The third school had been an *Instituto* but was undergoing reform at the time of the research project; the reform consisted of amalgamating the old system of dividing the secondary school children into *Institutos* and *FP* so all the students would be in the same school but streamed into different levels, similar to the British comprehensive system. The reforms were to be implemented throughout Catalonia, the first stage being pilot schemes where some schools in key areas were targeted to undergo reform before the system was introduced more generally. All three schools were located in the Catalan part of Igualada. The *Instituto* and the *FP* were located side by side, although on different sites. The school undergoing reform

was on the other side of town. The proportion of Catalan-speaking students was significantly higher at the *Instituto* than in the other two schools.

The case study of the secondary schools used various methodological techniques:

- i. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with groups and with individual teachers and pupils. There were thirty interviews with teachers and twenty interviews with pupils. The length of the interviews varied between ten minutes and over an hour, depending largely on the interviewees' readiness to talk and the amount of time available. The interviews were mainly conducted in the schools, in free classrooms, staff rooms or coffee bars. The vast majority of the interviews were tape-recorded, though for some I had to rely on taking notes due to technical problems. The interviews were semi-structured in the sense that a checklist of questions was used. However, the interviewee was intentionally allowed to direct the discussion as much as possible. The purpose of this was to find out what each interviewee considered to be the more important and less important aspects of language policy. Each interview was started by explaining who I was, why I was there, and roughly what I wanted to gain from the interview. Each individual was then allowed to interpret what they considered to be the most relevant points to be discussed. The checklist served as a prompt when the discussion faltered or when the discussion was going too far away from the subject.
- ii. The fieldwork further included several informal discussions with parents, pupils, and teachers outside of the school environment. These less formal discussions were useful since, in a formal context, the interviewees seemed to be overly preoccupied with saying the right thing or, more importantly, with not saying the wrong thing.

- iii. Observations of various classes were also carried out, taking note of classroom interaction and pedagogical techniques employed. The classroom observations were intended to give an insight into the language used by students and teachers, not only in language classes but also in scientific and arts-based subjects. The aim was to see if what I was being told by the professionals and administrators was actually taking place consistently, and also to examine individual strategies of students and teachers concerning code-switching. Were the pupils and teacher interacting in Castilian or Catalan? The intention was to identify patterns of changing linguistic codes, i.e. switching from Catalan to Castilian or vice versa in response to certain interactive cues.
3. The last but not least part of my fieldwork consisted of observation of and participation in family, bar, and *barrio* life in a Castilian-speaking, mainly Andalusian, *barrio*. During the three months of my fieldwork (January to March 1994), I was living with my partner and his Andalusian family in an immigrant *barrio* on the edge of Igualada. My discussions and conversations with family, friends and acquaintances proved to be very useful and informative and provided a testing ground for my ideas and queries concerning my research.

Direct measurement techniques were used: these involved semi-structured interviews which asked questions that specifically addressed attitudes to the normalisation process in secondary schools. The sample included equal numbers of the Catalan- and Castilian-speaking ethnolinguistic groups. The sample targeted three sections of the population: teachers, pupils and parents. I had planned to use a written questionnaire because I thought that this would be the simplest way of gathering a large amount of material and that it would be the easiest format to analyse, followed by an informal interview. I spent a lot of time designing and preparing what I thought were fairly straightforward questions.

However, when it came to carrying out an informal pilot scheme, I found people were very unwilling to give straightforward answers and that every question turned into a discussion. I tried adapting the questions, but every attempt met with more or less the same response. Generally, people seemed very unwilling to put down in writing a definitive answer to anything at all. Finally, it was concluded that a questionnaire was not the best method to gather the nature of information I was seeking. Eventually the questionnaire was abandoned in favour of a less formal interview and discussion format.

Organising interviews with teachers and students in the secondary schools was by far the most difficult part of my fieldwork. The first problem was making the initial contact. I started by approaching in person the directors of the schools and explaining what I wanted to do. The reactions I received ranged from interest and enthusiasm to polite but suspicious questioning of my motives and intentions. Although I have a good passive knowledge of Catalan, my active knowledge leaves a lot to be desired. Consequently I started each encounter with my potential interviewees by explaining that I would have to conduct the interviews in Castilian, but I was quite happy for them to reply in Castilian or Catalan depending on their personal preference. The manner in which this was received depended on the attitude of the person I was speaking to. However, I was aware of a general willingness to discuss these issues and curiosity concerning my motives and reasons for conducting my research, although some individuals were more guarded than others I met with considerable tolerance and co-operation.

Once permission had been given by the directors of the institutions under study to do the interviews, the next problem was making contact with individual teachers and persuading them to give me enough of their valuable time to conduct the interviews. The aim was to interview more or less equal numbers of Castilian- and Catalan-speaking teachers who taught a range of different subjects. I particularly wanted to interview Catalan

and Castilian language teachers from each school because I thought they would be helpful in assessing attitudes expressed about the two languages. I also wanted to interview teachers from a variety of other departments to find out if there were any particular issues that might be associated with particular subjects. In general it was quite hard work just setting up an interview because this involved, firstly, identifying who I wanted to speak to, secondly, introducing myself and explaining what I wanted to do, and lastly, agreeing on a time and place to do it.

The next problem was deciding exactly what information I wanted to gain from my interviews. On this matter I was partly influenced by conversations and discussions I had been having over a period of time with friends and acquaintances, and partly by the debates conducted by the media. These discussions had inspired me to read some literature on the matter: both academic accounts of the sociolinguistic situation and publications of the *Generalitat* of a more political nature.<sup>232</sup> This preliminary research had led me to suspect that not everyone was as happy about the progress of normalisation policies as some of the literature might suggest. Furthermore, there was some contention as to what exactly the aims and objectives of these policies were: was the intention of the *Generalitat* to promote bilingualism or monolingualism in Catalan? It would seem that the more power that was enjoyed by the Catalans the more determined they became in terms of implementing the aims of Catalan normalisation. Obviously some sections of the community questioned how far they were intending to go and whether these plans were in line with the original justification of Catalan normalisation. Various factors thought to influence ethnolinguistic

---

<sup>232</sup> For example: Pujol, J., *L'immigració: problema i esperança de Catalunya* (Barcelona: Nova Terra, 1976). *Direcció General de Política Lingüística*, 'Sobre la Llei de Normalització Lingüística a Catalunya. Els conceptes de doble oficialitat i de llengua pròpia, segons el Dictamen del Consell Consultiu de la Generalitat i un treball de J. M. Salellas' (Barcelona: Departament de Cultura de la Generalitat de Catalunya: 1983). Stubell i Trueta, M., *Llengua i població a Catalunya* (Barcelona: La Magrana, 1981).



vitality were strengthened by the successful negotiations of the Catalan government with the central government in Madrid, particularly over economic policy and further autonomy. The Catalans were implementing highly competitive strategies politically and linguistically. This caused some sections of the Castilian-speaking ethnolinguistic group to become concerned over the situation both within and outside of Catalonia. The question arose as to whether the *Generalitat*, carried away by its enthusiasm to protect the Catalan language, was not actually getting dangerously close to discriminating against Castilian speakers within Catalonia, in a similar manner to which Franco had discriminated against Catalan speakers.<sup>233</sup>

The interview discussions were intended to discover if the normalisation process in schools was considered successful and exactly what 'successful' meant to different sections of the sample. The aim was to discover how people were interpreting the objectives of Catalan normalisation policies in schools and how they rated the effectiveness of these policies. I also hoped to discover what problems, if any, were being identified as arising from policies already in practice and any preoccupations about what might happen in the near future. The expectation was to determine if the ethnolinguistic situation was considered conflictive and what effect language policies were considered to have on this account. The objective of these research methodologies was to ascertain the nature of consensus and disagreement both within and between the two ethnolinguistic groups.

Initially, my interviewees were curious as to why I should be interested in the Catalan situation. I found a useful technique for initiating interviews was to say that I was studying in Scotland and to draw some parallels between Catalonia and Scotland in terms of

---

<sup>233</sup> '... And with the rightist Madrid newspaper *ABC* asserting that Catalonia was doing to Spanish what Franco did to Catalan, indignant politicians in Barcelona have been quick to denounce anti-Catalan "hysteria".' (Riding, A., 'Catalonians Open A War of Words in Schools, No More Spanish', *Herald Tribune*, 24/11/1993.)

historical and political development of central state and regional power relations. This inevitably led onto a discussion of the relative language situations. Anyone living in Catalonia, whether Catalan or of immigrant descent, soon warms to the theme of language and its related issues. However, I found that there were problems in getting people to give their true feelings and that these problems were more pronounced in the more formal context of an interview. These reservations were probably partly due to the past and present political situations, namely the association of criticism of the current language policy with right-wing centralist ideas. As a consequence of the politically polarised debate on language policy there was the fear of being labelled reactionary or anti-Catalan. When discussing the topic, the Catalans were often concerned with presenting a good image in the face of possible further criticism from an outsider. I had to combine a certain amount of 'objective' interest with appropriate empathy with the circumstances of the interviewee.

At the time of this research, *Partido Popular*, which was in opposition to the Socialist government of Spain, was mounting an attack on Catalan language policies in order to undermine the coalition between the Catalans and the Socialist government. Obviously this meant that anyone who did not want to be associated with the right wing of Spanish politics might well wish to avoid expressing any doubts or criticism about the direction of the normalisation policies. This situation also made the Catalans very sensitive to any questions about possible problems with the process. The inclination was to stress the success and rush over any practical problems that were occurring. Accordingly, I had to be very sensitive in the manner in which I expressed my interest. I found I had to adapt the tone of my questions to fit the political and ethnic persuasion of the interviewee.

With respect to ethnography, the problem with the term 'objectivity' arises from its identification with a form of positivistic writing that was meant to exclude the observer's

subjective stance, including emotions as well as political, moral, and theoretical attitudes.<sup>234</sup> It has been argued that such an exclusion in its purest form is not only impossible to achieve but is also a questionable goal, given that it would produce very poor ethnography.<sup>235</sup> Equally implausible is a description that completely identifies with the native perspective and does not, in some fashion, reflect the researchers' perception of the described events, including their own sociohistorical awareness of peculiarities (or, alternatively, predictability) of such events and hence their value for comparative purposes. Duranti remarks that a successful ethnography is not a method of writing in which the observer assumes one perspective, whether 'distant' or 'near', but a style in which the researcher establishes a dialogue between different viewpoints and voices, including those of the people studied, of the ethnographer, and of his or her disciplinary and theoretical preferences.<sup>236</sup> The research for this thesis tries to combine these differing viewpoints in an effort to throw some light on what is considered by some to be a radical and even controversial attempt to change linguistic behaviour and by others to be a 'normal' or 'natural' state of affairs.<sup>237</sup>

---

<sup>234</sup> Duranti, A., *Linguistic Anthropology*, (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 85.

<sup>235</sup> De Martino, E., *La Terra del Rimorso*, (Milan: Il Saggiatore, 1961).

<sup>236</sup> Duranti, A., *Linguistic Anthropology*, p. 87.

<sup>237</sup> The researcher found that the subjective stance of the participant observer whilst immersed in the field work project was countered by a more objective stance at different stages of the research project, notably towards the beginning during the formulation of the project and towards the end during the writing up process. The degree that one can engage with the material subjectively and objectively is not a constant but varies according to one's own involvement with the situation under study. The insight of an insider was contrasted with the perspective of an outsider at varying stages of the research project which contributed to the richness of the ethnographic project.

#### **4.4 The interviews**

##### **Teachers**

I interviewed thirty teachers in total, ten from each school, five from each school being Castilian speakers and five being Catalan speakers. In each school I interviewed at least one teacher of Catalan and one teacher of Castilian. The remaining teachers taught a variety of different subjects. The interviews took place in classrooms, staff rooms and coffee bars. On a few occasions the interview was followed by an informal discussion over coffee or an evening drink. I was also invited to the house of one teacher who was particularly interested in my research. The interviews varied considerably in length from ten minutes to several hours, either due to the amount of time available on the part of the teacher or due to the enthusiasm for the topic of the teachers concerned. All the interviews were tape-recorded, although often the most interesting discussion would occur after the tape-recorder was turned off. In these cases I asked the teacher concerned if I could use the content of our informal discussion. I used a checklist of questions, although there was considerable variation from one interview to the next because I intentionally let the teachers control the discussion as much as was possible.

I started each interview by trying to get as much background information about the interviewee as possible. The first question was always 'What's your name?' The name of someone in Catalonia can give an idea of that person's ethnic identity. There are Catalan names and Castilian names which are quite distinct. In Spain, people use two surnames: the first surname is from the father's family and the second surname is from the mother's family. Women generally do not adopt their husband's surname when they marry but continue to use the first surnames of their father and mother respectively. When you are told someone's full name you can generally tell whether they are from a Catalan family or whether they have family from another region of Spain. One can also tell if their parents were from the same or different regions of Spain.

The next question asked was 'Are you Catalan?' The answers to this question generally were not short or simple but, if they were, I would generally probe a little further to find out what it was for them that constituted their identity as being Catalan or not.

The next few questions were designed to find out how old each interviewee was or how long they had been teaching and to obtain some kind of a description concerning their professional career. This information was important in terms of what sort of questions I would ask later on in the interview. If the teacher had been teaching for a long period of time, then I would go on to ask about how things have changed in relation to use of Catalan and Castilian in schools during their career and whether they considered such changes positive or negative. If the teacher was young or fairly new to the profession, I would concentrate on how they rated the present situation in relation to their own experiences of education. These questions were asked with the aim of getting the interviewees to give me, in their own words, a description of how secondary education had changed concerning the use of the two languages in the classroom and overall school environment.

I then went on to ask them if they were happy about the changes and if they considered the normalisation of Catalan in their schools to be going well. By this point in the interview, I generally had a rough idea about whether they wholeheartedly supported the language policies or if they were going to express some reservations or criticisms of aspects of this policy.

The subsequent questions concerned their own classes. I asked what ratio of Castilian-speaking students to Catalan-speaking students they had in their classes. I wanted to know what language they taught in and what language the students used in their classroom. I also asked how they dealt with students who asked or answered questions in a different language than the one being used to conduct the class. At this point, the discussion would either

concentrate on the harmonious nature of language interaction in the classroom or would turn to examples of rebellious language behaviour, when students would refuse to use the language the teacher was using to take the class.

At this point I would start talking about the polemic which had been reported in the newspapers and ask what they thought about it, and why they thought it had come about at this moment in time, ten years after the normalisation law had been passed. I then asked about particular issues that had come out of this polemic, such as whether the Catalan normalisation law is in any way discriminatory against Castilian-speaking teachers or students. I then asked if any problems of this nature had arisen in their schools, and if there had been any problems with teachers, students or parents complaining of discrimination.

Lastly, I asked for a general appraisal of the situation and asked if they would like to see any changes or improvements. For those teachers that expressed concern or criticism about the present situation I asked them to specify in what way they thought things could be changed for the better. This often led onto a discussion about the wider social and economic environment outside of the school.

These questions allowed me to gain some insight into how individuals were identifying themselves ethnically and politically. Their evaluation of the changing relationship between the Catalan and Castilian languages was informative in terms of identifying the strategies that were being implemented by different sections of the two ethnolinguistic groups. The manner in which the interviewees responded to the questions asked allowed me to assess the degree of acceptance of the process of normalisation as implemented in their schools, and points of resistance or discontent coming from the teachers point of view.



## Students

I interviewed thirty students in total from all three schools, in equal proportions from each ethnolinguistic group. Most of the interviews I conducted with students took place in the school classrooms. However, I did also conduct some interviews in the house where I was living and in the houses of some of the students. I preferred to do the interviews with small groups of two or three students, since the students were less shy and much more talkative when they had the backup of friends. Also, I found the discussion between the students, as they tried to answer my questions, very informative. Again, the length of interviews varied considerably, depending on available time and the readiness of the students involved to talk. Most of the interviews were tape-recorded, although there were a few in which I had to rely on taking notes due to technical problems. I used a checklist of questions, although I did allow the discussion to be directed to a certain extent by the students.

Interviews with the students followed the same semi-structured format as those with the teachers. I wanted the students to discuss what they considered the important aspects of normalisation of Catalan. The checklist of questions did not vary a great deal from that of the teachers, except that I was asking them about their reactions and attitudes towards normalisation as the recipients of policy as opposed to the imparters of policy.

As with the teachers, I started by asking the students questions to find out whether they considered themselves Catalans and, if not, how they identified themselves. I asked students from both ethnolinguistic groups how they would rate their own abilities and the abilities of their peers in both languages. I wanted to know about their relationships with teachers of both ethnolinguistic groups, which language they used and which they would prefer to use when they interacted with the teachers in the classroom.

I asked the students if they were in favour of the normalisation of Catalan, if they wanted to learn Catalan and if they were in favour of being taught in Catalan. I also asked them to explain their answers and give me reasons for either negative or positive responses to these questions. I asked the students to tell me about their friends and family and which language they used in different social settings outside of the school environment. Finally I asked the students to give me a general appraisal of the normalisation of Catalan in their schools and asked if they would like to see any changes, and if so, what they would like to be changed.

The answers to the questions concerning their own perception of their language abilities in both languages were illuminative in terms of assessing penetrability of the two ethnolinguistic groups by members of their outgroups and how this related to subjective perceptions of linguistic competence. Their evaluation of the process in their schools was intended to identify what linguistic strategies they were implementing and what they were hoping to gain by these actions.

### **Parents**

I did not organise formal interviews as such with parents. Instead, I drew on my contacts with people I already knew socially or had met informally whilst conducting this research. For this reason it is difficult to quantify exactly how many parents I spoke to, though it was in the region of fifty, drawn more or less equally from both ethnolinguistic groups. Investigating the attitudes of parents to the normalisation of Catalan took a very informal format, mainly because of the nature of the relationships between myself and the parents I managed to contact. The school setting of the interviews with the teachers and students made such interviews more formal. I met with parents in lots of different locations: in bars, in people's houses, in the street or the *plazas*. In most cases, the conversations were not tape-recorded but were of a more spontaneous nature. I tried to cover the same topics as

with the students and teachers, though in a rather more flexible manner. This in turn allowed me to see from a rather more calculating angle what were believed to be the advantages and disadvantages of Catalan language normalisation for the future of members of both ethnolinguistic groups. The informality of the discussions also meant that some of the obstacles in the way of the more rationalised and cautious responses were cleared.

#### **4.5 Observation of linguistic interaction in the classroom**

I sat in on four classes in order to observe the types of code-switching that occurred in a variety of different classes. I observed a Castilian language class at the *Instituto*, a Catalan language class at the *FP*, a maths class at the *Instituto* and a technology class at the school undergoing reform. I observed how the students and teachers interacted: my intention being to try to understand under what circumstances and for what purposes they switched codes.

I asked the teachers of the above-mentioned subjects if they would mind me observing their classes. All of these teachers had already been interviewed so they understood why I was interested in observing their classes. On each occasion the teacher introduced me to the class as a research student interested in the process of normalisation of Catalan in schools. I sat at the back of the classroom and tried to make myself as inconspicuous as possible. I then took notes concerning different types of code-switching on the part of the teacher and the students as the class progressed. It is probable that the teachers may have adjusted their pattern of code-switching to a degree as a result of my presence, simply because my presence would have made them more conscious of the language they chose to use. The students appeared not to be greatly affected by my presence after the first few minutes of the class. The purpose of these observations was to compare what I could see happening in the classroom to what the teachers and pupils had told me.

#### **4.6 Observation of linguistic interaction in a variety of social settings**

Throughout the research (both formal and informal) carried out for this thesis the problem of what has come to be known as 'the observer's paradox' recurs. This problem was first discussed by Labov in connection with studies on linguistic variation. In this context, the problem is one of observing, without being observed, how people speak. M. Teresa Turell<sup>238</sup> discussed this problem in the context of an axiom of investigations on linguistic change and variation. The axiom is that, whenever a systematic observation of a speaker is made, the context immediately becomes formal in so much as the speaker will pay more than a minimal amount of attention to what he or she is saying. The implication of this axiom is that the investigator should not hope to obtain examples of the vernacular variety of language in the corpus obtained by means of a direct interview. When investigating language attitudes the same principle applies, particularly in a language contact situation where individuals may have reasons for hiding their true feelings about language policy. Obviously an interview situation where the linguistic interaction is being tape-recorded promotes a certain amount of self-editing in terms of what is said. There is no real solution to this paradox, although there are means of minimising the problem. One such means is for the observer to participate in the situation and hence minimise the effect of his or her presence.

As I gradually became more knowledgeable concerning the two languages in contact and the two ethnolinguistic groups in contact, I became increasingly aware of different and varying attitudes towards the two languages and their speakers. I also became more aware of different strategies of code-switching employed by members of both ethnolinguistic groups in a variety of social settings. When I first came to live in Catalonia, I was in the

---

<sup>238</sup> Turell, T. M., 'El comportament lingüístic: els grups socials', in Bastardas, A. and Soler, J. (eds), *Sociolingüística i Llengua Catalana* (Barcelona: Empúries, 1988), p. 119.

position of having to learn as much as possible about these two languages and their speakers in order to be able to function socially. As both ethnolinguistic groups were characterised by being particularly soft-shelled in their dealings with foreigners of English-speaking backgrounds, I was readily adopted by members of both ethnolinguistic groups as a student of the Catalan situation. This was before I even conceived of doing this research project, although it is one of the reasons that I undertook it. This period of being informally educated by friends and acquaintances stood me in very good stead for my more formal and focused research, which was undertaken between January and March of 1994.

My background knowledge of the Catalan situation was very useful when it came to investigating attitudes to language policy and the state of interethnic relations. My identity as being neither Catalan nor a native Castilian speaker made it easier for me to question members of both ethnolinguistic groups from the position of an interested outsider. At the same time, friends and family connections gave me access to a wide network of informants who knew and accepted me in a variety of different roles: a teacher, an anthropologist, a friend or relative. The types of roles and relationships that I developed over the entire period of my stay in Catalonia are reflected in my research and reporting of results of this research.

#### **4.7 Results**

Once I had informed myself by reading about the language policy debate in the newspapers, my next task was to start interviewing different sections of the local community to find out how they were interpreting the progress of normalisation in the secondary schools in Igualada. The newspaper debate provided a focus for discussions in the interviews with teachers, pupils and parents.

All three secondary schools are located in the Catalan area of Igualada: the *Instituto* and the *FP* are situated side by side, although they are on different sites. The school undergoing reform is on the other side of town and is positioned close to a large immigrant *barrio*. There was some variation in terms of the proportion of Catalan- and Castilian-speaking students attending each school. The proportion of Catalan-speaking students was higher in the *Instituto* than in the other two schools. In my interviews, I asked various members of staff why they thought this was the case. It was suggested to me that this was due to the fact that the upper and middle classes in Catalonia are mostly from the Catalan ethnolinguistic group, whereas the working class is mostly from the Castilian-speaking ethnolinguistic group. This situation was explained in terms of a correlation between a high level of pupil achievement and children from families of the upper and middle socio-economic classes. The high proportion of members of the Catalan ethnolinguistic group in the *Instituto* and the high proportion of members of the Castilian ethnolinguistic group in the *FP* was explained along these lines. The high proportion of members of the Castilian-speaking ethnolinguistic group attending the school undergoing reform was explained in terms of it being close to a large immigrant *barrio*.

### **Interviews with teachers**

The attitudes of the thirty teachers that I interviewed concerning the normalisation process did not appear to vary much between schools but had more to do with their ethnic identity, whether they were native Catalan speakers or native Castilian speakers, and their particular political persuasion. The Catalan-speaking teaching staff were fairly uniform in their endorsement of and optimism concerning the progress and results of these policies. Any variation amongst this group concerned the issue of enforcement of the objectives of the normalisation process. All the members of the Catalan ethnolinguistic group that I talked to appeared to be in agreement with the general policies being implemented. Variation centred around the 'obligation' to teach in Catalan immediately, as opposed to taking a more



gradual approach. Amongst the Castilian-speaking teachers there was more variation in terms of their attitudes towards normalisation.

Variation amongst the Catalan-speaking teaching staff, along the aforementioned lines, seemed to correspond to their political persuasion. The more radical nationalists were in favour of enforcing the normalisation process in both primary and secondary schools, and in other areas, such as the mass media, cinema, book publications and other social and economic institutions. This attitude was legitimised by the idea that Catalan, as a minority language, is still in danger of being displaced by the language of the state, due to the historical situation of diglossia in favour of Castilian. One Catalan teacher told me that 'the diglossic situation in Catalonia is so big that the immigrants can live in a closed environment, they don't have to speak Catalan except in school.' She went on to say 'There are people who have very closed minds so they want to do their own thing without realising that they are living in another country.' The implication was that the immigrant population of Catalonia would not speak Catalan unless they were obliged to. This was the reasoning for supporting an enforcement of normalisation policy in schools. Education in Catalan was seen as the solution to the problem 'so long as nothing is left in the air.' The more radical members of the Catalan ethnolinguistic group considered the proposed new legislation a step in the right direction, since it required teachers to have the relevant qualification in Catalan if they wish to take up a position in any of the 70% of secondary schools nominated by the department of education. A small minority of this group thought that this policy did not go far enough and should be extended to all secondary schools, and furthermore, that it should be obligatory to teach in Catalan except for classes in which Castilian or any other foreign language was taught.

The Catalans of a more moderate nationalist persuasion appeared to be reasonably content with the progress of normalisation in schools. Concerning enforcement of policy,

some expressed a fear of provoking a negative reaction. Frequent remarks that I heard in my interviews with Catalans of this persuasion were: 'you can't force anybody to speak in Catalan', 'change has to be gradual', 'little by little'. Members of this group were approving of the manner in which normalisation of Catalan had been carried out in schools. The essential ingredient for success, in their eyes, was the gradual and consensual manner in which policies had been introduced and implemented. Concerning the proposed new legislation which required teachers to obtain a qualification in Catalan, this section of the Catalan ethnolinguistic group considered this a positive step in bringing secondary education in line with the already predominantly Catalan primary education. The emphasis for this group was the importance of gradual and negotiated change that would not provoke negative reactions to the normalisation process in general.

The attitude of the Castilian-speaking teaching staff towards the normalisation policies in schools varied between approval, acceptance, concern and criticism. Not surprisingly, the range of attitudes amongst members of the Castilian-speaking ethnolinguistic group covered a wider range than those of the Catalan group. It could be presumed that members of the ethnolinguistic group whose first language is not the language of education will be more concerned about the changing relationship between the languages. I did not speak to any member of this group whose attitude corresponded to those expressed by the Catalans of a more radical nationalist persuasion. However, those that expressed attitudes along the lines of approval or acceptance and even concern appeared to base these attitudes on the same principles as those of the Catalans of a more moderate persuasion. Concern and criticism on the part of the Castilian-speaking teachers were more readily expressed than by any of the Catalan-speaking teachers interviewed and were exemplified by reference to the school and wider social environment.

Approval was based on the manner in which normalisation had been gradually introduced with consultation and sensitivity to parent and pupil needs. One teacher from the *FP* remarked that 'the success of the program was largely due to the "little by little" rate of change with no undue pressures.' The acceptance attitude was part of the more general opinion that if one lives in Catalonia one has to adapt and adopt the Catalan language and, to some extent, the Catalan way of life. A teacher at the school undergoing reform commented 'I suppose if you go to live in a different country you have to expect to learn the language of that country whether it be Catalonia, France, or wherever.' Members of the Castilian ethnolinguistic group who expressed these types of attitudes tended not to think of language policy as being discriminatory or, if they did entertain this possibility, saw it as a necessary evil.

The approval and acceptance of the normalisation process in schools appeared to have its base in the belief that in order 'to get on in life' one needs to be able to speak Catalan. I did not hear anybody who expressed this kind of attitude question the validity of the situation or express an opinion concerning the desirability or dislike of this situation. Approval, then, was based on the manner in which normalisation had been implemented, i.e. so that all children would be able to compete on equal terms, at least as far as language was concerned. A history teacher at the *Instituto* said 'If your children are going to live here, they need to know Catalan. It's logical that they know Catalan.' A teacher of Castilian at the *FP* told me that 'all the children that have been brought up here shouldn't have any disadvantage. It's only those with closed minds that have problems.' Acceptance, also, was expressed in very neutral terms. Another Castilian teacher at the *FP* remarked: 'at an economic and social level Catalan is important. Parents want the students to learn Catalan so they won't be discriminated against.'

Some mild concern was expressed about a general anti-Castilian feeling that may have been (inadvertently) encouraged by the normalisation program insofar as it connected with more radical elements of Catalan nationalist sentiment. A Castilian teacher (who also taught drama) at the *Instituto*, when asked if she was concerned about any aspects of the normalisation process in schools, said 'there is nothing definite you can put your finger on: it's more a feeling of self-censorship, as if anything non-Catalan is inferior or uninteresting.' She found it difficult to explain exactly what it was that worried her so. By way of explanation; she told me of an incident concerning the production of a play that she was producing with the students for the drama society. 'We wanted to produce a play by Lorca, in Castilian. Some of the students objected to having to act parts in Castilian, though they didn't explicitly say this, obviously they couldn't admit this, as it would not be acceptable. What they said was "How can we play this part in Castilian with our Catalan accents?"' They were implying that they couldn't do it. I told them that was the essence of acting, pretending to be someone you're not. In the end they did it but it took some persuading. We purposely chose Lorca to try to combat this kind of attitude.'

Concern was also expressed by a number of teachers in relation to the proposal of obliging teachers to have a specific qualification in Catalan in order to take up a teaching post. Several teachers believed this would cause discrimination against members of the Castilian-speaking community along linguistic lines. This was seen as part of a tendency towards monolingual education in Catalan which relegates Castilian to an inferior position within the education system. A Castilian teacher at the *FP* when asked if she was Catalan answered: 'I am Catalan but I speak Castilian. I was born in Barcelona. My parents have lived here for thirty-two years.' By answering in this manner, she was expressing her belief that second-generation immigrants can, or should be able to, claim Catalan identity. She expressed concern about discrimination at an institutional level against Castilian-speaking teachers. 'Policy that obliges anybody to use a language that is not their mother tongue

could provoke bad feeling and interrupt the peaceful nature of the normalisation process.' A teacher of social studies at the *Instituto* said 'I'm worried that if they want us all to teach in Catalan, the level of Castilian spoken and written by the students will suffer.' Several of the Castilian teachers interviewed expressed concern about the level of Castilian spoken by young children on leaving primary education, specifically those children from Catalan-speaking families.

Many of the teachers who held a more critical attitude towards the process of normalisation expressed concern about the amount of time and energy that was put into the implementation of language policy, e.g. the training and examining of teachers in Catalan language. This was seen to detract from other areas which would benefit from more attention. A maths teacher at the school undergoing reform complained that 'This is just yet another demand on teachers' time and energy that could well be spent on more important matters.'

Catalan- and Castilian-speaking teaching staff appeared to be expressing the same general commitment to the process of Catalan normalisation in their schools but for different reasons. The Catalans wanted to protect their language and their right to speak Catalan whenever and wherever they so wished. The Castilian-speaking teachers perceived this process as a means of providing the Castilian-speaking students with equal opportunities in later life. The more negative or cautious attitudes expressed by members of both ethnolinguistic groups centred around the proposed legislation of obliging language policy. The enforcement of policy was considered dangerous by some members of the Catalan ethnolinguistic group because of the possibility of negative reactions, which might endanger the progress towards normalisation. Some members of the Castilian-speaking ethnolinguistic group expressed concern about loss of proficiency in Castilian, discrimination that might result from the enforcement of language policy, and fear that a



more general anti-Castilian feeling might inadvertently be encouraged. Most accepted, however, that it was not unreasonable to pursue a normalisation policy in Catalan.

The Heads of Studies of the *Instituto* and the *FP*, the Vice-Head of Studies of the school undergoing reform and a co-ordinator of language policy of the *FP* were also interviewed with the purpose of trying to find out how language policy instigated by the *Generalitat* was implemented on a local basis in the secondary schools in Igualada. What was most striking was the apparent relaxed control and the easy-going attitude that was prevalent. The Heads of Studies explained to me what was being done in their own schools. Apart from a minimum amount of classes that had to be taught in Catalan, the exact amount of which no-one seemed to know, and the fact that all the teachers had to have at least the minimum qualification in Catalan language, it seemed to be pretty much left up to the individual teachers as to which language they used in the classroom. I was told by the Vice-Head of Studies of the school undergoing reform that 'because the majority of teachers taking up teaching positions in Igualada are Catalan speakers we don't have to worry too much about complying with the regulations concerning a minimum of classes to be taught in Catalan. Every year we send a report to Barcelona concerning the teachers and the language they teach in. All the teachers have to demonstrate that they can write and speak correctly in Catalan if necessary. An inspector in each school examines them. As yet, they don't have to have the module 2 qualification. It's not obligatory in this centre. If there's enough demand we run courses in Catalan for the teachers. Sometimes we combine with the teachers from the other schools in Igualada and run a joint course.'

All the Heads of Studies, who were Catalan, also taught, albeit a reduced number of classes to allow time for their administrative work. They all told me that they taught in Catalan. Two of them said that they had no problem in changing to Castilian if the situation demanded it. One of them said that he found no need to use Castilian in the classroom as all



the students understood Catalan. All thought that the process of normalisation was going very well: an often-repeated remark was 'there's no problem'. All the Heads of Studies were optimistic about the progress of normalisation. I was told 'The children integrate perfectly. Their families want them to speak Catalan.' When I asked about if they thought the children were using more Catalan outside of school as a result of language policy in school, I was told 'all the time they are speaking more and more in Catalan. Whereas before a Catalan child would switch to Castilian when with a Castilian-speaking child, now more often than not, the Castilian-speaking child will switch to Catalan.' It was pointed out that the increase in television programmes, comics, newspapers, and publication of books in Catalan all influenced the progress towards normalisation of Catalan.

I spoke to one co-ordinator of Catalan language normalisation in secondary schools. She told me that each centre has a co-ordinator who is responsible for producing statistics relating to the amount of teachers who are able to teach in Catalan. They also organise Catalan courses for the teachers, document vocabulary and correct language usage. She described her job as being to supervise all aspects of Catalan normalisation in that particular school.

When I questioned the teachers about linguistic interaction in their classrooms, all the Catalan-speaking teachers said that they conducted their classes in Catalan, except for one who taught Castilian language. Of the Castilian-speaking teachers that I interviewed, only four taught in Catalan – all of these taught at the *Instituto*. There were quite diverse strategies employed by teachers concerning the language used in their classrooms. Those teachers from the Catalan ethnolinguistic group who taught Catalan language were the most insistent on using Catalan at all costs. One Catalan language teacher told me that 'even when they ask me what something means in Castilian I always answer in Catalan. I try to explain the word by using a synonym.' Other Catalan-speaking teachers were quite happy to

switch to Castilian if they thought it necessary, although it was often pointed out that the children that were entering secondary education at that time had received all their primary education in Catalan, and therefore, were perfectly capable of understanding and speaking Catalan.

The Castilian-speaking teachers also appeared to adopt a variety of techniques concerning language usage in the classroom. Those that taught Castilian language generally insisted on conducting the class in Castilian. A few of these teachers complained that sometimes the students would insist on asking questions in Catalan. Some teachers found this annoying and others would just carry on the class in Castilian as if this was perfectly acceptable. All teachers said that cases of language switching as a sign of a rebellious attitude were not the norm and were definitely in a minority. A teacher of Castilian at the *FP* told me of an incident in her classroom that occurred just before I interviewed her. 'I asked a student to do a summary of the text that we had just read. He refused and started talking in Catalan. These cases are rare, but sometimes you do meet resistance.'

A great number of factors were mentioned in relation to what influences the pattern of language switching in any one classroom. One of the most important factors stated by the teachers I interviewed was the relationship between the teacher and the student. A native Catalan-speaking teacher of technology, who taught in Catalan, when asked what language the students used when they spoke to him in class, replied 'It depends on confidence: the closer the relationship the more likely they are to use their first language.' In general the students were reported to address the teacher in the language that was being used to give the class, so the teacher set the language environment of the classroom, except for 'isolated' or 'rare' occasions when a particular child would rebel against the language choice of the teacher. Amongst themselves, the students were reported to switch from one language to

the other depending on a variety of factors. I discuss these factors further in relation to the students' perceptions of language policy in their schools.

I asked the teachers if they thought the children from Castilian-speaking families suffered any kind of discrimination or disadvantage in their school career. All the teachers, from both ethnolinguistic groups, did not believe that the students were at any disadvantage on linguistic grounds. I was told by one Castilian-speaking teacher 'Those that speak badly in Catalan also speak badly in Castilian.' Another teacher told me 'The teaching materials are in Catalan, but they can do the exams in either language. Some students still have problems writing in Catalan, but other students have problems writing in Castilian.' A remark made by many teachers was that the general level of writing skills was low in both languages. However, no one attributed this directly to the process of Catalan normalisation. A native Catalan speaker who taught Castilian remarked 'Their writing skills are terrible, but in Catalan as well. Sometimes they confuse the two languages but really I think it's more a sign of the times.' Another Castilian-speaking teacher remarked 'A responsible and conscientious student realises that Catalan is the language of culture, education and work.' A Catalan-speaking technology teacher told me 'There was a case of a parent complaining that his child was discriminated against because his accent wasn't good in Catalan, but this child always spoke in Castilian.'

There was also a large degree of agreement between teachers concerning the polemic reported in the newspapers about whether the Catalan Language Normalisation Law was constitutional or not. All the teachers agreed that this was not a serious debate. No one thought that this polemic reflected in any way on the manner in which language policy had been implemented. Everyone agreed that this type of polemic, as reported in the newspapers, was a result of political manoeuvring instigated by the right-wing political parties. One teacher told me 'This whole debate is about politics, it's not anything real.'

There isn't a problem.' Another teacher commented 'This is about the *PP* who want to discredit the Catalans in order to destabilise the government.' Another remarked 'It's like a virus that keeps coming back.' Similarly, no one seemed to take seriously the objections raised by *Cadeca*, the parents who wanted education in Castilian for their children. A Castilian-speaking teacher remarked 'I suppose they are people who don't want to stay in Catalonia, most people want their children to learn Catalan.' The general attitude of the teachers to this issue was illustrated well by an often-used expression 'much ado about nothing'.

Towards the end of each interview, I asked the teachers if there was anything they would like to see change concerning language policy in their schools. The majority of teachers from both the Catalan-speaking ethnolinguistic group and the Castilian-speaking ethnolinguistic group said they were happy with the way language policy was being implemented in their schools. Frequent remarks were 'There aren't any real problems', 'The children integrate well', 'It's a popular policy, the students want to learn Catalan' and 'the parents want their children to learn Catalan'.

Members of the Catalan ethnolinguistic group that expressed a wish to see things change were not unhappy with the aims and objectives of normalisation but rather with more practical matters concerning funding, lack of adequate materials, or just the gradual pace at which policy was being implemented. A maths teacher at the *FP* complained that 'so much time is spent teaching languages, Catalan, Castilian, and now they have to study at least one foreign language, which means that there is less time available for other subjects.' However, he could not think of any practical solution to the problem. The more radical Catalans thought change could be speeded up, especially in policy relating to the mass media, television, etc. It was suggested that the overall linguistic environment needed to be more Catalan in order to encourage Catalan usage outside of the school environment.

Members of the Castilian-speaking ethnolinguistic group expressed rather more varied attitudes, although the majority of them agreed with the less radical Catalans and were quite happy with the way in which language policy was being implemented. Some teachers, although accepting that it was not practical, would have liked the children to have more choice as to which language they were taught in. A Castilian language teacher at the *Instituto*, when asked if she thought the students should be able to choose the language they are taught in, said 'In reality it wouldn't be possible. There's no point in dreaming of a policy that isn't practical.'

There were some teachers who were concerned that children from the Castilian-speaking ethnolinguistic group felt marginalised because of a general anti-Castilian feeling. Teachers who expressed this kind of attitude were hesitant about blaming language policy but talked in more general terms about a minority of young people who displayed radical nationalist tendencies. A teacher at the *FP* told me that 'some of the youths get into gangs, the skinheads are *Catalanistas* and then there are other groups which are *Españolistas*.' There was some concern expressed about the relative status of Castilian in Catalonia. A Castilian teacher remarked that 'They have reversed the roles and the prestige. They should try to achieve an equilibrium. Catalan, now, is the language of culture, but that's not the way it should be. They are not trying to achieve bilingualism but a clear monolingualism, with Castilian as a foreign language.' Criticism by some individuals focused on the problem of implementing the right to instruction in pupils' mother tongues (up to the age of seven) exacerbated by problems of providing adequate resources, both in terms of staff and teaching materials. A small minority thought that all children should have a right to choose their own language of instruction. Those that expressed this preference were not in favour of separate schools, but instead preferred a more balanced education in both languages. Any criticism was expressed in very tentative terms, presumably because they did not want to be thought of as anti-Catalan.



There appeared to be a near consensus over the desirability of education, both primary and secondary, being carried out using Catalan as the vehicular language. The majority of teachers that I spoke to in both ethnolinguistic groups were in favour of the policy of normalising Catalan in their schools, although the two groups supported the policy for different reasons. The Catalans were in favour of the current language policy because it was seen to be effective in terms of reversing the damage done to the status and use of Catalan during the Franco period. Policy was believed to be successful in moving towards a more general usage of Catalan without causing any undue discrimination for teachers or students from the Castilian-speaking ethnolinguistic group. Teachers from the Castilian-speaking ethnolinguistic group supported language policy in their schools because they believed that this was an effective way of minimising the disadvantages students might experience in later life if they had not mastered Catalan. Both these groups of teachers appeared to accept without question that the Catalan language had more prestige and was associated with the upper socio-economic levels of society within Catalonia. A teacher from the Castilian-speaking ethnolinguistic group told me 'The economic and social status associated with the language is important. Parents want the students to learn in Catalan so they won't be discriminated against.'

### **Interviews with students**

I interviewed about thirty students in total from all three schools, in equal proportions from each ethnolinguistic group. Amongst the students there was a similar range of attitudes. The Catalan-speaking students were generally supporting and approving of the normalisation process in their schools. However, some of them took a more radical stance insofar as they would have liked it to have been taken further and resented any teaching in Castilian. One student at the *FP* said 'If they want to teach in Catalonia they should teach in Catalan – it's logical.' A student at the *FP* who came from a Castilian-speaking background told me:



'Even in the Castilian class, some of the students refuse to speak Castilian and answer the teacher in Catalan and ask her to talk in Catalan.'

The Castilian-speaking students had a similar range of attitudes to that of the Castilian-speaking teachers. The students who were high achievers were, generally speaking, the most approving of the process of Catalan normalisation in their schools. The most widespread attitude amongst the Castilian-speaking students appeared to be that of acceptance. The children from more middle-class backgrounds or aspirations were more positive about the whole process. A student at the *Instituto* who wanted to go to university said 'I think it's good that they teach in Catalan as it's the language of this part of Spain.' She went on to say that 'although my parents never speak to me in Catalan I have no problem speaking Catalan, I can express myself equally in either language. I have Catalan and non-Catalan friends, when I speak Catalan people don't notice that I'm not Catalan.' When I asked her why it was important for her to speak Catalan, she replied 'You need Catalan to get a good job and it's important just to get on with people generally. If I didn't want to speak Catalan I wouldn't have half the friends that I do have.' Another student at the *Instituto* who comes from a Castilian-speaking family but said she had no problem with Catalan, told me 'Once the history teacher gave us an exam in Castilian. The Catalan students did so badly that they had to do it again in Catalan. Catalans, when they're young, often have problems with Castilian, but this improves as they get older though they usually speak Castilian with Catalan accents.'

Students from a working class background often accepted the situations along the same lines as mentioned above. A student at the *FP* remarked 'They don't teach in Chinese in Andalusia.' Several individuals from this group of students remarked that they could speak in Catalan if necessary but would only speak it in formal situations when it was demanded of them. This group of students often expressed concern about their ability to

speaking Catalan adequately and was very sensitive to criticism by native Catalan speakers particularly concerning accent. A student at the *FP* who was studying administration, since she wanted to work as a secretary, told me: 'I think my accent in Catalan is bad, for this reason Catalans change to Castilian when speaking to me, even when I speak to them in Catalan. I can write well in Catalan but I have problems speaking.' This student said she did not have many Catalan friends and those that she did have she spoke to in Castilian. When I asked her why she wanted to learn Catalan she replied 'You need Catalan to get a good job. I'm learning English too because that's important if you want to be a good secretary.'

A student at the *FP* told me his story. 'I was studying at the *Instituto* but I had some problems with a teacher who objected to me speaking in Castilian. At the *Instituto* nearly all my classmates were Catalan speakers. The Catalan classes were taught in Catalan. If Castilian is spoken the other students complain, but in Castilian classes the students speak in Catalan. Now I'm at the *FP* I never speak in Catalan. Even in Catalan classes, I speak to the Catalan teacher in Castilian and he replies in Catalan. The problem is my accent. I don't sound like a Catalan, but it's the same for the Catalans: when they speak Castilian they have a Catalan accent. I respect the Catalans but I don't think they respect me.' Even this student said he thought the teachers should teach in Catalan simply because they were in Catalonia. He also wanted to learn Catalan in order to get a job.

In general, the students who were doing the more academic courses were more confident about their abilities in Catalan language and also appeared to mix more with members of the Catalan ethnolinguistic group on a social level. These students wanted to learn Catalan for instrumental and integrative reasons. The students who were doing more vocational-oriented courses were less confident about their oral abilities in Catalan, but were also in favour of Catalan normalisation policies in their schools. These students

appeared to want to learn Catalan primarily for instrumental reasons.<sup>239</sup> There appeared to be radical elements from both ethnolinguistic groups. Several students from Castilian-speaking backgrounds complained about students refusing to speak in Castilian even in Castilian language classes. Similarly, students from Catalan-speaking backgrounds complained about students who continued to speak in Castilian in the classroom without making much effort to even try to speak Catalan. This kind of rebellious attitude was more predominant in the *FP*. One student complained 'some of the kids don't speak Catalan, not because they can't, they just can't be bothered or don't want to try. When the teacher of Catalan speaks to them in Catalan they just reply in Castilian all the time.'

The vast majority of students were in favour of policies aimed at the normalisation of Catalan in their schools. All the students wanted to learn Catalan. Some expressed this in terms of instrumental reasons and some for both integrative and instrumental reasons. There was some conflict between students concerning when it was appropriate to use Catalan or Castilian. Overall there appeared to be very little real tension between members of the two ethnolinguistic groups. Most students either had a mix of friends and switched languages easily amongst themselves, or had a preference for speaking their own language and

---

<sup>239</sup> Gardner and Lambert, in their early work investigating acquisition of a second language by English-speaking students in Montreal, identified attitude as an important factor in terms of success at learning the second language. It was as a result of these early investigations that the distinction between integrative and instrumental motivation appeared. The first refers to a curiosity and sincere interest about the other group and a tendency for the individual to increase his or her knowledge about the other community in order to become a member of the said group. The second refers to learning the language of the other group for practical reasons, maybe because it is required for work, or because proficiency in this language is seen to enhance one's possibilities of personal development. Siguan and Mackey warn that it is not possible to make such a clear-cut distinction between these two types of motivation, because, even though at first they may appear to be distinct, they are in fact related and mutually implicated, which means that they normally appear together and for each language and for each person in a different form. (Siguan, M. and Mackey, W. *Educación y bilingüismo*, Madrid: UNESCO, Santillana/Aula XXI, 1986).

therefore tended to have friends from their own linguistic background. There was a minority of students who expressed more antagonistic tendencies and looked for grounds on which to criticise members of the outgroup. Interestingly criticism focused more on individual attitudes of particular teachers or students rather than being aimed at the policies themselves.

### **Interviews with parents**

It was more difficult contacting parents to talk to them about their attitudes to Catalan normalisation. Some of the students I interviewed introduced me to their parents, but the majority of parents I talked to were those that I knew socially or met informally while I was staying in Igualada. Consequently the conversations I had with parents were of a more informal style. It is difficult to exactly quantify how many conversations I had with parents, but I talked to over fifty parents, again drawn roughly equally from both ethnolinguistic groups.

Parents from both ethnolinguistic groups were all in favour of the normalisation policies in school, though to varying degrees. Attitudes expressed by the parents followed roughly the same pattern as those of the teachers and students. All parents wanted their children to have a good knowledge of both languages so they could take full advantage of employment opportunities when they left school.

As one would expect, parents from the Catalan ethnolinguistic group were more concerned that their children should have a good level of Catalan and were less concerned about their children's abilities in Castilian. They believed that Catalan was the language under threat of remaining under the shadow of the more widely used Castilian. I did not speak to any parents of Catalan origin who thought the level of Castilian language spoken by their children would be in any way limited by policies aimed at normalising Catalan. One

mother of two children who were studying at the *Instituto* remarked 'I don't think their Castilian will suffer. They are surrounded by Castilian language outside of school, in the newspapers, on television, on the radio, in the cinema etc. I'm more worried about their Catalan. I think they need more Catalan at school. All the teachers should teach in Catalan, except those that teach other languages.'

I did come across a few parents from Catalan origin who could understand why some parents of Castilian-speaking background might be concerned that their children would have problems at school. However, this kind of attitude was always qualified by remarks such as 'If they want to stay in Catalonia their children will need to learn Catalan' or 'It's for their own good. If they have problems with Catalan they won't be able to compete for the same jobs as the other kids.' There were also some parents of a more radical persuasion who were quite hostile towards the concerns of parents of Castilian-speaking backgrounds. One parent told me in no uncertain terms that 'If they don't like the policies of the *Generalitat* they should go and live somewhere else.'

Parents from the Castilian-speaking ethnolinguistic group were generally approving of how language policy had been implemented up until that point, although many were concerned that now there was a tendency to move towards monolingual education in Catalan. One parent commented 'If our children are going to live in Catalonia they need to be bilingual, but I'm worried that if they want to make all education totally in Catalan, who's going to teach them to read and write in Castilian? After all Catalonia is part of Spain and the language of Spain is Castilian.' Many of the parents that I spoke to were concerned about a general feeling that somehow they were inferior, that the rights of their children were not as important as those of the Catalans. They complained of being made to feel like second-class citizens because they were of immigrant origin. However, this sensation of being made to feel inferior was not directly attributed to education policy, or normalisation



of Catalan language, but had more to do with attitudes of the Catalans that they interacted with on a daily basis.

Most parents that spoke to me were impressed with the way the teachers and administrators dealt with any problems or queries that they had concerning their children in relation to language policy in the schools. Criticism tended to be more to do with the wider community, for example, the fact that there was not a secondary school in any of the immigrant *barrios*. All three secondary schools in Igualada are located in 'Catalan areas'. Another common complaint was that a lot of money was being spent on doing up the 'Catalan areas'. This involved making new play areas for children or planting trees and park areas, etc, whereas in the immigrant *barrios* there was no money available for such projects. All these things led to a feeling that the immigrants and their families were marginalised and to some extent excluded from the mainstream Catalan culture.

### **Observation of Classroom Interaction**

I sat in on four classes in order to observe the types of code-switching that occurred in a variety of different classes. As time was limited by this point in my fieldwork I had to be quite selective. I observed a Castilian language class at the *Instituto*, a Catalan language class at the *FP*, a maths class at the *Instituto* and a technology class at the school undergoing reform. I wanted to see how the teachers and the students interacted, and under what circumstances and for what purposes they switched code.

In the language classes the teachers gave the presentation of the material in the language being taught, which corresponded with the ethnolinguistic identity of the teachers. The maths class was taught in Castilian by a member of the Castilian ethnolinguistic group and the technology class was taught in Catalan by a member of the Catalan ethnolinguistic group. The students were grouped more or less according to ethnolinguistic identity. This



grouping was of their own choice. When the students were instructed to do some work in pairs or groups they talked amongst themselves in groups of Catalan speakers or Castilian speakers. When a student addressed a question to the teacher at the front of the class the question, in most cases, was asked in the language of the teacher's preference. When a question was asked in the other language the teacher would generally respond in the language of his or her preference. For example, in the maths class a student put his hand up and the teacher asked in Castilian 'What's the problem?' The student asked the teacher, in Catalan, to repeat an explanation for one of the exercises. The teacher repeated the explanation in Castilian. The student said in Catalan 'OK, now I've got it.'

The pattern described above was basically the same in all the classes I observed. There was more variation between the teachers' responses to code-switching on the part of the students when the teachers were moving around the class helping individuals or groups. In the language classes the teachers were more inclined to stick to the language of the class, even when addressing individuals privately who repeatedly asked questions in the other language. This type of linguistic interaction seemed quite common and went without comment. The teacher would respond and explain problems in one language and some of the students would ask questions in another language. In the maths and technology classes, the teachers tended to switch to the language preferred by the students when speaking to them privately or in small groups.

In all the classes there was a significant amount of code-switching between students, and between teachers and students. None of the classes were by any means monolingual. When I asked the teachers and some of the students why they switched languages, there was a lot of variety in the reasons they gave. The students appeared to be largely unaware of switching languages. If they could identify a reason it tended to be along the lines of 'I always speak to that teacher in that language' or 'I always speak to that friend in that

language.' Relationships between students and between students and teachers had developed in either one language or the other, or a combination of the two languages. Each relationship had to be negotiated along linguistic lines.

The teachers tended to have worked out their own personal strategies for language switching. For example, certain activities were done strictly in one language and other activities could be done in either language, depending on the relationship with the students involved. Some of the teachers from the Castilian-speaking ethnolinguistic group said they did not feel confident enough to address the whole class in Catalan, but they did not mind talking to individual students in Catalan. Some of the teachers from the Catalan ethnolinguistic group preferred to conduct the entire class in Catalan for ideological reasons. Other teachers from the Catalan ethnolinguistic group would conduct most of the class in Catalan, because they felt they could teach better in their mother tongue, but had no objection to switching to Castilian for those students that asked questions in Castilian.

There were teachers from both ethnolinguistic groups who said they chose to teach in their mother tongue because for them it was the language they felt most comfortable using in the classroom. Some teachers also commented that they thought they could teach better using their mother tongue. There was a significant amount of teachers from the Catalan ethnolinguistic group who said they used Catalan as the first vehicular language in the classroom for ideological motives, i.e. they believed they were positively promoting the process of Catalan normalisation by teaching in Catalan. I did not speak to any teachers from the Castilian ethnolinguistic group who explicitly said they chose to teach in Castilian for ideological reasons, i.e. they purposely taught in Castilian as a means of expressing their opposition to the process of Catalan normalisation in schools. I do not think this necessarily means that teachers from the Castilian-speaking ethnolinguistic group did not chose to teach in Castilian for ideological reasons. It seems probable that some did have ideological

reasons for their choice but did not want to admit to being in any way opposed to normalisation of Catalan, because of the political stigma associated with any opposition to language policy.

The reasons students gave for their own language choice in the classroom setting followed a similar pattern to that of the teachers. Those students that insisted on speaking in Catalan when the teacher used Castilian as the vehicular language either said this was because they felt more comfortable speaking in Catalan or gave an ideological explanation for their choice of language, such as 'We're living in Catalonia so we should be taught in Catalan.' The students from the Castilian-speaking ethnolinguistic group were reticent about explicitly expressing any opposition to the process of normalisation. Explanations for choosing to speak in Castilian when the teacher was using Catalan as the vehicular language tended to be along the lines of a lack of confidence about their oral ability in Catalan. In most cases the lack of ability was identified as problems with accent. Many students expressed a fear of being ridiculed when speaking in Catalan. The ridicule could come from members of both ethnolinguistic groups, although in practice students did speak in Castilian and in some cases this would appear to be a form of resistance.

The code-switching strategies of the members of the speech community interacting in the secondary school setting appeared to be a complicated and intricate means of negotiating relationships and making statements about one's own ethnic identity and political persuasion. Administrators, teachers, students and parents explained to me some of the issues involved in this process of negotiating which language is used in different situations and contexts. In both ethnolinguistic groups, there were members who expressed varying degrees of awareness concerning political meanings associated with their own particular strategy of code-switching.

### **Observation of linguistic interaction in a variety of social settings**

The formal interviews carried out on the school premises were without doubt affected by a degree of self-editing on the part of the informants. However, these were only a part of the research carried out. Living in the community and participating in social life in the *barrio* on a daily basis meant that I could have any number of informal conversations with people. These quite often involved some discussion on language issues.<sup>240</sup> I also spent a lot of time in the schools in the staff rooms and coffee bars trying to meet people to arrange interviews. This inevitably meant having many informal conversations with teachers and other school staff, which was very useful in terms of gaining a relatively unedited insight into the issues discussed in this chapter.

These informal encounters did not on the whole contradict the information gained through the interviews. The difference was more in terms of how these attitudes were expressed. Prejudicial stereotypes were more prevalent from both ethnolinguistic groups in an informal context. The more extreme conflictive type of opinions were expressed more forcefully in an informal context. The Catalan perception of the immigrant Castilian-speaking population was extreme, e.g. 'They live in ghettos like gypsies. If they don't have to speak Catalan they won't even try.' 'They are lazy and self indulgent, they would rather spend all day in the bar than go to work.'

The Andalusian perception of the Catalans was also expressed more in terms of prejudicial stereotypes in an informal context: 'They are very serious people. They can't appreciate a joke.' They are considered to be more introverted, less sociable, and hence more difficult to get to know. Many jokes were also made concerning their thriftiness.

---

<sup>240</sup> At the time of doing this research, language policy in Catalonia was an issue that was being debated almost on a daily basis in the press, which meant that it was a topic that frequently occurred in daily discussions or commentaries in many different social contexts.

Catalans have a reputation for being hard-working and having a good business sense. This particular stereotype, although not directly disputed by non-Catalans, often prompted remarks of the sort 'They think we are lazy but it was us who made them rich by working for a pittance in their factories.' There were a lot of defensive remarks reflecting a feeling that the Castilian-speaking population was undervalued or misrepresented.

This type of hostile sentiment, however, was in a minority. The more positive aspects were also expressed more freely in an informal context, e.g. Catalan respect for the Andalusian musical culture of flamenco; in the music bars, Catalan rock and flamenco rock, amongst other styles, were mixed and enthused about by members of both ethnolinguistic groups. Youth culture and night life was one of the social arenas that seemed least preoccupied by issues relating to language policy and where differences in ethnolinguistic culture and language, although still noticeable and marked, were not considered to be an issue or of much relevance in terms of social interaction. Frequently, people would remark 'What does it matter which language we speak as long as we understand each other?' or respond to questions about what they thought about language policy along the lines of 'Oh, that's not important, that's just politics.' There was also evidence of respect for the Catalan culture and character from the non-native Catalan population. This respect was often expressed in terms of their resistance and opposition to Franco and with reference to the Catalan characteristic of *rauxa*. This term refers to the anarchist tendencies of the Catalans, particularly marked in the 1920s and 1930s, though currently still in evidence amongst certain sections of the population.<sup>241</sup>

---

<sup>241</sup> The union of the Catalan working class and immigrant working class in opposition to Franco and, later, in the communist and anarchist unions which are led by Catalans with Catalanist tendencies was a key factor in terms of acceptance of the Catalan language normalisation process on the part of the immigrant population. This point is further discussed in chapter five.



Code-switching strategies in an informal context were complex. There were the minority extremists from both ethnolinguistic groups that would refuse to accommodate to the language of the interlocutor of the outgroup. These interactions would be brief, to the point and quite hostile in character. At the other extreme were the sorts of interactions where the interlocutors from different ethnolinguistic groups knew each other well and would each carry out the interaction in their own first language, resulting in a bilingual conversation. In this sort of case obviously each interlocutor had a good passive knowledge of the outgroup language but preferred to speak in his or her own first language. In this type of interaction, the level of intimacy between the interlocutors was such that there would be no need to make an effort to accommodate or diverge for any ideological reasons. Between these two extremes was any number of variations. The ideological climate set by the policies of Catalan normalisation meant that many interactions between members of the two ethnolinguistic groups would commence in Catalan but often would switch to Castilian at some point of the conversation. Sometimes this would be due to one of the interlocutors having difficulty in speaking Catalan fluently so the member of the Catalan ethnolinguistic group would switch to Castilian in order to aid the fluency of the interactions or because the member of the Castilian-speaking ethnolinguistic group had difficulty finding a particular word or phrase in Catalan so would interject a word or phrase in Castilian. Whether the interaction would then continue in Catalan or Castilian would then depend on a number of factors:<sup>242</sup> the relationship between the individuals, the language attitudes held by the individuals, the social context of the interaction, etc.

My own observation and participation in everyday communicative interactions did not contradict the findings of the more formal research carried out in the schools but rather provided a more in depth insight into what I was told in the interviews.

---

<sup>242</sup> These factors are outlined in more detail in chapter two and further analysed in chapter five.



#### **4.8 Conclusion**

If, when deciding which code to use, individuals are saying something about themselves and their perceptions of the relationships involved in interactive situations which reflect and influence wider political issues, then an analysis of the motives underlying this pattern of linguistic interaction should be helpful in understanding why one language gains or loses ground to another.

Members of the Catalan ethnolinguistic group who were in favour of enforcement of Catalan language normalization were those that were inclined to use Catalan even when their interlocutor was unwilling or unable to use Catalan. This section of the Catalan ethnic group could be said to perceive cognitive alternatives to its superior status on the grounds that its speech patterns are characterized by upward divergence. This speech pattern is most probably due to the general political situation being considered unstable. Hence language is perceived to be continually endangered by any change of policy coming from the central government in Madrid. Members of the Catalan ethnolinguistic group who were in favour of a more gradual approach to implementation of Catalan language normalization policy were more prepared to switch to Castilian when their interlocutor was unwilling or unable to use Catalan. Those characterized by this convergent pattern of code switching had accepted the dominant ideology promulgated by the Generalitat concerning the need for all those in Catalonia to speak Catalan. However, they were aware of the dangers of a negative backlash to policy if enforcement was considered to be discriminatory by members of the Castilian ethnolinguistic group.

Members of the Castilian ethnolinguistic group who expressed approval of the process of Catalan language, normalization and consistently used a strategy of upward convergence when interacting with members of the Catalan ethnolinguistic group, were willing to assimilate into the Catalan ethnolinguistic group for both integrative and

instrumental reasons. Members of the Castilian ethnolinguistic group who expressed acceptance of the process of Catalan language normalization, and also implemented strategies of upward convergence when interacting with members of the Catalan ethnolinguistic group, had accepted the dominant ideology of the Generalitat that if one lives in Catalonia one should speak Catalan. The motivation to speak Catalan for this group was primarily expressed in terms of instrumental reasons though there were also integrative elements.

Members of the Castilian ethnolinguistic group who expressed concern or criticism about certain aspects of the Catalan language normalization process were characterized by using linguistic strategies of downward divergence in certain circumstances. These strategies were explained in terms of concern with anti-Castilian feeling that may be inadvertently produced as a result of the normalization process, and also as a result of in acceptance by members of the Catalan ethnolinguistic group.

For all sections of the Castilian ethnolinguistic group there was a complicated interplay of desire to be successful and accepted by the Catalan ethnolinguistic group counteracted by a fear of loss of solidarity with the group of origin coupled with a fear of rejection by members of the Catalan ethnolinguistic group.

The attitudes to the policies of normalisation, the effect of this process on interethnic relationships and how this relates to patterns of linguistic interaction are all intricately interrelated. The private discourses on the issues reported in this chapter reveal what might be considered a surprising acceptance on the part of the majority of the Castilian-speaking population of a radical language policy implemented in the schools and communities of Catalonia. The results obtained and reported in this chapter are analysed in the concluding chapter.

## **CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSIONS**

### **5.1 Preliminaries**

The aim of this final chapter is to draw together the different themes of the previous chapter, to analyse the findings of the research, with links to the main points covered in chapters one to three, and to draw some tentative conclusions.

### **5.2 Summary of previous chapters**

The first chapter provided a discussion on bilingualism and diglossia and how these concepts may be applied to patterns of language use in Catalonia. The ideological nature and significance of these concepts was also discussed. The functionalist approach to patterns of linguistic interaction and code-switching was considered to be inadequate because it did not consider power relations between the ethnolinguistic groups or the political importance of relations between Catalonia and the Spanish state, both historically and presently. Instead, an analysis of how these concepts have been and continue to be used needs to be considered in terms of relations of power between ethnolinguistic groups within Catalonia and between Catalonia and the Spanish state.

The second chapter provided a discussion on ethnolinguistic group interaction and varying linguistic strategies utilised with regard to power relationships between different sections of the Catalan population. The linguistic strategies employed by different sections of the Catalan population are related to factors thought to influence the vitality of ethnolinguistic groups. The vitality of an ethnolinguistic group is defined as that which makes a group likely to behave as a distinct and active collective entity in intergroup situations. The factors thought to influence a group's vitality consist of both objective and subjective structural variables. The relationship between these objective and subjective factors is of importance when considering the conclusions to be drawn in this final chapter. The manner in which groups and individuals perceive their ethnolinguistic identity in

relation to Catalonia as a nation and to Spain as a nation state, and indeed to Europe as an economic and political community, affects the type of linguistic strategies employed on a daily basis in Catalan communities.

The third chapter focused on the political context of language policy within Catalonia and between Catalonia and the Spanish central government during the Socialist administration of 1993 to 1996. This chapter provided an insight into the political aspect of language policy as a cornerstone of the pact between the Catalan nationalists and the Spanish Socialist Government. The strength of the Catalan nationalists in terms of their support of the central government meant that Catalan language policy had little opposition at least from within Catalonia. Moreover, opposition from outside of Catalonia only served to unite the different political parties and groups of people within Catalonia. The effect of the public political discourse on autonomy and language policy, which was produced in the context of the political power relations of this period, is reflected in the private discourses of people in the Catalan community.

The fourth chapter described the methodologies used to carry out the ethnographic part of the research carried out in the schools and community in Igualada and reported on these research findings. In order to draw any conclusions from this research, it is necessary to grasp some understanding on how people living in a Catalan community align themselves in relation to the public debate on language policy. How political decisions are implemented and dealt with by those directly concerned will ultimately determine the success or failure of the objectives of policy. The way in which individuals and groups position themselves in relation to the public debate on language policy and related issues of identity will influence their choice of linguistic strategies, which will, in turn have some influence on the shape of relations of power between languages, and ethnic groupings in the future.

### **5.3 Summary of Theoretical perspective**

In chapter two the discussion covered some of the theoretical aspects of ethnic group relations, Giles and co-workers' typology of ethnolinguistic vitality provided a schema for analysing a group's potential for being dominant. The variables thought to be of importance were related to the situation of both ethnolinguistic groups in question. The objective structural variables are relatively easy to compare with other language contact situations. The subjective evaluations that ethnolinguistic group members make of their own situation and that of members of the outgroup are more problematic simply because there are so many variables to consider. It is suggested that the objective economic and political circumstances of the social groups are the base on which subjective evaluations are made. These subjective evaluations are mediated by the ideological discourses generated by the conflict between state and community. The interpretations made by people living in Catalonia of the various ideologies proposed by the political climate of the time are directly related to their own historical experiences and struggles in both the public and private domains of life. This is why a purely empirical etic investigation into the variables influencing language attitudes and behaviour will not provide the whole picture. It is important to also investigate the emic perspective and consider the interpretations that the population of Catalonia gives to their own language contact situation. In turn, these interpretations should be considered in light of relations of power between the groups concerned and the impact of ideological discourses generated by the political balance of forces.

The public political discourse on issues concerning the relationship between Catalonia and the Spanish State and related issues of language policy within Catalonia were reflected in the more private and personal discourses reported in the previous chapter. The aim of this chapter is to draw some conclusions concerning the relationship between the public political discourses reported in chapter three and the private discourses reported in chapter four. The

personal discourses on language policy are a product of a number of factors: personal experience, political orientation, ethnic identity, class allegiances, and gender. All of these factors are mediated through and by the public discourse on issues relating to language policy and other wider political, economic and social issues. The attitudes and opinions expressed about language policy in the secondary schools of Igualada are located in a particular time and space. However, in order to understand these language attitudes, it is essential to trace the political, social and cultural processes that have shaped them.

The attitudes expressed in the previous chapter are grouped primarily in terms of ethnic and language allegiances to identifiable groups. Attitudes to language, language policy and inter-group relations are related to the public discourse of politicians, academics and policy implementers that was reported in the media. The way that different groups in society relate is dependent on their conceptual framing. It is argued that at the most elementary level the conceptual framing of group relations depends on definitions of group identities. Ronen argues:

One's religion, mother tongue, culture, also one's education, class, sex, skin colour, even one's height, age, and family situation are all potentially unifying factors. Each factor can be ignored as irrelevant in the formation of an 'us'. Various unifying factors, such as language, religion, and colour of skin, seem 'natural'. I propose that none is. Language, culture, a real or assumed historical origin, and religion, form identities for an 'us' in our minds, and only as they exist in our minds as unifying factors do the entities of 'us' persist.<sup>243</sup>

The point of this is that it is hard to come up with objective criteria that could be used to identify 'natural groups'. The role that each individual parameter plays in determining

---

<sup>243</sup> Ronen, D., The Quest for Self-Determination (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979), p. 9.



group identity depends fully on group-internal and group-external perceptions and conceptualisations that are historically and socio-culturally shaped.

A parameter may be dominant in one context while being ignored completely in another. Still, groups and group relations are usually objects of a wide consensus within the groups thus created: they are felt to be natural. In other words, 'group relations and group identities are cognitively framed phenomena to be found at the inter-subjective level of the community.'<sup>244</sup> This cognitive framing is an active process, in which identifiable social actors organise the structure and distribution of knowledge and ideas about, as well as perceptions and impressions of, social phenomena and simultaneously furnish ways of speaking about these phenomena. It is important to point out that this process is not strictly collective because the common-sense theorising that occurs in the process of organising and applying some description of the world allows for a range of inter-individual and inter-subgroup variability.

In order to be more specific we need to clarify who is being referred to as 'identifiable social actors' and what type of social phenomena is being addressed. The social phenomena under analysis are the changing patterns of linguistic behaviour that reflect and actively shape relations of power and ethnicity within Catalonia, and between Catalonia and the Spanish state. The identifiable social actors cover a range of groups with varying amounts of power and influence: politicians; union leaders; residents' associations; the national and regional press; the owners and controllers of the media; the academic community, particularly educationalists and language planners; the administrators of language policy in local government and the schools; the teachers; the parents; and last but by no means least

---

<sup>244</sup> Blommaert, J., and Verschueren, J., Debating Diversity Analysing the discourse of tolerance, (London and New York: Routledge, 1998), p. 24.

the pupils. All of these groups and sections of society contribute to, and have some influence on, the social phenomena under analysis, the debate surrounding language issues and the process of change.

The identification of a group has a strategic potential for forming alliances or bringing about exclusions. It would appear that power is the factor that consolidates negative perceptions and distancing attitudes. The societal and socially structured dimensions of the cognitive framing of group relations and the processes of power which are involved lead directly into a discussion of ideology. Fairclough<sup>245</sup> points out that sociolinguistic conventions have a dual relation to power: on the one hand they incorporate differences of power, on the other hand they arise out of, and give rise to, particular relations of power. Fairclough's approach to language and power puts particular emphasis upon 'common-sense' assumptions that are implicit in the conventions according to which people interact linguistically, and of which people are generally not consciously aware. Such assumptions are ideologies. Fairclough argues that ideologies are closely linked to power, because the nature of the ideological assumptions embedded in particular assumptions, and so the nature of those conventions themselves, depends on the power relations that underlie the conventions. Ideological assumptions are a means of legitimising existing social relations and differences of power, simply through the recurrence of ordinary, familiar ways of behaving which take these relations and power differences for granted. Ideologies are closely linked to language, because using language is the commonest form of social behaviour, and is the form of social behaviour where we rely most on 'common-sense' assumptions.

---

<sup>245</sup> Fairclough, N., Language and Power, (London and New York: Longman, 1989), p. 2.

Fairclough's assertion that the exercise of power, in modern society, is increasingly achieved through ideology, and more particularly through the ideological workings of language, does not mean that power is just a matter of language. To clarify this point he makes a distinction between the exercise of power through coercion of various sorts including physical violence, and the exercise of power through the manufacture of consent to or at least acquiescence towards it. Power relations depend on both, though in varying proportions. Ideology is the prime means of manufacturing consent.

Spaniards are particularly aware of their historical and political situation due to their relatively recent experience of dictatorship and the difficult transition to democracy; whilst the rest of Europe enjoyed a boom after the post-war hardship Spain was still struggling with fascism. One theory is that the long years of dictatorship left the political parties relatively isolated from the rest of Europe and may have limited their ability to develop strong political ideological discourses. This provided the gap for a rise in regional nationalism. However, there are alternative explanations for the rise in nationalist sentiment which will be discussed below. The reign of the Socialists that started with great hope and enthusiasm for democracy and all the benefits thought to accompany it ended in scandals of corruption and political disillusionment for many of the Spanish people. The pact between González and Pujol that began after the Socialists failed to gain an overall majority in the 1993 elections could be said to be the beginning of the end for the Socialist Government of González. The same election results signalled a new era for Catalan power and influence not only in terms of autonomy within Catalonia but also within the Spanish State.

Fowler<sup>246</sup> points out that the Spanish political parties abandonment of traditional ideological discourses in favour of pragmatic policies aimed at maintaining power, has left an ideological space that has been filled by nationalist sentiment. Llobera<sup>247</sup> points out that Catalonia had all the essential ingredients for the growth of a strong nationalism. The question is what were the conditions that provoked a new lease of life. Williams<sup>248</sup> draws attention to the link between academic and political discourse to conceptions of nationalism and language. A closer look at these ideas will help clarify how the discourse on language policy emerges from the larger historical and political picture. The ideas of Fowler, Llobera and Williams help explain how the Catalan nationalist discourse on language policy has been able to arise from the particular social, political and historical context of Catalonia in relation to the state, and maintain hegemony. The contribution of Pujol to shaping the form of Catalan nationalism has been significant. So why exactly did the ideology promulgated by the *Generalitat* during the period 1993–96 achieve such widespread acceptance by members of both ethnolinguistic groups regardless of the sensationalistic claims of the press? It is suggested that the considerable political power enjoyed by the Catalans during this period, coupled with their already existing economic power, was of crucial importance.

This period of Socialist rule in Spain that started with such strong ideals and hope and ended in a sense of betrayal and general disillusionment with the political process is discussed by Fowler as part of a more general trend of abandonment of more traditional ideological discourses on the part of political parties, both in Latin America and in the Western world, since the demise of the Soviet Union. These traditional ideological

---

<sup>246</sup> Fowler, W., (editor), *Ideologues and Ideologies in Latin America*, (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1997).

<sup>247</sup> Llobera, J., 'Catalan National Identity: the dialectics of past and present', in Thomkin, E., McDonald, M., and Chapman, M., (ed.) *History and Ethnicity*, (London: Routledge, 1989).

<sup>248</sup> Williams, G., *Sociolinguistics: A Sociological critique*, p. 40.

discourses have been replaced by pragmatic policies which Fowler suggests could, to some, appear as a naked quest for power.

The end of the twentieth century could be described as the beginning of a technocratic era, where our so-called democratic systems have ceased to offer the electorate a clear ideological choice of possible future governments. In this sense, managing the country or aspiring to manage the country, responding almost exclusively to world economic pressures, and leaving aside any strong commitments to political philosophies, whether it be socialism, liberalism, conservatism or communism, has become the main priority for governing and opposition parties.<sup>249</sup>

Fowler points out that the Spanish case serves as a perfect example of this new technocratic era. He demonstrates this point by referring to the elections of 1996 when the electorate was offered the choice between two parties whose historical ideological credentials had long been abandoned. The issue was no longer whether the electorate preferred a right-wing or left-wing government, given that both parties claimed to be centre Christian or social-democratic options, but whether the governing *PSOE* had been in power for too long, and whether it was time for a change of personnel rather than one of policies. At this time many committed socialists who had supported the *PSOE* for years seemed resigned to the fact that it was time for a change, even though the change was obviously going to be the *PP*, traditionally a right-wing party.

Fowler argues that although the behaviour of the political parties has been one of absolute pragmatism, the electorate in most countries has continued to hold ideological notions of what the different parties represent. He illustrates this point with an example of *PSOE's* electoral campaigns of 1993 and 1996, when they insisted in associating the *PP*

---

<sup>249</sup> Fowler, W., *Ideologues and Ideologies*, p. 2.

with its Francoist past. The *PSOE*, during the 1996 campaign, went to the extreme of producing posters that used *La Pasionaria*'s famous cry of '*No pasarán*' (the fascists will not pass/succeed), publicised during the siege of Madrid that lasted throughout the civil war, as one of their slogans. The predicted landslide victory of the *PP* only demonstrated the extent to which this sort of ideological strategy no longer affected the electorate. *PP* had undergone such dramatic changes since Aznar became its leader in 1990 that this type of slogan lost its impact. "However, *PSOE*'s repeated accusation that the *PP* was a right-wing party, and the repeated claim of *PP* that it was not *de derechas*, illustrates the extent to which the electorate were perceived to be still affected by ideological beliefs that ran deeper than any awareness that both parties, by 1993, were pursuing almost identical policies."<sup>250</sup>

Fowler summarises this discussion by saying that in the Western world the governing and opposition parties of modern capitalist democracies have replaced traditional ideological debates between conservatives and socialists with a tendency to seek pragmatic policies that merely aim to prolong their survival in power or to bring them to power respectively. In the process of so doing they are accepting and promoting the main values of neoliberalism. It is pointed out that this glorification of pragmatism has promoted the notion that ideologies are dead and it is also clear that those members of the electorate who continue to think along ideological lines have found that their parties have betrayed them or ceased to represent them. Fowler argues that it is because there has been an absence of emphasis on ideological discourse that nationalism and religion have become so important. The war in the former Yugoslavia between different ethnic and religious groups is cited as evidence of the extent to which this vacuum of ideologies has found a violent expression, which, rather than being based on political principles and values, has arisen from the

---

<sup>250</sup> Fowler, W., *Ideologues and Ideologies*, p. 4.



different sides' xenophobic and cultural (as well as religious) intolerance. Fowler believes that the rise of nationalism in Europe of what he terms 'unrecognised' nations (e.g. Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland, Catalonia, the Basque Country, Sardinia) also demonstrates how the younger generation, disillusioned with the lack of political debate along ideological premises, has channelled its energy into defending nationalist or religious aspirations that do not sustain a clear political ideology other than that of achieving independence or religious uniformity. The conflict in Chechnia is cited as yet another example of this trend.

Llobera<sup>251</sup> argues that national ideologies are a dialectical precipitate of the old and the new. Though they project an image of continuity, they are pierced by discontinuities; though they conjure up the idea of an immutable ideological core and an adaptable periphery, in fact, both core and periphery are constantly redefined. The history of nationalism in Europe offers a good number of examples in which the nation is conceived as a quasi-eternal, motionless reality. Llobera asks why is there this pretence of continuity. He sees national identity as an attempt to preserve the ways of our foreparents, but adds, reality is constantly changing and the effect of nationalist ideologies is that we tend to perceive the same image where there are in fact different realities.

In contrast to many authors on nationalism<sup>252</sup> Llobera believes that the history of Western Europe is the history of the qualified failure of the so-called nation-state. He

---

<sup>251</sup> Llobera, J., Catalan National Identity: the dialectics of past and present, p. 247.

<sup>252</sup> The following authors see European history in terms of the rise and practical monopoly of the nation state in modern times. Wallerstein, I. The Modern World System I, (New York: Academic Press, 1974); Tilly, C. (ed) The Formation of National States in Western Europe, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975); Giddens, A. The Nation-State and Violence, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1985); Gellner, E. Nations and Nationalism, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983).

argues that the history of Europe since 1978 shows that ethno-nations are not simply vestiges from the past, but rather dynamic configurations with a life of their own. However, they are not self-propelling entities: they may survive for a long time as cultural and linguistic fossils, but the question is under what conditions can they have a new lease of life. There are various explanatory frameworks, which are derived from different ways of conceiving the nation. Llobera mentions: essentialism, economism, culturalism, and eclecticism. He rejects these in favour of a conception of society as a structural, evolving, self-forming whole. The social totality is not constituted by facts: rather the latter can only be understood from the standpoint of the whole. History is the result of a complex dialectical process in which no *a priori* primacy is given to any one factor. However, once ideas and institutions have appeared in history they acquire a life of their own and under certain conditions, to be empirically investigated, have a perdurable effect on society. Structural history cannot explain all that happened or why it happened. Many areas of social life, particularly in the sphere of nationalism, are the result of historical events that are difficult to predict and may always remain impervious to our enquiries.

Llobera lists the conditions he considers to be of importance in the development of the Catalan national identity in its modern form, which was recreated in the second half of the nineteenth century:

1. *A strong ethnonational potential.* The standard raw materials on which national identity is built were definitely present in Catalonia. To start with, there is the existence of a long-lasting and original medieval Catalan polity with a clearly differentiated political autonomy within the crowns of Aragon. When the dynastic union of crowns of Castile and Aragon was effected in the second half of the fifteenth century, the sovereignty of the Catalan parliament (*Corts*) was preserved. The Catalan revolts of 1640 and 1701 against the monarchy reflected a reaction against the real or potential loss of autonomy. Second, there is the differential fact of a written and

literary language in existence since the Middle Ages. Although after the end of the fifteenth century, Catalan declined as a language of culture, and after 1714 suffered state persecution, by the nineteenth century it was still the language spoken by the majority of the population. The two factors stated here by Llobera as being the standard raw materials are: a history of political autonomy and a unifying language fought for against all odds. Third, there is the existence of a common body of ideas, beliefs, practices, norms, etc, that may be referred to as culture in the widest sense of the term. Fourth, a certain sense of historical identity had been preserved. Llobera goes on to add that, all these elements are no doubt problematic in that they are not clear-cut objective factors, but rather ideological constructs and hence malleable and open to manipulation.

2. *The appeal of the model of romantic nationalism.* The development of romantic historiography in different parts of Europe in the early nineteenth century had a profound effect on Catalonia. The Napoleonic invasions are thought to have generated great feelings of patriotism for both Catalonia and Spain. There followed between 1833 and 1866 an intellectual attempt, known as *Renaixença*, to revitalise Catalan culture and language.
3. *A thriving bourgeois civil society.* Catalonia was the first area within the Spanish state to experience the Industrial Revolution. The existence of a more-or-less enlightened bourgeoisie was the precondition for the intellectual take-off of Catalan cultural nationalism in the nineteenth century. Llobera adds that this is not to deny the existence of a popular though diffuse consciousness of Catalan identity during the same period, which manifested itself first through Carlism and then through Republican Federalism.

4. *A weak and inefficient Spanish state.* This expression has to be understood in relative terms. The centralising and uniformist tendencies of the Spanish state were as pronounced as they were elsewhere. However, the Spanish state had neither the financial nor the administrative machinery to enforce the cultural and linguistic uniformisation of the country as the French did between 1870 and 1914.
5. *A strong 'national' church.* In the modern period the Catholic Church in Catalonia has exhibited a firm commitment to defend the Catalan language and culture against the impositions and encroachment of the Spanish state.

Williams<sup>253</sup> argues that linguistic theory has not emerged separately from the social philosophy of its time. Rather, it must be seen as a manifestation of the ongoing debate on the nature of society and the social world. He also claims that the assumptions that underlie many of the conceptions of society, as they enter into contemporary sociolinguistics, derive from highly questionable claims about the nature of society made by social philosophers. Williams states that during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries language was part of the search for the cultural origins of human population. Herder developed his thesis on language as the manifestation of the people that speak it. True to his time he claimed that a language was a depository of the experience and knowledge of past generations. Language, according to Herder, is also the centre of our knowledge of the world, the entity that conditions and sets limits on thought. The Kantian theory of perception involving sensations produced by the external world being ordered by categories imposed by the mind was related to language, and language became the mirror of the nation. This approach was typical of its particular historical conjuncture when the creation of a sense of nationhood in

---

<sup>253</sup> Williams, G., *Sociolinguistics: A Sociological critique*, p. 40.

the name of the state was in operation. A nation's speech was an individual phenomenon possessing intimate bonds with national thought, national literature and national solidarity.

Williams<sup>254</sup> outlines how the ideas of Herder were developed by Humboldt. For him, culture derives from the people, language expresses the spirit of the people, the love of the nation. The diversity of languages corresponds to the diversity of mentalities. Language was an interior form independent of the world but which organises the world. Language creates or helps to create representation of the world, something that is impossible without language. Thus language transforms an objective world into a different world, a world of the spirit. Similarly, language constitutes the people and is thereby the basis of collective identity, but the language also creates the nation and the nation is identified with the language. In a sense the language represents a collective memory of its speakers, the collective memory representing the basis of a conception of common identity that is the nation. Even though Herder never intended his ideas to encompass race, the idea that those born to speak a certain language within a certain national territory have a particular perspective of the world has led commentators to infer a racist conception of language.<sup>255</sup> Similarly, Williams points out, it can be argued that the equation of language with nation serves to prevent a social conception of language since in each case, when the social is invoked, it involves either the people or the nation. The language is reduced to its official form within which the people are viewed as homogeneous, as uniform.

This idea of language is still present in some form today in Catalonia, and has certainly been influential in the past, particularly with the romantic model of Catalan nationalism associated with the *Renaixença*. Today one can often hear Catalans commenting that they

---

<sup>254</sup> Williams, G., *Sociolinguistics: A Sociological Critique*, p. 31.

<sup>255</sup> Marcellesi, J., and Gardin, B., *Introduction à la sociolinguistique*, (Mont Saint-Aignan, IRED, 1987) p. 23.

cannot really express themselves properly in Castilian although they consider themselves to be perfectly proficient linguistically in both languages. There appears to be an implied meaning that one can never really express oneself fully in a language other than the mother tongue. This attitude is exemplified in a lyric composition written in 1965 by Salvador Espriu,<sup>256</sup> one of the leading Catalan poets of the post-war period, and which became a popular song of the late 1960s and 1970s:

But we have lived to save the words for you,  
 To return to you the name of everything,  
 That you may travel along the straight road  
 That leads to the mastery of the earth.  
 Now ye say: 'We shall be faithful and true  
 For ever more to our people's service.

The long period of fascist repression generated a predictable defence mechanism among the custodians of Catalan identity: an essentialist vision of the nation.

During the Franco era the large-scale influx of immigrants to Catalonia from other regions of Spain became numerically significant. While prior to the war a significant percentage of the migrant population was assimilated culturally and linguistically, this was not the case with the influx of people during the Franco period.<sup>257</sup> The presence in Catalonia of a large, newly arrived working-class population, which was culturally and linguistically non-Catalan, was potentially conflictive. The immigrants were the carriers of the official language of the state and hence were perceived as linguistic oppressors. Some intellectuals voiced the right of the immigrant community to defend their language, culture,

---

<sup>256</sup> Espriu, S., *The Lord of the Shadow*, (Oxford: The Dolphin Book, 1975).

<sup>257</sup> Candel, F., *Els altres Catalans*, (Barcelona: Edicions 62, 1964).



and identity of origin now potentially threatened by Catalan essentialism.<sup>258</sup> It is a reflection of the isolationism of the Catalan ideologists during the Franco period that they decided to stick to an essentialist vision of Catalonia, in which the immigrant population was not considered an important variable. In their idealist conception it was assumed that the immigrants would be miraculously assimilated<sup>259</sup>.

Jordi Pujol as leader of *CiU* and president of the *Generalitat* since 1980 has been very influential in terms of constructing a political discourse on modern Catalan nationalism and stressing the importance of the Catalan language for Catalan identity. Pujol's demonstration of Catalan nationalism even during the Franco dictatorship gave him credibility as a post Franco leader of the Catalan cause. During the last years of Franco, Pujol's patriotism led him to create a movement capable of uniting Catalans, in which language was identified as being the most important factor for a modern Catalan identity. Pujol's type of nationalism, from the early days, was one of integration rather than exclusion. The immigrant Castilian-speaking population of Catalonia presented a problem for the nationalists: it would not be possible to make Catalan truly the language of Catalonia if half the population continued to use Castilian in the public domain. The solution was to attempt to integrate them into the Catalan extended family by teaching them to speak Catalan. Then, at least they would not have the excuse of not being able to speak Catalan as a reason for inability to integrate into the Catalan culture and society. Pujol realised that the only way to construct a strong Catalan nation was to unite, as much as possible, all sections of Catalan society. During the Franco régime, *CiU*'s ideology stressed the need to build up the country according to three major ideas: national restoration, change in social structures and democratic recovery. Pujol called on people from all ideologies to agree with these very elemental aims and struggle

---

<sup>258</sup> De Miguel, A., *Los intelectuales bonitos*, (Barcelona: Planeta, 1980).

<sup>259</sup> Pujol, J., *L'immigració, problema i esperança de Catalunya*, (Barcelona: Nova Terra, 1976).

together to bring them about. Hence an important link was forged between the two ethnolinguistic groups of Catalonia. They did struggle together and all the political parties of Catalonia incorporated a nationalist element, to some extent. 'Nationalism is the shape; Marxism, social democracy, liberalism or fascism are the colours that can eventually produce opposing pictures of the nationalist message.'<sup>260</sup>

For Pujol, continuity over time is a key concept of nationalism. The emphasis on the role of identity takes on a new dimension with his exploration of its sources and conclusion that it owes a great deal to historical developments. Pujol accentuates the difference between Catalonia and the other areas of the Spanish state by alluding to the positive attitude of the Catalans in the late eighteenth century towards European ideas, industrialisation, agrarian reforms and mercantilism, in contrast to their Spanish counterparts.<sup>261</sup> The major factors that are identified by Pujol as prompting a flourishing industrial revolution in Catalonia are: the existence of a civil society and a relatively high degree of social cohesion, especially compared to the rest of Spanish state and the sentiment of being a country, thus implying collective hopes and ideals.

Catalonia had all the basic ingredients for a resurgence of ethno-nationalism. The pragmatic policies of the political parties left an ideological vacuum. The Catalan nationalists took advantage of the political situation: they recreated the essentialist vision of Catalan nationalism into an integrative nationalism that fitted the social context of the modern Catalan nation within a decentralised democratic state. Normalisation of the Catalan language was central to this process.

---

<sup>260</sup> Guibernau, M. and Rex, J., *The Ethnicity Reader*, p. 143.

<sup>261</sup> Pujol, J., *Quatre conferències: Analitzar el passat per renovar el projecte*, (Barcelona: Edicions 62, 1990), p. 34.

#### **5.4 Conclusions drawn from the case study**

The case study of secondary schools in Igualada provides some insight into strategies employed by members of both ethnolinguistic groups, as a response to the policy of normalisation of the Catalan language. The situation in Catalonia with regard to language policy is complex and changing and it is difficult to predict outcomes. My conclusions are, as a result, tentative and limited. However, it is reasonably clear that language and language teaching is important in forming identity even if it is expressed in terms of accommodation or resistance.

There appears to be some resistance, amongst certain sections of the immigrant Castilian population and their descendants, to becoming Catalanised. This was expressed through various means and can be illustrated by referring to the strategies employed by the Castilian-speaking students in their secondary schools. The students in the Castilian-speaking ethnolinguistic group fell into three categories concerning levels of integration. There were those that claimed to be able to express themselves equally well in both Catalan and Castilian, and more importantly, stated that when they were speaking Catalan they couldn't be distinguished as not being Catalan. This type of student appeared to be using their knowledge of the Catalan language to integrate socially and almost 'become' Catalan. I say 'almost' because none of these students actually categorised themselves as being Catalan: although they might have felt Catalan on some occasions, they also defined themselves as non-Catalan on other occasions. The change in the objective conditions of the Catalan ethnolinguistic group in terms of economic and political power during the period under study meant that those structural variables thought to affect ethnolinguistic group vitality were changing. The manner in which this group of students responded to these circumstances would have been mediated by the dominant discourse on Catalan normalisation and identity. The subjective perception of the interethnic situation held by this group enabled them to assimilate to a large degree into the new Catalan nation. It was

amongst this group that the dominant discourse encapsulating the integrative nationalism was most successful.

Students that fell into the second category were those that claimed to be proficient in Catalan but were concerned that their accents were not Catalan. Students from this group were eager to point out that Catalans spoke Castilian with a Catalan accent in the same way that they spoke Catalan with a Castilian accent. In this case accent appears to be an important marker of ethnic identity. This group of students generally were willing to learn Catalan and integrate superficially into the Catalan community but without losing their own ethnic identity. They were prepared to make concessions in order to integrate, primarily for instrumental reasons. These students appeared to want the benefits associated with being a Catalan speaker but, at the same time, were not prepared to pay the price of losing their Castilian ethnic identity. It is important to note that, within the student population, this second group seemed to form a substantive majority; as, indeed, the wider Castilian community in Catalonia also showed a clear preference towards this strategy. From this group we can identify the contradictory pulls of group solidarity and a desire for social mobility. The fact that accent is mentioned so frequently in terms of a barrier to acceptance by the outgroup suggests that this group perceived some reluctance on the part of the Catalan ethnolinguistic group to accept them. Alternatively, possibly they did not want to sound like a native Catalan speaker out of loyalty to their own ethnolinguistic group. However, this did not mean that they did not feel themselves to be Catalan in some respects nor want to participate in the Catalan society as equals to members of the outgroup.

The students that fell into the last category were those that were very reticent about speaking in Catalan and would only do so when they felt they had no option. This group of students appeared to have rejected the possibility of using the Catalan language as a means of improving their chances in life and were determined to retain their own ethnic identity at

any cost. A strategy of choosing to speak in Castilian within a Catalan classroom environment was often equated with a rebellious attitude by students and teachers alike. Whether these sentiments were more to do with a sense of solidarity with their own ethnolinguistic group or a reaction to feeling rejected by members of the Catalan ethnolinguistic group is difficult to know. I would suggest that the sort of attitude expressed by this group of students was a combination of both factors.

It would appear that students who come from Castilian-speaking families integrate with the Catalan students and Catalan school culture to varying degrees. The level of integration reflects a two-way process of degree of positive action taken by the Castilian-speaking child in order to integrate plus the response of the Catalan-speaking children, teaching staff and Catalan community. Integration is a function of the attitudes and behaviour of both sides. It would seem probable that the same principle applies to other sections of the Castilian-speaking community.

The degree of positive action taken on the part of the Castilian-speaking community in order to integrate is affected partly by their own evaluation of the interethnic situation and partly by the evaluation made by the Catalan ethnolinguistic group. The subjective perceptions of ethnic identity held by both groups concerning the ingroup and outgroup are affected by the relative vitality of each group. The desire to integrate, on the part of the Castilian-speaking ethnolinguistic group, in order to attain social and economic rewards, is counteracted by the fear of losing solidarity with the ingroup. The perception of identity held by members of the Catalan ethnolinguistic group concerning the ingroup and the outgroup affects the degree to which their attitudes can be associated with those of a hard-shelled or soft-shelled community. These language attitudes can be related to strategies of convergence or divergence. Ultimately these attitudes will play their part in shaping patterns



of linguistic behaviour in the community that can be described in terms of bilingualism or diglossia.

In the case of sections of the Catalan community being characterised by speech patterns of divergence (i.e. speaking Catalan in such a way as to make it more difficult for the interlocutor to understand) in their interactions with members of the Castilian-speaking ethnolinguistic group, this may be interpreted as a means of resisting the assimilatory strategies employed by members of the outgroup. Linguistic strategies of divergence employed by members of a dominant group are thought to indicate a desire to maintain ethnic distinctiveness and superiority. According to the theory, this would indicate that sections of the Catalan ethnolinguistic group perceive the interethnic situation as being unstable. This would suggest a fear of losing their distinctive ethnic identity related to the essentialist type of nationalism. In the case of sections of the Catalan ethnolinguistic group being characterised by speech patterns of non-convergence when conversing with members of the outgroup, this may be interpreted as a sign of their belief in the legitimacy of the state of interethnic relations and the stability of the situation. This would suggest an acceptance of the mainstream inclusive nationalism of Pujol with speaking Catalan as being the important factor in terms of the new Catalan identity. In the case of sections of the Catalan ethnolinguistic group using strategies of convergence in their interactions with members of the outgroup, this could be interpreted as a sign of their belief in the illegitimacy of the existing state of power relations between the two ethnic groups and a belief in the possibility of claiming Catalan identity without the necessity of speaking Catalan in every social context.

The patterns of language choice in the school environment reflect and shape attitudes held by members of the two ethnolinguistic groups to the two languages in contact. These language attitudes are shaped by the state of ethnic relations between the two



ethnolinguistic groups. Strategies of resistance and assimilation can be seen to be employed to varying degrees by both ethnolinguistic groups. It is important to point out that the ethnolinguistic groups are not by any means homogeneous: sections of both groups can be seen to adopt differing strategies based on their own particular political evaluation of the interethnic situation and their own positioning in terms of experience and interests between social groupings which enter into relationship with each other in terms of power. The attitudes themselves are the result of a complicated interplay between contrasting factors.

For members of the Castilian-speaking ethnolinguistic group these may include:

- A wish to integrate, motivated either by a belief that by doing so one can improve one's chances in life, or by the wish to integrate socially and become Catalan.
- These wishes may be counteracted by a fear of losing solidarity with one's own ethnolinguistic group, or a fear of feeling a loss of identity and 'rootlessness'.

For members of the Catalan ethnolinguistic group these may include:

- A wish to assimilate non-Catalans into the Catalan ethnolinguistic group, motivated either by a belief that this will strengthen the position of the Catalan ethnolinguistic group in relation to the Castilian ethnolinguistic group outside of Catalonia; or a belief that by doing so one is improving the chances of members of the Castilian ethnolinguistic group in terms of equality.
- These wishes may be counteracted by a fear of losing one's own distinctive identity.

The Catalans would appear to have a fundamental problem in terms of the objectives of language policy. They need to promote the use of Catalan within Catalonia in order to strengthen Catalan identity: to achieve this it is essential that the immigrant population learn to use Catalan actively. However, if the immigrant population chooses to assimilate and effectively become Catalans, this would in itself endanger the essentialist vision of a distinctive Catalan identity. This apparent paradox does not appear to have been addressed

directly by the policy makers. Pujol and his fellow nationalists have indeed worked hard to construct a modern inclusive definition of Catalan identity that would seem to rely almost exclusively on use of the Catalan language. However, the more essentialist vision of Catalan identity is not going to disappear rapidly, having been clung to so determinedly for so long, although this is only a minority element.

However, despite these contradictions, the findings from the research carried out in the schools and community in Igualada suggest that those who have economic and political power in Catalonia have succeeded in creating an ideological common sense which is accepted to a large degree by the majority of the population. The common sense is that if one wants to live in Catalonia one must learn to speak Catalan. Of course there are variations on this theme and some contention but nevertheless this seems to be taken largely for granted, at least by the young generation of Catalans.

### **5.5 General Conclusions**

In Catalonia, since the advent of democracy, the Constitution and autonomy, changes in power relations have been relatively rapid and profound affecting all sectors of society. This has meant that the 'common-sense' assumptions implicit in the linguistic behaviour of people in Catalonia have also been thrown into question. Of course this is not something that started with the downfall of Franco but is part of a continual process that reflects and shapes the fluctuating political and social climate of Catalonia as history unfolds. However, the political leaders of a now autonomous Catalonia set about challenging and changing the linguistic behaviour of the people of Catalonia in a planned and systematic fashion. What is more they have achieved a surprisingly rapid success in that within the space of one generation the dominant language, Castilian, has been replaced by Catalan. This rapid change in linguistic behaviour can be best understood in the context of an ideological climate that links the concepts of democracy and autonomy in opposition to dictatorship

and centralist policies that persecuted the Catalans and outlawed their language. The threat to Catalan greatly increased under the two dictatorships in this century: General Primo de Rivera (1923–30) and General Franco (1938/9–75), especially the latter, which was longer lasting and more virulent. Following Franco's death in 1975, the nostalgic moan of his supporters was '*Con Franco vivíamos mejor*'<sup>262</sup> was countered by democrats who said '*Contra Franco vivíamos mejor*'<sup>263</sup>. Behind the pun lies a firm belief that, among other thing, Catalan gained an inner strength by being illegitimately suppressed: a strong link with the ideals of democracy.<sup>264</sup> For this reason the 'normalisation' of Catalan has become such an important issue not only within Catalonia but also at the level of state politics. The power and influence of the Catalan nationalists, again both within Catalonia and at the level of state, serves to illustrate the impact of relatively recently gained power on the ideological political discourse. This point is particularly well illustrated by the response of Pujol to the questioning of whether Catalan normalisation was constitutional by the Supreme Tribunal: he declared that Catalan normalisation policy was the cornerstone of the *Generalitat's* politics in Catalonia and in Spain.<sup>265</sup>

This success has been called surprising because of a number of factors: the first is the time scale under which the 'normalisation' of Catalan has been achieved, namely in the space of one generation. The parents of children presently at school were not taught Catalan formerly in the education system and many of these parents cannot write in Catalan, whereas the children now will not only be taught Catalan but will also be taught using Catalan as the vehicular language most of the time. The second factor is the apparent lack

---

<sup>262</sup> 'We lived better with Franco'.

<sup>263</sup> 'We lived better against Franco'.

<sup>264</sup> Srubell, M., 'Language, democracy and devolution in Catalonia', in Wright, S., (ed) *Language Democracy and Devolution*, Clevedon: Multilingual matters, 1998).

<sup>265</sup> Carbo, I., Pujol says that Catalan is the 'cornerstone' of the policies of the *Generalitat*, *Avui*, 31/1/94, p. 8.

of any serious opposition to Catalan normalisation on the part of the Castilian-speaking population of Catalonia. Although there has been plenty of debate around the issues and political polemic surrounding Catalan language policy there has, in reality, been very little organised grassroots opposition to what could be considered quite a radical language policy. The third factor is the degree of peaceful and harmonious relations between the two ethnolinguistic groups in contact. Of course there has been and there will continue to be problems and inevitably some conflict between the two groups but outbreaks of actual violence have not been commonplace. One might ask why is this so surprising, which can only really be answered by reference to comparisons with other language contact situations where language policies with similar objectives have been implemented. The problem with this comparative approach is that there obviously has not been another identical situation. Each case of language planning and language conflict has its own particular ingredients that will influence the degree of success or failure of the implementation of particular policies. So, all that can be done is to look at instances that may be considered comparable in certain ways but outline the differences and postulate hypothesis as to why each case enjoys the success or suffers the failures incurred.

Hoffman<sup>266</sup> compares the situation of the main different languages in Spain. Although they have all suffered the same type of treatment from a centralising modern Spanish state their individual circumstances are still distinct. The three regions, Catalonia, the Basque Country, and Galicia, share some features, such as their geographical situation on the fringe of their country, their history of suppression and neglect, their desire to maintain their cultural distinctiveness, their fear of language loss and linguistic inadequacy and a consequent commitment to language promotion. All three perceive themselves to be

---

<sup>266</sup> Hoffman, C., 'Monolingualism, Bilingualism, Cultural Pluralism and National Identity: Twenty Years of Language Planning in Contemporary Spain', *Current Issues in Language and Society* Vol. 2, No 1, (1995), p. 66.

ethnically different from other Spaniards. Their languages, for them, represent the expression of their ethnic, if not national, identity. Hoffman goes on to point out that otherwise there are more differences than similarities. Whereas Catalonia and the Basque Country have long been two of Spain's most powerful economic areas, Galicia saw millions of her people migrate to other parts of Spain or abroad.

With regard to demographic considerations, too, there are marked differences. Most of Galicia's almost three million inhabitants are of Galician descent and while Galician is said to be understood by most of them, over three quarters (80%) are said to be able to speak it. In Catalonia, likewise, a very large number of the population are said to understand Catalan (90%) and over two thirds of Catalonia's six million and a half inhabitants are able to use Catalan, both in its written and in its oral form. However, Catalonia has experienced immigration on such a massive scale that today only about half of its population is of Catalan descent.

According to Hoffman<sup>267</sup> only Catalan can be said to have been supported consistently by an articulate middle class which conferred positive values on the language. This ensured a certain amount of familiarity with literacy in Catalan, even at times of suppression, and then provided Catalan society with speakers able to occupy influential positions in the new autonomous community. She goes on to draw significance to the large immigrant element in Catalan society, which she believes is beginning to resist some of the language policies designed to make all Catalonia Catalan-speaking.

In the Basque Country there is also a large immigrant element. Some 30% of inhabitants are assumed to be of non-Basque origin but most of them are not recent

---

<sup>267</sup> Hoffman, C., *Current Issues in Language and Society*, vol. 2, No 1, (1995), p. 67.

immigrants. Basque is very much the language of a minority of Euskadi's 2.2 million inhabitants. It is understood by less than half and spoken, at the most, by a quarter of the population. Like Galician, and unlike Catalan, it cannot look back on a long literary tradition, nor has Basque drawn its speakers mainly from the middle classes and the region's intelligentsia. Whereas Catalan aspirations have tended towards greater independence from Madrid, the political agenda of many prominent Basques has often veered towards separatism.

It would appear that one of the main differences between Catalan and the other two languages is that Catalan has benefited from having a relatively high status due to the economic and political success of its nation. The Catalan nationalist ideology has been successful in that it has managed to withstand suppression and reach a relatively popular regard by both the Catalan and Castilian working class within Catalonia. The loyalty of the upper and middle classes of Catalan society to their language, and the cleverness of the Catalan nationalist politicians who have negotiated greater autonomy for Catalonia and great influence on political agendas at the level of state, have both been significant in the overall success of the Catalan normalisation project.<sup>268</sup>

So now we have to ask why this particular discourse type has achieved such widespread acceptance at the cost of other possible discourse types. The question is, who has access to which discourses, and who has the power to impose and enforce constraints on access?<sup>269</sup> The educational system has the major immediate responsibility for differentials

---

<sup>268</sup> Vidal-Folch, X., (ed.) *Los Catalanes y el Poder*, (Madrid: Ediciones El País, S. A. / Aguilar, S. A. de Ediciones, 1994). This publication provides a good account of how the Catalan politicians of this period exercised power both within Catalonia and also within the Spanish state.

<sup>269</sup> Fairclough, N., *Language and Power*, p. 62.



in access. In the words of Michael Foucault,<sup>270</sup> 'any system of education is a political way of maintaining or modifying the appropriation of discourses, along with the knowledges and powers which they carry.' The education system reproduces without dramatic change the existing social division of labour, and the existing system of class relations. However, it will not do to blame the education system for constraints on access, or to attribute to it alone power over access. This power is diversified through the various social institutions, not just education, and its origins are in the system of class relations at the societal level.

There is a constant endeavour on the part of those who have power to try to impose an ideological common sense that holds for everyone. However, there is always some degree of ideological diversity, and indeed conflict and struggle, so that ideological uniformity is never completely achieved. What determines the level of diversity? Basically, the state of social relationships and social struggle, including class relationships and class struggle, determines it. Ideological diversity sets limits on what Fairclough<sup>271</sup> calls ideological common sense. Fairclough states that ideological diversity comes from differences in position, experience and interests between social groupings, which enter into relationships with each other in terms of power. These groupings may be social classes, they may be women versus men, they may be based on ethnicity, and so on, although they may be groupings of a more local sort, associated with a particular institution. For instance, in education, children, parents, and teachers, and groupings within each of these (based upon age, class, political allegiance, etc) may in principle develop different educational ideologies. The situation in which they are likely to do so is where there is a struggle between them over institutional power.

---

<sup>270</sup> Foucault, M., Power-Knowledge, (Bighton: Harvester. 1980), in Fairclough, N., Language and Power, p. 65.

<sup>271</sup> Fairclough, N., Language and Power, p. 88.

Ideological struggle pre-eminently takes place in language, but also over language. It is over language in the sense that language itself is a stake in social struggle as well as a site of social struggle. Having the power to determine things like which word meanings or which linguistic and communicative norms are legitimate or 'correct' or 'appropriate' is an important aspect of social and ideological power, and therefore a focus of ideological struggle. Existing language practices and orders of discourse reflect the victories and defeats of past struggle, and are stakes that are struggled over.<sup>272</sup>

In Catalonia, during the period covered by this research project, struggles over establishing new language practices were being fought on a daily bases in all social institutions. The observation of language practices in the classrooms of the secondary schools of Igualada demonstrated that there was an on-going process of negotiating new language practices that was particularly intensive because of language policy decisions being constantly amended, implemented and interpreted by all concerned. This meant that those processes that, under a less dynamic situation, would be unconscious become less unconscious and more open to diverse interpretation but also more significant.

The struggle over language can manifest itself as a struggle between ideologically diverse discourse types. This term refers to conventions, norms and codes of practice underlying actual discourse. Discourse types are ideologically particular and ideologically variable. The struggle between discourse types is a struggle over the establishment or maintenance of one type as the dominant one in a given social domain, and therefore the establishment or maintenance of certain ideological assumptions as commonsensical, for example, the assumption that if one lives in Catalonia one should learn to speak Catalan. Fairclough argues that if a discourse type so dominates an institution that dominated types

---

<sup>272</sup> Fairclough, N., *Language and Power*, p. 89.

are more or less entirely suppressed or contained, then it will cease to be seen as arbitrary and will come to be seen as natural. Naturalisation of a discourse type is a matter of degree, and the extent to which a discourse type is naturalised may change, in accordance with the shifting balance of forces in social struggle. This process of naturalisation is particularly well illustrated in the Catalan case by the number of people who, when asked if they were in favour of Catalan being used as a vehicular language in the classroom, responded along the lines of 'well they do not teach in French in Andalusia.' Rather than give an evaluation of their own preference it was conveyed that that was the way things are: if one wants to live in Catalonia then one has to learn to speak Catalan.

So how did this particular discourse type come to be dominant out of all the possible discourses that could have emerged from democracy in Spain? The fact that Franco was a dictator and expounded centralist policies that persecuted the Catalan people and their language almost automatically sets up Pujol, with his discourse on regional autonomy and promotion of regional languages, as the hero who will attempt to undo all the damage accrued by Franco. The fact that the immigrant population of Catalonia also suffered under Franco, in that they were dispossessed and forced to emigrate, facing hunger and poverty (and political persecution for those who fought on the side of the republic), meant that there was a common enemy. The transition to democracy was characterised by a discourse that stressed the importance of decentralisation and recognition of the regional cultures and languages that had been so persecuted by Franco. These circumstances meant that the immigrant population of Catalonia was incorporated into the movement for democracy and autonomy.

Despite the enthusiasm for autonomy and widespread popular support from all sections of the Catalan population, the early days of democracy were fraught with problems

and power struggles with the military and reactionary sections of the political parties.<sup>273</sup> However, Pujol managed to steadily gain more and more autonomy within Catalonia and at the same time became an influential politician at the level of state. The nationalist discourse of the centre right in Catalonia was not seriously contended by any of the political opposition in Catalonia apart from the *PP* who periodically complained about the possibility of discrimination against Castilian-speaking sections of the population. This meant that the political parties to the left of the Catalan nationalists could do or say very little about Pujol's language policy without appearing to be siding with the right-wing centralist *PP* and the right-wing media that supported their position.

The silencing of the left opposition to Pujol in Catalonia over language policy became even more accentuated after the Socialist government lost its overall majority in 1993 and became dependent upon the Catalan nationalists in order to stay in power. The Socialists in Catalonia could hardly criticise the very political force that was maintaining them in power at the level of State. This effectively meant that Pujol and his party found themselves in a very powerful position of being able to develop their political discourse on nationalism and how that relates to their perception of the Spanish state as being plurinational and plurilingual; but also to relate this to the language that was being spoken in the social institutions of Catalonia. Gradually it became almost anti-democratic to at least not attempt to speak Catalan.

Ideologies come to be ideological common sense to the extent that the discourse types that embody them become naturalised. This depends on the power of the social groupings whose ideologies and whose discourse types are at issue. What comes to be common sense is thus largely determined by who exercises power and domination in a society or social

---

<sup>273</sup> Busquets, J., Aguilar, M., and Puche, I., *El Golpe Anatomía y Claves del Asalto al Congreso*.

institution. However, in the naturalisation of discourse types and the creation of common sense, discourse types actually appear to lose their ideological character. A naturalised type tends to be perceived not as that of a particular grouping within an institution but as simply that of the institution itself. One consequence is that the learning of the dominant discourse type comes to be seen as merely a question of acquiring the necessary skills or techniques to operate in the institution. In the Catalan case, those teachers, parents and students who expressed a desire to learn Catalan for so-called instrumental reasons illustrate this.

What then are we to make of the explanations people give of their own discourse practices? Fairclough argues that explanations should be seen as rationalisations that cannot be taken at face value but are themselves in need of explanation. Rationalisations can be seen as part and parcel of naturalisation: together with the generation of common-sense discourse practices comes the generation of common-sense rationalisations of such practices, which serve to legitimise them. It would seem that the varying success and failure of a given discourse depends on the power of the group or groups that pronounce it and the relative strength of groups that pronounce opposing discourses. Power can be gained from economic, political, or legal factors, or any combination of the three. The Catalan nationalist ideology and its corresponding language policies have to large degree won hegemony over other possible discourses in Catalonia, so far. If this situation is to continue then they must continue to convince the population of Catalonia of both ethnolinguistic groups that indeed they are all benefiting from these policies. It should be noted here that one of the prerequisites for an ethnolinguistic group to adopt a group strategy of assimilation is that it is believed to be possible and beneficial. Whether or not members of the Castilian ethnolinguistic group in the future believe they are receiving their just rewards for participating in Catalan society will influence the direction of strategies to come.

The academic discourse, the media debates and political discourse, and the discourse produced by the people of Catalonia interacting everyday in the schools, communities and workplaces all have worked together to help the return of Catalan as a national and powerful language. Nationalist sentiment can be either beneficial or detrimental, depending on whether there is a racist element. The Catalan nationalism that is most prevalent at present is largely inclusive and promotes an ethos of conviviality, living in peace and working jointly to achieve a more prosperous and fulfilling future. However, this does not mean that there are not dangerous elements of Catalan nationalism which could under certain circumstances produce a conflictive situation along the lines of ethnicity.



### **BIBLIOGRAPHY**

Agheysi, R. and Fishbein, M., 'Language Attitude studies: A brief survey of methodological approaches', Anthropological Linguistics 12 (1970), p. 137-157.

Ajzen, I. and Fishbein, M., Understanding Attitudes and Predicting Social Behaviour, (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1980).

Aracil, L., 'Bilingualism as a Myth', Inter American review 2:4 (1973), p. 521-33.

Badia i Margarit, A., Llengua i cultura als Països Catalans, (Barcelona: Edicions 62, 1964, 1975).

Bastardas, A. and Soler, J. (eds), Sociolingüística i Llengua Catalana, (Barcelona: Empúries, 1988).

Bastardas, A., La bilingüïtzació de la segona generació immigrant, (Barcelona: La Magrana, 1985).

Blommaert, J. and Verschueren, J., Debating Diversity Analysing the discourse of tolerance, (London and New York: Routledge, 1998).

Busquets, J., Aguilar, M., Puche, I., El Golpe. Anatomía y Claves del Asalto al Congreso, (Barcelona: Editorial Ariel, 1981).

Candel, F., Els altres Catalans, (Barcelona: Edicions 62, 1964).

De Martino, E., La Terra del Rimorso, (Milan: Il Saggiatore, 1961).

De Miguel, A., Los intelectuales bonitos, (Barcelona: Planeta, 1980).

*Direcció General de Política Lingüística, 'Sobre la Llei de Normalització Lingüística a Catalunya, Els concepte de doble oficialitat i de llengua pròpia, segons el Dictamen del Consell Consultiu de la Generalitat i un treball de J. M. Salellas', (Barcelona: Departament de Cultura de la Generalitat de Catalunya: 1983).*

Driedger, L. and Church, G., 'Residential segregation and institutional completeness: a comparison of ethnic minorities', Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology, 11, (1974), p. 30–52.

Duranti, A., Linguistic Anthropology, (Cambridge: Cambridge University press, 1995).

Edwards, J., Language, Society and Identity, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1985).

Espriu, S., The Lord of the Shadow, (Oxford: The Dolphin Book, 1975).

Esteve, J., 'Multi-cultural education in Spain: the autonomous communities face the challenge of European unity', Education Review, 44 (1992), p. 255–272.

Esteva Fabrigat, C., Estado, Etnicidad y biculturalismo, (Barcelona: Ediciones Peninsular, 1982), p. 255–272.

Fairclough, N., Language and Power, (London and New York: Longman, 1989).

Ferguson, C., 'Diglossia', Word, Journal of the Linguistic Circle of New York, 15 (1959), p. 325–340.

Fishman, J., 'Bilingualism with and without diglossia; diglossia with and without bilingualism', The Journal of Social Issues, xxi11, 2, (1967).

Fishman J., 'Language and Ethnicity', in Giles, H. (ed.), Language, Ethnicity and Intergroup Relations, (London: Academic Press, 1977).

Fishman, J., Advances in the Sociology of Language, (The Hague: Mouton, 1971).

Foucoult, M., Power-Knowledge, (Bighton: Harvester, 1980).

Fowler, W., (editor), Ideologues and Ideologies in Latin America, (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1997).

Gallagher, T., Autonomy in Spain: lessons for Britain, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991).

Gardy, P. and Lafont, R., '*La diglossie comme conflit: l'exemple occitan*', Languages, 61 (1981).

Giles, H., Language, Ethnicity and Intergroup Relations, (London: Academic Press, 1977).

Giner, S., Social Structure of Catalonia, (Sheffield: Anglo-Catalan Society, 1984).

Gellner, E. Nations and Nationalism, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983).

Gerth, H. and Mills, C., From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1948).

Giddens, A. The Nation-State and Violence, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1985).

Guibernau, M. and Rex, J., 'Nations without states: Catalonia, a case study', The Ethnicity Reader Nationalism, Multiculturalism and Migration, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1997), p. 133–154.

Hervey, S., 'On the penetrability of speech communities', La Linguistique, 27 (1991).

Hobsbawn, E., Nations and Nationalism since 1780, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

Hoffman, C., 'Monolingualism, Bilingualism, Cultural Pluralism and National Identity: Twenty Years of Language Planning in Contemporary Spain', Current Issues in Language and Society, Vol. 2, No. 1, (1995) p. 59–90.

Hooper, J., The New Spaniards, (London: Penguin Books, 1995).

Kolde, G. Sprachkontakte in gemischtsprachigen Städten, (Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1981).

Labov, W., The Social Stratification of English in New York City, (Washington D.C.: Centre for Applied Linguistics, 1966).

Lambert, W. E., 'The social psychology of bilingualism', Journal of Social Issues, 23 (1967), p. 91–109.

Lambert, W., Hodgson, R. and Fillenbaum, S., 'Evaluating reactions to spoken languages', Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 60 (1960), p. 44–51.

Lieberson, S., Language and Ethnic Relations in Canada, (New York: Wiley, 1970).

Llobera, J., 'Catalan National Identity: the dialectics of past and present', in Thomkin, E., McDonald, M. and Chapman, M. (ed.), History and Ethnicity, (London: Routledge, 1989), p. 247-260.

Marcellesi, J. and Gardin, B., Introduction à la sociolinguistique, (Mont Saint-Aignan, IRED, 1987).

Mar-Molinero, C., 'Language Policies in Post-Franco Spain: Conflict of Central Goals and local objectives?', British Studies in Applied Linguistics, 5, Language And Power. (1990), p. 52-64.

Marx, K., The Communist Manifesto, (Harmonsworth, England: Penguin Books Ltd, first published 1888, 1967).

Miller, H. and Miller, K., 'Language Policy and Identity: the case of Catalonia', International Studies in Sociology of Education, 6, 1, (1996), p. 113-128.

Ninyoles, R. L., Consciència lingüística: vells tabús, noves exigències, (Montserrat: Serra d'or, 1969).

Ninyoles, R. L., Idioma y poder social, (Madrid: Tecnos, 1972).

Osgood, C., Suci, G. and Tannenbaum, P., The Measurement of Meaning, (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1957).

Preston, P., The Triumph of Democracy in Spain, (London and New York: Methuen and Co. Ltd., 1986).

Pueyo, M. '*Vikings in pagesos: Una batussa continuada. Assaig per a un estudi de les relacions interdialectals en català*', Treballs de Sociolingüística Catalana, 3 (1980), p. 83-102.

Pujol, J., '*Fer Poble, fer Catalunya*', Contruir Catalunya, (Portic: Barcelona, 1980).

Pujol, J., La personalitat diferenciada de Catalunya, (Generalitat de Catalunya: Barcelona, 1991).

Pujol, J., L'immigració: problema i esperança de Catalunya, (Barcelona: Nova Terra, 1976).

Pujol, J., Quatre conferències: Analitzar el passat per renovar el projecte, (Barcelona: Edicions 62, 1990).

Ronen, D., The Quest for Self-Determination, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979).

Sánchez, Á., Quién es Quién en la democracia española, (Barcelona: Flor del Viento Ediciones 1995).

Saville-Troike, M., The Ethnography of Communication, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1982).



Schlieben-Lange, B., '*Quelques remarques sur les problèmes méthodologiques de la conscience linguistique dans l'histoire*', *Colloque International d'Etudes Occitanes*, (Montpellier, 1984), p. 273–284.

Siguan, M. and Mackey, W. *Educación y bilingüismo*, (Madrid: UNESCO, Santillana/Aula XXI, 1986).

Smith, A., *National Identity*, (London: Penguin, 1991).

Solé, C., '*La immigració a Catalunya*', *Perspectiva Social*, 23 (1986), p. 7–144.

Strubell, M., 'Language, democracy and devolution in Catalonia', in Wright, S., (ed.) *Language Democracy and Devolution*, (Clevedon: Multilingual matters, 1998).

Strubell i Trueta, M., *Llengua i població a Catalunya*, (Barcelona: La Magrana, 1981).

Thomas, J., *Ideology and Modern Culture*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990).

Tilly, C., (ed.) *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975).

Torres, J., Problems of linguistic normalisation in the *Països Catalans*, from the congress of Catalan culture to the present day, *International Journal of the Sociology of Language*, 47, (1984) p. 59–62.

Turull, A., *La Torre Bernadot*, (Barcelona: Edicions 62, 1986).

Turrell, T. M., '*El comportament lingüístic: els grups socials*', in Bastardas, A. and Soler, J. (eds.), *Sociolingüística i Llengua Catalana*, (Barcelona: Empúries, 1988).

Vallverdú, F., '*Hi ha o no hi ha diglòssia a Catalunya? Anàlisi d'un problema conceptual*', *Treballs de Sociolingüística Catalana*, 5 (Valencia, 1983), p. 17-24.

Vallverdú, F., *Treballs de sociolingüística Catalana*, 5, (1983).

Vallverdú, F., *Aproximació crítica a la sociolingüística catalana*, (Barcelona: Ediciones 62, 1980).

Vidal-Folch, X., (ed.) *Los Catalanes y el Poder*, (Madrid: Ediciones El País, S. A./Aguilar, S. A. de Ediciones, 1994).

Wallerstein, I. *The Modern World System 1*, (New York: Academic Press, 1974).

Webber, J. and Strubell i Trueta, M., *The Catalan Language: Progress Towards Normalisation*, (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press Ltd, 1991).

Weber, M., *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (New York: Scribner, 1958).

Weinreich, U., *Languages in Contact*, (The Hague: Mouton, 1976).

Williams, G., *Sociolinguistics A Sociological Critique*, (London and New York: Routledge, 1992).

Woolard, K., edited by Schieffelin, B., Woolard, K. and Kroskrity, P., Language Ideologies Practice and Theory, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).

Woolard, K., Double Talk: Bilingualism and the politics of Ethnicity in Catalonia, p. 121.

### **Newspapers**

Alonso de los Ríos, C., Cambio 16, (1/8/94), 1.184: 32.

Alonso de los Ríos, C., Cambio 16, (1/8/94), 1.184: 33.

Alonso de los Ríos, C., Cambio 16, (26/9/94), 1.192: 30.

Alós, E., 'Castilian on the menu', El Periodico, (6/3/94), p. 24.

Álvarez Suárez, J., 'The Catalan language in schools', El Periodico, (20/2/94), p. 23.

Anguita, J., Cambio 16, (12/8/94), 1.186:34.

Cambio 16, 6/6/94, 1.176: 26.

Cambio 16, 26/6/95, 1.231: 38.

Cambio 16, 26/6/95, 1.231: 36.

Cambio 16, 26/6/95, 1.231: 37.

Cambio 16, 3/7/95, 1.232:24.

Cambio 16, 10/7/95, 1.233: 14.

Cambio 16, 10/7/95, 1.233: 20.

Cambio 16, 24/7/95, 1.235: 29.

Cambio 16, 4/7/95, 1.241: 32.

Cambio 16, 4/7/95, 1.241: 33.

Cambio 16, 25/9/95, 1.244: 22.

Cambio 16, 4/3/96, 1.267: 24.

Cambio 16, 18/3/96, 1.269: 18, 19.

Carbó, I., 'Pujol accentuates the fact that the Catalan language is the key to the Generalitat's policies in Catalonia and in Spain', Avui, (31/1/94), p. 3.

Casal, S., Cambio 16, 26/9/94, 1.192: 32.

Castro, C., La Vanguardia, (15/6/97), p. 14

Company, E., El País, (21/8/95), 639: 12.

Delclós, T., El País, (28/8/95), 640: 12, 13.

Duran i Lleida, J., *Cambio 16*, (28/2/94), 1.162: 30.

*El País*, 'Pujol says that he will not form a coalition with the PSOE', (4/6/93), 525: 1.

*El País*, 'Fear of economic failure stops the nationalist parties *CiU* and *PNV*', (21/6/93), 526: 1.

*El País*, 'Political Manoeuvres', (25/6/93), 527: 12.

*El País*, 'The Basque nationalist party refuses to enter into a coalition government due to lack of guarantees', (12/7/93), 529: 1.

*El País*, (4/10/93), 541: 11.

*El País*, 'The Generalitat confirmed that Catalan will normally be the vehicular language of education in Catalonia', (27/9/93), 540: 16.

*El País*, 3/1/94, p. 22.

*El País*, 23/1/95, 609: 1.

*El País*, 8/5/95, 624: 15.

*El País*, 29/5/95, 627: 11.

*El País*, 5/6/95, 628: 1.

El País, 12/6/95, 629: 1.

El País, 19/6/95, 630: 13

El País, 26/6/95, 631: 1.

El País, 10/7/95, 633: 1.

El País, 24/7/95, 635: 11.

El País, 11/9/95, 642: 1.

El País, 18/9/95, 643:1.

El País, 24/7/95, 635: 12.

Franquesa, J. G., Cambio 16, (1/1/96), 1.258: 22.

Gafarot, X., Barcelona, Cambio 16, (4/9/95), 1.241: 30.

Gafarot, X., Barcelona, Cambio 16, (4/9/95), 1.241: 30.

Garfot, X., Barcelona, Cambio 16, (4/7/95), 1.241: 30.

Garfarot, X. and Fernandez, J. M., Cambio 16, (25/9/95), 1.244: 26.

Garfarot, X. and Fernandez, J. M., Cambio 16, (25/9/95), 1.244: 27.



Gomez, J., 'Language in the dock', Cambio 16 (28/2/94), 1.162: 27.

Gomez, J., 'Pujol says that Catalan is a cornerstone of the Generalitat's policies', Cambio 16, (28/2/94), 1.162: 26.

Gómez, J., 'United for the moment', Cambio 16, (16/5/94), 1.173: 20.

Gomez, J., Cambio 16, (6/6/94), 1.176: 27.

Gomez, J., Cambio 16, (27/6/94), 1.179: 25.

Horcajo, X., Cambio 16, (27/3/95), 1.218: 36.

Horcajo, X., Cambio 16, (26/6/95), 1.231: 32.

Horcajo, X., Cambio 16, (10/7/95), 1.233: 20).

Oppenheimer, W., 'Euskadi demands its own foreign policy, Jordi Pujol asks that the autonomous regions have powers to represent the State', El País, (20/12/93), 552: 13.

Orozco, R., Cambio 16, (12/6/95), 1.229: 5.

Paster, C., El País, (27/3/95), 618: 15.

Pastor, C., El País, (10/7/95), 633: 12, 13.

Peirón, F. and Marchena, D., 'The Public Prosecutor believes that the Catalan Normalisation Law is constitutional', La Vanguardia, (11/2/94), p. 10.

Perez, J., Cambio 16, (26/6/95), 1.231: 40.

Pérez, J., Cambio 16, (26/6/95), 1.231: 41.

Perez, J., Cambio 16, (3/7/95), 1.232: 18.

Peréz, J. and Ramírez, F., Cambio 16, (5/2/96), 1.263: 20.

Perez, J. and Plaza, C., Cambio 16, (18/3/96), 1.269: 18, 19.

Riding, A., 'Catalonians Open A War of Words in Schools, No More Spanish', Herald Tribune, (24/11/93).

Sabriá, S., 'The Catalan Government gives a new push to the normalisation of Catalan', El Periódico, (18/2/94), p. 3.

Sabriá, S., 'Central points of the plan', El Periódico, (18/2/94), p. 3.

Santos, C., 'I'll get out the way', Cambio 16, (16/5/94), 1.173: 19.

Santos, C. and Gomez, J., Cambio 16, (21/2/94), 1.161: 26.

Santos, C., Cambio 16, (20/6/94), 1.178: 17.

Santos, C., *Cambio 16*, (27/6/94), 1.179: 16.

Soriano, M., *Cambio 16*, (8/1/96), 1.259: 26.

Tobarra, S., 'The M.P. Saavedra promises Jordi Pujol that there will be changes in policies concerning the autonomous regions', *El País*, (30/8/93), 536: 9.

**APPENDIX****Original questionnaire for the planned collection of data from teachers:**

1. What is your full name?
2. Are you Catalan?
3. How old are you?
4. Which school do you teach at?
5. What subject do you teach?
6. How has the use of Catalan and Castilian changed since you started teaching?
7. How has the use of Catalan and Castilian changed since you were at school?
8. Are you happy with the changes you have noted in the use of Catalan and Castilian?  
Please specify.
9. What is the ratio of Castilian speaking students to Catalan speaking students in your classes?
10. Which language(s) do you use as a vehicular language in the classroom?

11. Which language(s) do your students use in the classroom?
12. Do you object to students using a different language to the vehicular language of the classroom?
13. Do you believe that the Catalan normalization law is in any way discriminatory towards Castilian speaking students or teachers? If yes please specify.
14. Would you like to see any changes with regard to the present situation of Catalan language normalization? If so please specify.

1. ¿Cuál es su nombre completo?
2. ¿Es usted Catalán?
3. ¿Cuántos años tiene ud?
4. ¿En qué escuela da ud. clases?
5. ¿Qué asignatura enseña ud?
6. ¿De qué manera ha cambiado el uso del catalán y del castellano desde que ud. comenzó a enseñar?

7. ¿De qué manera ha cambiado el uso del catalán y del castellano desde que ud. fue al colegio?
8. Es ud. feliz con los cambios que ud. ha observado en el uso del catalán y del castellano? Especifique por favor.
9. Qué proporción de castellanoparlantes con respecto a catalanoparlantes tiene en sus clases?
10. ¿Qué language(s) usa ud. para impartir sus clases?
11. ¿Qué language(s) usan sus estudiantes en el aula?
12. ¿Se opone ud. a que sus estudiantes usen un language diferente al impartido en el aula?
13. ¿Cree ud que la ley de normalización de la lengua catalana es de algún modo discriminatoria hacia estudiantes y profesores castellanoparlantes? Si afirmativo especifique por favor.
14. ¿Le gustaría ver algunos cambios con respecto a la situación presente de la ley de normalización lingüística de Cataluña? Si afirmativo especifique por favor.



1. Quin es el seu nom complet?
2. Es vostè Català?
3. Quina edat té vostè?
4. A quina escola ensenya?
5. Quina assignatura ensenya?
6. De quina manera ha canviat l'ús del català i del castellà desde que ha començat a ensenyar?
7. De quina manera ha canviat l'ús del català i del castellà desde que ha començat a l'escola?
8. Li agradan els canvis que ha notat amb l'ús del català i del castellà? Per a favor especifiqui.
9. Quina es la proporció de castellaparlants amb respecte dels catalaparlants a las sevas classes?
10. Quina llengua utilitza per a impartir las sevas classes?
11. Quina llengua utilitzen els seus alumnes a las sevas classes?

12. Te vostè objeccions si els seus alumnes utilitzen un altre llengua que no sigui la impartida a les seves classes?
13. Creu vostè que la llei de normalització lingüística de Catalunya pot a ser discriminatoria pel que fa estudiants o mestres castellanol parlants?
14. Li agradaria que hi hagués canvis amb la present situació de la llei de normalització lingüística de Catalunya? Si afirmatiu especifiqui.